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It probably needs to be pointed out that the
following discussion of cosmology is a
"philosophical" discussion and not one from the
standpoint of empirical science. All too often the
philosophical approach to the study of nature, in
this case inanimate or lifeless being, is confused
with the empirical scientific study of nature.
While the two are related, they are not the same.
And please pay attention to the definitions of the
terms.
The
Philosophy of Nature
A
brief introduction to cosmology
Adapted from various sources and edited
by Jonathan Dolhenty, Ph.D.
Part One: The
Nature of the Bodily World
INTRODUCTION
The term cosmology is derived from the
classical Greek words cosmos and
logos. Cosmos means order or good
arrangement. Logy is from the Greek word
logos which signifies word, or mental
expression in the act of knowing. In a special
sense it means reasoned knowledge and has come to
mean science or the knowledge of things through
their causes. So the word cosmology signifies the
science of the universe, in this case the
philosophical study of the bodily universe or that
part of the universe which is lifeless. We can
formally define cosmology as
the philosophical science
which considers the first principles and causes of
material real being in general.
BODIES
A body, for our purposes here, is a
material substance which normally has extension in
space by the three dimensions of length, width, and
thickness. We accept at the outset the actual
existence of the bodily world in which we live. All
persons of common sense do. Within this bodily
world we experience, we find a vast complexity of
natural bodies, such as rocks, the moon, and
atoms, and artificial bodies, that is, those
bodies made through the inventive activity of human
beings. Our study here is concerned only with
natural bodies, physical bodies as they exist or
can exist in the material world, and not with
artificial bodies.
There are four important characteristics that
are intimately tied to the bodily world and the
bodies that make it up:
- Composition;
- Changeability;
- Contingency;
- Limitation.
Let's consider each of these characteristics in
turn.
Composition
All bodies are compounded or composed. This
means that large bodies are made of smaller bodies,
and as we know now from empirical science, their
ultimate physical division is a matter of molecules
and atoms and subatomic parts and maybe more. It
needs to be noted, however, that this splitting of
bodies into smaller and smaller parts cannot
go on forever, it is not an endless process, it
cannot run on to infinity. There is an ultimate
basis for material reality, there is a point where
we reach another sort of composition called
primal matter and substantial form,
both of which will be explained later. The main
point here is that bodies are necessarily
composed.
Composition is a necessary
property of bodies.
Changeability
Anything put together can be conceivably taken
apart. Anything composed can be decomposed. In a
word, anything compounded or composed is subject to
change. Now, as we have seen, bodies are
compounded or composed; hence they are subject to
change. Changeability is a property of bodies.
Change is called substantial when one
substance ceases to be and another emerges.
Substantial change is an instantaneous
thing, which, looked at in one way, is the
ceasing of one substance, and, regarded in
another way, is the emergence of a new
substance. The ceasing of a substance is called
corruption; the simultaneous emergence of a
new substance is called generation. The
generation of one substance is the
corruption of another or others, and vice versa. An
example of substantial change is found in the
process of nutrition by which lifeless food becomes
living flesh.
Change is called accidental when a
substance, remaining itself, undergoes a shift in
accidentals, as when water which is cold becomes
hot. The most notable types of accidental change
are change of quantity and change of
quality. Change of quantity is either
increase or diminution, as, for
example, the change in the weight of a child from
seventy to eighty pounds, or the change made in the
contents of the sugar-bowl by taking out a spoonful
for your coffee. Change of quality, called
alteration, is a change in almost any
accident other than quantity; such, for instance,
is the change from hot to cold, from young to old,
from ignorant to learned. A change from "fat to
thin" is at once a change of quantity and in
quality. Our chief concern
at this moment is to stress the truth that bodies
are properly subject to change.
Contingency
A being which is so perfect that existence is of
its very essence is called a necessary
being; it is a thing that must exist and
cannot be nonexistent. A non-necessary being is
called contingent. The word "contingent"
means "dependent," for a contingent thing depends
on its causes to produce it and maintain it; it has
in itself no absolute requirement for
existing. A contingent being can exist, but
it does not have to exist, and it would
not exist if definite causes, which are prior
to it, did not operate to give it existence.
