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(Note: The following is a presentation of the
classical Thomistic doctrine of philosophical
theology for those who are unacquainted with it.
Knowledge of the classical doctrine itself is
valuable for any student of philosophy. This branch
of philosophy is called Natural Theology or
Theodicy and discovers the First Efficient Cause
and the Last Final Cause of all things. This study
is a purely philosophical one, and draws no
arguments from revelation (although it makes
reference to Christian revelation at certain
points); it is a truly metaphysical study, for it
is a reasoned treatise on nonmaterial real Being,
from a traditional Christian perspective. Some of
this treatise is highly technical and an
acquaintance with Classical Thomistic ontology is
highly recommended before approaching this
subject.)
The
Philosophy of God
A
brief introduction to theodicy
Adapted from various sources and edited
by Jonathan Dolhenty, Ph.D.
Part 3: The
Activity of God
A.
Operations of God
By an operation we mean an activity
performed; we mean the product of a power for
acting or doing. Now, infinite power is an
attribute of God. But, as we have learned, this
attribute is not something that God has; it
is something that God is. God is
Infinite Power. In creatures, an operation is the
product of a power which is not the active or
operating creature itself, but something distinct
from the creature which the creature
possesses. A creature cannot act or operate
immediately; it must act or operate through
the medium or by the means of a power
to act; it operates mediately. But with God
this not so. Hence, when we speak of the operations
of God, or of the divine operations, we speak of
God Himself exercising Godhead.
An operation is either immanent or
transient.
- An immanent or "indwelling" operation
stays in its main effect within the being which
operates; we call this being the agent,
from the Latin agens "the actor,
the doer, the performer, the accomplisher."
- A transient operation (from the Latin
transiens "going across") goes
across, so to speak, from the agent and finds
its main effect in something outside the
agent.
The operation or activity of growing is
an immanent operation in a child. The tearing of a
garment by growing is a transient activity or
operation of the growing child. The operation of
thinking is immanent; the operation of bat against
ball is transient.
Now, since God is the author of all positive
being or perfection, there is nothing outside God
for Him to work upon except such things as His
power has placed there, and which His power keeps
in existence. And so there is no positive being, no
actual creature, which is utterly independent of
God, and which exists as a wholly alien thing for
Him to exercise transient operations or activities
upon. Besides, a transient activity always involves
(in creatures, where transient activity in its
perfection is possible, and where alone it
is possible) a kind of "kickback," an effect on the
agent itself. If the bat hits the ball, the bat
itself receives an impact; the bat itself is
affected. But this connatural property of transient
activity or operation is not found in God's
operations. And thus we perceive that the phrase
transient operation or transient
activity is not strictly and literally
predicable of any of God's operations. But we use
such language as we possess; it is imperfect
language, but it is the best we have. And so we
call by the name of transient divine
activity the operations of God which affect
creatures.
The immanent operations of God are those that
are "indwelling" in God, and indeed are
identified with the every essence of God in
His Undivided Infinite Self-Subsistent Being.
B.
Immanent Divine Operations
The immanent operations of God are the
operations of God as Intellect and of God as
Will.
1. God as
Intellect
God as Intellect is God the Omniscient, God the
All-knowing. Since God is infinite, there is no
limitation to God's knowledge; it exhausts the
knowability of everything. It is truly
comprehensive knowledge which takes in not
only what things are or have been or
will be or can be, but all that,
under other and non-existing circumstances, they
could be.
God's knowledge is knowledge of all things in
all their actual and possible relations. This must
be so, as reason sees, otherwise God's knowledge
would be limited; and God (who is His
knowledge) is infinite. God's knowledge is not the
product of learning. It is not conserved in
memory or anticipated in expectation.
For God has no past and no future; He knows all
knowables (in all actual and possible relations)
now, in an eternal now; for God's
knowledge is His eternal Self. God's
knowledge does not operate to the prejudice of his
free creatures, such as man. For God's knowledge
regarded as the operation of knowing, is
immanent. It is the will of God that
provides and governs and gives free creatures every
possible help to their happiness.