It is manifest that bodies are contingent. For
we see them emerge, and we see them disappear. Each
birth and death, each spring and autumn, each dawn
and dusk, is a plain proof of the
contingency of bodies. For a thing which can
change has no necessity in its being.
And what has no necessity in its being is
contingent. Now, we have
seen that bodies are changeable; it follows that
they are contingent.
Limitation
A thing which is absolutely unlimited is called
infinite. It is such a being as cannot be
increased or decreased in any way; for an increase
supposes a point or line or limit where the
addition takes effect, and decrease is always a
shrinking in or of lines. Now, it is manifest that
bodies are capable of increase and diminishment,
whether literally in point of quantity or
analogously in point of quality. Hence, bodies are
not infinite, but finite or limited.
Bodies, too, are capable of undergoing
substantial change, and substantial change
(generation-corruption) is a process of loss and
gain which, like increase and diminishment, is
incompatible with infinity. Therefore, we conclude
that bodies as such are limited.
Limitation is a property
of bodies.
To sum up: a body is a material substance,
normally extended by three dimensions, and marked
by composition, changeability, contingency, and
limitation.
QUANTITY
Quantity is that property of bodily
substance which extends it, spreads out its
parts; first, with reference to the bodily
substance itself; second, with reference to the
place that the bodily substance normally
occupies.
Quantity therefore is extension. And, as the
definition indicates, there are two types of
extension.
- The first and essential type is internal
extension.
- A normal effect of internal extension is
external or local extension.
A body must be extended in itself before
it can be extended in space, that is before it can
have place. And it is conceivable that a
body should have the essential type of extension
(that is, internal extension) without actually
occupying space or being localized within external
dimensions. We have no example of such a thing in
the natural bodily world, but it is not
inconceivable.
Internal extension is a property of bodies, that
is, it is a characteristic which belongs by natural
necessity to bodies. External Extension is a
secondary effect of quantity (or of internal
extension).
A body is not to be identified with its
extension any more than a man is to be identified
with his size. Just as the man has size, the
body has extension; it is not true that the
man is his size, nor is it true that a body
is its extension. A body is a substance;
quantity or extension is an accident, albeit a
proper accident or property. A bodily
substance is in itself independent of extension or
quantity, although extension is a required
condition for the normal existence of bodily
substance in this material world.
The effects of quantity in an existing natural
body are these:
- The external extension and localization of
the body;
- The impenetrability of the body which
renders naturally impossible the compenetration
of bodies;
- Divisibility of the body into an indefinite
number of parts; and
- Measurability of the body, which renders it
expressible in units of dimension or numberings
of parts.
Quantity when unbroken is called continuous
quantity, and a body of unbroken quantity is
called a continuum, whether this be
perfect or imperfect, that is,
whether the continuum has absolute continuity
without pores or interstices, or has, in fact, such
"holes" which it surrounds as water surrounds
islands.
Quantity that is broken up in pieces (like a
pound of sugar, or a heap of bits of broken glass)
is called discrete quantity. Each item of a
discrete quantity is a continuum. A discrete
quantity is called contiguous if its parts
or items touch one another (as in a spoonful of
salt); it is called separate if the parts do
not touch (as in a dozen eggs spread widely on a
table).
The basis of quantity in bodies is perfectly
continuous matter, at least in its basic
physical parts; and perfectly continuous matter can
only exist in virtue of a unifying form or
principle which determines the matter as an
existing reality of an essential kind. Our bodily
world is a great contiguous quantity (or
contiguum) which is made of substances that
are, in their essential existing elements, true
continua.
The extension of the whole bodily universe --
that is, its natural external extension -- fills up
what we think of as a kind of capacity or
container, the name of which is
real space. The
position of each body in space is called its
place. Our
mental image of space as a container of bodies is a
mental image and no more; it is an ens
rationis; it is logical being, not real
being. For space is only thought of as a
container. As a fact,
space is the actual
extension of existing bodies in the
universe.