God's knowledge (which is God as Intellect)
embraces all things perfectly. God knows Himself,
which is only saying that He is Himself. God
knows all creatures in Himself. We human beings
learn, we come to know; we apprehend
what things are in themselves after the
things are there. But God knows all knowables
eternally. In our language, God knows things
perfectly before they are there. If He did
not know them, they could not be planned and
created and put there. Their very
possibility rests upon God's knowledge. Thus
God knows all things in Himself, not in
themselves, as we know things. We know things
by taking in their mental image or species, as it
is called.
But God Himself is the adequate species
of all existible creatures. No image or species is
impressed on God, or expressed in God, for such
impression and expression is necessarily limited,
and God's knowledge is His Infinite Essence and
unlimited. But we say, technically (if
inaccurately), that in God are the "archetypes," --
that is, the first molds, the primal designs, -- of
all things knowable and creatable. Sometimes we
call these "archetypal ideas" or "archetypal
images" or "archetypal species." The primary object
of God's knowledge is Himself; the secondary object
of God's knowledge is all knowable creatures, and
these He knows eternally in Himself.
Philosophers (and theologians) make a
distinction (not real, but logical with a basis in
reality) in the knowledge of God, and speak of
God's Simple Understanding and God's
Vision. By the Knowledge of Simple
Understanding, God knows all thing possible.
By the Knowledge of Vision, God has present
knowledge of all things actual, whether, in our
view, these are past, present, or to come. Some
learned men make a further distinction and say that
there is a type of knowledge which lies midway
between these two types; they call it
Scientia Media or Middle Knowledge,
and they assign to this type of divine knowledge
the things, not merely and sheerly possible, and
not truly actual, but such things as a creature
would certainly do if certain circumstances and
conditions were verified, but which are not, in
fact, going to be verified.
Thus God knows perfectly what I would do if I
went out into the street tomorrow and found a
thousand-dollar bill. But, as a fact, I am not
going to find any such bill. What I would do
is not sheerly possible, but something that
would be actual if conditions were met (and
they are not going to be met); nor is it truly
actual but only what would be actual in
the unrealized circumstances. Such a thing is
knowable, and God knows it. But in the human
scheme of distinguishing God's knowledge into a
sort of set of two compartments (Simple
Understanding or Simple Intelligence and Vision)
such a thing does not seem to fit; we make a third
compartment called Scientia Media for
this thing to fit into.
Now, these things that are not going to happen,
but would certainly happen, if conditions
(which are not going to be realized) were in fact
realized, are called futuribilia. So
we may sum up this matter and say that philosophers
and theologians distinguish in God:
- Knowledge of Simple Understanding or
Knowledge of Simple Intelligence, by
which God knows all things possible;
- Knowledge of Vision, by which God
knows all things actual; and
- Some philosophers add what others call
unnecessary, the third distinction called
Scientia Media or Middle
Knowledge, by which God knows
futuribilia.
2. God as
Will
God as Will is God the Almighty; it is God as
Infinite Love. For love is the proper act of will.
God loves Himself infinitely, which is only saying
that God is Himself. We must not impose upon
God our creatural thoughts or expressions, and
think of self-love in God as we think of it in
creatures. For will is a thing which a free
creature has, not what he is.
Besides, "self-love" in a creature is really not
love of self; it is "selfishness" and does harm to
the creature afflicted by it; true love of self
would not do harm but good to the self. So we must
be on our guard, lest mistaken human expressions
should make us attribute something unworthy to
God.
In God love of Self is the highest perfection;
it is Infinite Godhead. And God loves all
creatures, for they are the product of His will,
that is, of His Almighty Love. The primary object
of God's will is Himself; the secondary object of
God's will is creatures. Creatures are the object
of God's will or love in proportion to their
actuality or perfection or being. Hence, men, among
the most perfect of creatures, are peculiarly the
object of God's will or love.
Philosophers and theologians distinguish in God
an antecedent and a consequent will.
God's will is called antecedent when it
wills simply; it is called consequent when
it wills in view of special conditions and
circumstances, especially those that come from the
freewill of a creature. Thus, from the orthodox
Christian perspective, antecedently God wills all
men to be saved. But men are free, and can abuse
their freedom, and so can be lost. Consequently
upon their choice, God wills their punishment if
they choose to be lost. This is not a philosophical
finding, but one whose source is Christian
revelation.
God wills or loves all things. But evil
is not a thing. Thing or being
means actuality, and actuality means
perfection. Evil is the absence of
perfection. Thus God does not will evil.
From the Christian perspective, physical
evils -- like hunger, sickness, hardships, a bad
climate, etc. -- may be really good inasmuch as
they help a man to virtue, such as patience,
penance, hope of eternal life, striving towards
heaven. Inasmuch as these are good, God is said to
will physical evils accidentally and not per se or
in themselves. Thus a loving father whose son has
been extravagant may profitably allow the young man
to suffer inconvenience and threat of arrest, or
even arrest itself, as a lesson that will be of
inestimable profit to him in time to come. The
father does not will the suffering of the son in
itself or per se; he wills it accidentally or
per accidens inasmuch as it comes along with
the good he wishes his son to take from a tight
situation.
Or, to use another analogy, a man who must
undergo a painful, dangerous, and expensive
operation if he is to recover health, wills the
pain, the danger, the expense -- all types of
deprivation, absence, evil -- accidentally and not
in themselves; for he wills his recovery of health,
and these things "go along." Se we say, God does
not will physical evils per se, but only per
accidens inasmuch as they are the means to good
for His children. But God does not will moral evil
or sin either per se or per accidens, for
sin is a contradiction of God and God does not will
-- that is, God is not -- a contradiction in
Himself. Sin is man's own doing; it is an abuse of
freewill; and, like all evils, moral evil or sin is
not a thing, but the absence of a thing; it is the
absence -- that is, the failure -- of agreement
between man's conduct and the rule of what it ought
to be. Sin is a failure to measure up. It is a
defection from the true moral rule, which is God as
Infinite Understanding and Will.
c.
Transient Divine Operations
As we have warned the reader above, there are no
literal or strictly-so-called
transient operations of God. But we call
transient the divine operations which reach out, so
to speak, to God's creatures.
1. The first of these
operations is creation.
There is, as we have seen, no ultimate
explanation of the world of creatures except an
absolute beginning, an emerging out of
nothing under the power and activity of the
First Cause. Creation is therefore a fact. And, as
we have also seen, only truly infinite power (which
is God) can account for such an emergence. For
creation is the producing of a thing in its
entirety out of nothing. Creation is an
operation so proper to Infinite Power that a
creature cannot serve even as an instrumental
cause. For an instrumental cause is a cause
employed upon something which is there to
work upon; and in the case of creating there
is nothing to work upon.
2. The second of the
divine transient operations is conservation or
preservation of creatures.
Not only does a creature fail to explain its
coming into existence, it fails to account
for its continuing in existence. Contingent
things (and all creatures are contingent) depend
utterly upon causes to produce them and to
maintain them. Hence, in last analysis, the
creating power (without which the world is wholly
impossible) must be extended to be also the
preserving or conserving power.
Now, preserving a thing may be direct or
indirect. A man who catches a delicate base
as it is about to fall, directly preserves
it. If he then locks it up in a case where nothing
can come near to break it, he indirectly
preserves it, and he may go off about his business
and forget the vase entirely; still he is
indirectly preserving it by the fact that through
his activity it is now locked up and safe.
Now, God must preserve creatures
directly. For creatures are wholly
contingent, and unable to preserve themselves for
an instant unless they are actually and actively
held out of nothingness. They cannot be locked in a
forgotten case, for God would also actively hold
the case in existence. Thus conservation is a
divine activity that is continuous. It is called "a
continuous creation," and the phrase is justified.
For the same divine power that is required to bring
creatures to existence is required to keep them in
existence.
If God were to refuse conservation, this would
be annihilation of creatures. Strictly
speaking, God could annihilate; but when we
consider that God is not only creating and
conserving Power, but is also Infinite Wisdom,
Infinite Mercy, and Infinite Goodness, we say that
He cannot annihilate, for this would
conflict with His perfections. The technical way of
putting all this is: God, by His absolute power,
can annihilate; by His ordinated power (that is,
power as seen in line with the other divine
perfections) He cannot annihilate.
3. The third of the
divine transient operations is concurrence by which
God supports creatures in their
activity.
By conservation God supports creatures in
being; by concurrence He supports creatures
in doing. When it is read in Scripture that
man "cannot so much as say the Lord Jesus but by
the Holy Ghost" we find the fact of necessary
divine concurrence neatly expressed; man (or any
creature) can do nothing except by the
concurrence of God.