In passing, it is to be noted that philosophy
has no quarrel with science on the question of
space or that of place. But some scientists,
misunderstanding their own field, propound
philosophies of space which are in conflict with
sound reason. But with physics or mathematics as
such, philosophy cannot come into contact or
conflict. Albert Einstein's theory of relativity of
space or the curvedness of space does not concern
us. This is not properly a theory of space but of
distance and measurement, that is, of
partial space and its interpretation in terms of
numbering.
Since real space is the actual extension of
existing bodies, and since bodies are limited, as
we have learned, it follows that real space is
limited. The universe may be expanding, it may be
contracting, it may be doing neither. But whatever
it is doing, at any given instant, it has its
definite limits. The fact that man has no
instruments to enable him to tell just where these
limits lie, does not change the basic fact that the
limits are there. Real space is finite.
In addition to real space we may mention
ideal space (or the idea of space)
which is the mind's concept of all possible space.
So also we may mention imaginary space which
is the envisioning by fancy or imagination of the
visible reaches of space stretching on and on into
the void. Ideal and imaginary space are indefinite;
real space is definitely limited.
Bodies with quantity are subject to change.
Change is movement or motion, for
change is a transit, a
going-over, a movement from one state of being to
another. Now, movement or motion is a
matter of now this -- then that; it is a
matter of before and after. And motion or
change, under the aspect of before-and-after, is
the basis of real time. Time in itself is
described as a continuous and numerable series
of motions under the aspect of
before-and-after.
Man conceives of time as a measure, just
as he conceives of space as a container. But
just as space in its reality is the real extension
of bodies, so time in its reality is the continuous
numberable succession of bodily movements. Time
as a measure is logical being, not real
being. It serves man's uses to note some regular
and reliable movement (of sun, of stars, of moon)
and to use this as a standard of comparison with
other and less regular motions.
Thus we have solar time, sidereal time, lunar
time. And man's inventiveness -- which is to say,
his mind or intellect at grips with material
problems -- has enabled him to devise mechanical
instruments with regular movements that can be
recorded, and to indicate these recordings as
intervals of solar time, sidereal time, or lunar
time. Thus we have chronometers, watches,
clocks.
Besides real time, we have ideal time
which is the mind's concept of all possible
numerable and continuous movement; and we have
imaginary time which is the fanciful
envisioning of real time indefinitely extended.
Real time is necessarily finite, for it is
finite motion in a finite world of finite bodies.
Ideal time and imaginary time are indefinite
or potentially infinite, but never actually
infinite. Thoughtless people sometimes confuse
ideal or imaginary time with eternity. But
eternity is, strictly speaking, the opposite of
time. It is an endless now; it has nothing
of before and after which is of the essence
of time. Eternity in its strict meaning belongs
only to the Infinite Being, to God.
ACTIVITY OF
BODIES
Activity is a doing, an operating, or at
least a cooperating, a responding. All bodily
substances are active if it were only in
holding their parts together by cohesion, or in
responding to the thing called gravitation, which
is really the effect of the activity of body on
body.
Bodily activity is immanent or
vital when its chief effect is in the
agent, that is, in the thing which is
active. Growing, for example, is first of all in
the growing body. A tree's growth has an outer
effect; the tree casts a larger shade as it grows
taller and fuller; it may so grow as to block the
view from a window; but the main effect of
growing is in the growing tree. Such activity is
therefore called immanent, that is,
indwelling.
Non-immanent activity is called
transient, that is, passing over and
having its effect outside the agent. The activity
of the growing tree in blocking the window, or in
throwing the shadow, is transient. Growth is
immanent; these outer and alien consequences
of growth are transient.
Truly immanent activity is
always "life-activity" or, as it is usually called,
"vital" activity.
Transient activity is called mechanical
when it consists of local movement. Such is
the activity of the rolling stone, the turning
wheel, the expanding balloon, the rising steam, the
drive of the tennis-racquet against the ball.
Transient activity is called physical when
it consists of change or motion in quality. Such is
the activity of a light which continuously sends
out its rays, the activity of a sounding body, the
activity of an electrical charge. It will be
noticed that physical activity is normally
accompanied by mechanical activity, for some
local movement is to be discerned in every
qualitative change or movement; but physical
activity as such doe not consist of these
local movements. The man who says that heat is
movement (meaning local or mechanical movement) is
not thinking clearly or thinking well; he should
say that head is produced by mechanical
movement and is accompanied by mechanical
movement; he has no right to assert that heat
is mechanical movement.