But what about sinning? Remember that the actual
physical activity that may be connected with a sin
(such as the bodily exertions of the murderer) are
in themselves good; a murderer might use the
same muscles, the same movements, in saving a life
that uses in destroying a life. The bodily actions
of the sinner are in themselves good. It is
their direction and their result as determined by
free will that is bad. It is the free will that
fails to bring them into line with God and
so make them morally, as well as
physically, good.
But what of the free will action itself? This is
sinful inasmuch as it fails, is
defective, is an absence of agreement
with the moral law. For, as we have seen elsewhere,
evil, whether physical or morel, is not a
thing but the absence of a thing. A thing, a
positive being, as such, is good. So God
does not concur with sinful activity as
sinful, for this phase of the activity,
being negative and defective, is not positive being
or activity.
But God does necessarily concur with physical
activity, even in a sinner, and He permits
the abuse and defection whereby the sinner
fails to make his act a good act. God is
in no sense the author of sin; man is
responsible for sin by defection, by failure, by
absence of the work and effort needed to bring his
activity into line with moral goodness. Sin
requires, in itself, no effecting cause, but
a defecting cause; not a cause that produces
being, but a cause that fails to produce being as
it should. Hence, God, the sole Primary
Effecting Cause of all being and all real activity,
is not cause of sin; this, as we say, is a
defecting cause; it is the failing
will of man.
We distinguish types of divine concurrence:
- Mediate concurrence is that by which
God supports in creatures their power to
act.
- Physical concurrence is that by which
God supports the actual exercise of such
power.
- Moral concurrence is that by which
God draws or invites free creatures to good
action.
- Previous concurrence is the divine
support or influence on the agent before
the operation and in view of it.
- Simultaneous concurrence is the
divine support in the doing or operating of the
creature at the actual instant that such
operating takes place.
- Efficacious concurrence is that which
infallibly takes effect.
- Indifferent concurrence has its
effect dependently upon the cooperation of the
creatural cause (or secondary cause).
- General or Indeterminate
concurrence is not directed to a definite
effect.
- Special or Determinate
concurrence is directed to one determinate
effect.
- Intrinsic concurrence is intertwined
in the very essence of the operation of the
creatural cause.
- Extrinsic concurrence is, so to
speak, an outer influence.
Now, how does God concur with man's free acts?
Some say that God's concurrence with man's free
acts is immediate, moral, indifferent,
simultaneous, and extrinsic. (Such is the theory of
Molina, famous Jesuit theologian and philosopher of
the 16th century.) Others maintain that God's
concurrence with man's free acts is physical,
previous, immediate, special, intrinsic, and also
simultaneous. (Such is the theory of "Physical
Pre-motion.")
We cannot pause here upon a point of
controversy. Suffice it to say that, whichever
theory best expresses the fact of God's concurrence
with man's free will, God so concurs with the
human free will as, on the one hand, to retain in
Himself the creating power necessary for the first
origin of all activity, and, on the other hand, to
keep man's deliberate activity truly free.
There is mystery here, of course; but the facts
remain: God alone is necessary and primary Cause;
man is actually free in all his deliberate moral
conduct.
4. The fourth of the
divine transient operations is the governing of the
world.
God is Infinite Wisdom. He has made the world,
therefore, for a most wise purpose. Hence He has a
most wise plan for the working of the world
to its end. This plan of God we call divine
Providence. The working out of the plan is
divine Government. Providence and Government
extend to everything and every activity in the
world, not only in a general way, but in every
particular and detail.
God supports and moves all creatures according
to their nature (that is, their working
essence which He has made), and where man's
free nature brings in, by its
failure, the evil of sin, even here God's
Providence and Government so shape things, by
eternal plan, as to bring good out of evil, as, for
example, the great good (the sanctity) of the
martyrs is drawn out of the crime of those who put
them to death.
Mystery is here too, but reason sees that
Providence and Government must be factual, and
experience of honest minds testifies to the actual
working out of Providence in the Government of
creatures. In many matters we are in the dark about
just how such and such a thing fits in with
God's Providence and Government; we are like the
puzzled child undergoing a painful operation at the
hands of his surgeon-father; the child cannot see
how his own father can hurt him so. Yet the
hurt means life to the child.
Reason and experience, as well as faith, testify
that indeed God "moves in mysterious ways."
Return to Part 1:
The Existence of God
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