Transient activity is called chemical
when it affects a body in its substantial being,
and usually changes it into another substance or
other substances. Such is the activity which
resolves water into hydrogen and oxygen. Chemical
activity is usually accompanied by both mechanical
and physical activity.
Bodily activity is something which the bodily
substance does; it is not what the bodily
substance is. Each body is equipped by its
nature with certain powers for activity. No body is
immediately active, but it is active
mediately, that is through the medium or
real powers which it possesses. These powers, in
themselves, are accidentals of the bodily
substance; they are among its qualities.
A false cosmology called mechanistic
materialism teaches that the world consists of
matter and motion. But this theory is so much a
simplification that it is a falsification.
- It does not explain the origin of motion
which is never self-generating;
- It does not explain the transference of
motion;
- It does not explain the conserving of
motion.
Another false cosmology called
energeticism explains the bodily world as a
complexity of kinetic and potential energies which
act according to the laws of conservation,
intensity, and entropy. Now these "laws" may be at
work in the world but they do not explain the
world. Energy requires a source, a sustaining
power, a transferring power. To speak of energies,
and waves of power, and electrical charges, and so
on, without reference to actual substantial bodies
exercising such powers by true bodily activity, is
like speaking of the tides while denying the
existence of the ocean. The truth is that bodily
activity exists as the product of bodily substance
equipped with powers for exercising such
activity.
CONSTITUTION OF
BODIES
The question here raised is that of the
ultimate constitution of bodily substance.
We seek to know what makes a body a body,
and what makes any body an existing reality of the
essential or specific kind that it actually is.
Thus our investigation probes far more deeply into
reality than that of the physicist and the chemist
who wish to know the proximate constitution
of the bodies they handle in their laboratories.
Ours is a philosophical inquiry; theirs is
an experimental investigation. The physicist
who explains to us that a body is made up of atoms
and atomic parts, leaves us, philosophically
speaking, exactly where we were before he
explained. For the smallest atomic part is a
body. And our inquiry is, "What makes a body a
body?" To tell us that a
body is made of smaller bodies is to tell us
precisely nothing; our inquiry is about the
smallest body as well as about the
largest.
The theories about the constitution of bodies
may be reduced to four:
- Monism;
- Atomism;
- Dynamism;
- Hylomorphism.
Monism
The term "monism" is derived from the Greek
monos which means "alone" or "single," and
refers to the theory that
this bodily world is all
one kind of reality; that there are no substantial
or essential differences among
bodies.
Monism is of two types:
- Materialistic monism: makes the world
a vast lump of homogeneous matter of which all
bodies -- lifeless, living, plants, animals,
men, earth, air, stars, -- are different
shapings, like differently shaped biscuits from
one pan of dough.
- Idealistic monism: denies the reality
of bodily substances as our senses present them
to knowledge, and makes them various
"appearances" or "expressions" of thought, of
will, of "the unconscious," of "the Absolute,"
of "the Unknowable."
Both types of monism are pantheistic, for if
only one reality exists, this must be self-existent
reality, and self-existent reality is Infinite
Being or God.
Monism is inept and inadmissible. It is inept
inasmuch as it offers itself as a philosophy of
bodies and then refuses to explain bodies. For it
is no explanation of the essence of bodies to say
that there is only one body, or that bodies are
only apparent.
Monism is inadmissible because it involves
self-contradiction and thus conflicts with reason,
and because it disagrees with normal sense
experience which is the basis of all certitude.
Both types of monism involve self-contradiction.
Materialistic monism makes bodily substance
self-existent and hence infinite, whereas bodily
substance is necessarily limited; thus monism
preaches "a finite infinity" or "an infinite
finiteness." Idealistic monism says there are no
bodies, and then tries to explain them as bodily
expressions of something else. Both types of monism
are manifestly in conflict with normal sense
experience that we are living in an actual universe
of different bodies.
Atomism
We mean here the atomist philosophy. It
does not mean the atomic theory which is
generally accepted among empirical scientists. With
the atomic theory we have no concern and certainly
no quarrel. The case is otherwise with the atomist
philosophy. The atomic theory is like an
explanation of a log as a thing made up of grains
of wood, a perfectly sound doctrine as far as it
goes. The atomist philosophy is like an explanation
of a log in terms of its grains alone, denying all
reference to a tree; and this is an utterly unsound
theory.
Atomist philosophy has two notable forms:
- Mechanistic atomism: says that the
bodily world is made up of minimum-particles (or
atoms) of homogeneous matter, which have
different shapes and sizes, and are kept in
motion by some outside force.
- Dynamistic atomism: says that the
minimum-particles of homogeneous matter are
endowed with their own power of motion.
Both forms of atomism explain bodies as the
clusterings of differently shaped, differently
sized, and variously moved atoms. There is,
therefore, no real difference among bodies, and no
individual body is truly a substantial unity. Most
atomists hold that the atom-clusters called bodies
are the result of chance meeting of these
minimum-particles of matter.
We reject the atomist theory as inadequate. It
proposes itself as a philosophy of bodies, and ends
precisely where it starts -- with bodies. To say
that bodies are clusters of smaller bodies is still
to leave bodies unexplained. Further, the atomist
theory unwarrantedly rejects the notion of true
substantial unity, and therewith it upsets the
possibility of achieving certitude. For, if we
cannot trust our knowledge of the substantial
character of individual bodies, we cannot trust our
knowledge at all, and must lapse into the insane
position of the skeptic. Finally, atomism is
unacceptable because it ignorantly proposes chance
as a cause. Chance is never a cause. Chance
is a circumstance which belongs to an unpredictable
effect.
Dynamism
The term "dynamism" is derived from the Greek
dynamis which means "force" or "power," and
refers to the theory that what we call substantial
bodies are collections of points of force
which have no extension (that is, no quantity), and
which attract one another up to a certain distance
and then hold one another off. Thus, though
unextended, they constitute extended matter by
marking, so to speak, extended intervals. The
power-points are changeless; hence, there is no
such thing as substantial change in the world, or
even substantial difference of bodies.
It will be noticed that dynamism, like atomism,
is radically monistic. All three of the doctrines
so far considered have this in common; they reduce
the world to a single thing which is either a mass
of homogeneous particles, or a series of
expressions of a single non-bodily substance, or a
complexity of indestructible power-points which are
all of the same nature.
We reject dynamism as self-contradictory and
inadequate. If dynamism recognizes the actual
extension of bodies, it does so by the
self-contradictory process of adding a series of
zeros and reaching a positive sum. For unextended
power-point plus unextended power-point results in
inextension, not actual extension. Even if the
points are separated by intervals of distance,
there is pure vacancy between and among them, and
the result of their addition must still be zero.
Thus the form of dynamism which affirms the actual
extension of bodies also denies the actual
extension of bodies.
If we consider the form of dynamism which
frankly denies the actuality of bodies and makes
the universe a dream-world of mere appearances, we
find that the theory cannot explain the appearances
or interpret the dream. For unextended power-points
in motion are invisible and cannot create the
illusion of a visible world. Indeed, no illusion of
a solid universe could be excited in a mind which
had no experience of real solidity to begin
with.
Dynamism cannot explain what we call solidity,
it cannot explain substance, it cannot explain the
organic unity of a living body. It invokes the
activity of power-points across a void, a thing
which philosophy finds, at best, a very dubious
possibility, and which science has never discovered
in any experiment.
The electrical theory of matter and even the
electrical theory of life are dynamistic. While
that extremely mysterious thing called electricity
is everywhere at work in the world, it is a thing
which affects bodies but does not wholly constitute
bodies. Too many inadequate scientists like to talk
in abstract terms of what is really concrete; they
say that protons and electrons are "charges" of
electricity (that is, "points of power"). What they
mean, of course, is that protons and electrons are
particles of bodily substance charged with
electricity.
To Part Two: The
Theory of Hylomorphism
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