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XVIII.
Classification of the Sciences and Divisions of
Philosophy
Topics:
- A. Particular and General Sciences
- B. Division of Philosophy
- C. Speculative Philosophy
- D. Practical Philosophy
A. Particular and
General Sciences
At the time of the thirteenth century, the West
possessed a comprehensive classification of the
sciences, which we may well look upon as one of the
characteristic achievement of the mediaeval mind,
and which, in its main features, lasted up to the
time of Wolf.
At the lowest stage we find the particular
sciences, -- which for the Schoolmen were the same
as the experimental sciences. Such are Astronomy,
Botany, Zoology, Human Physiology, Medicine, also
Civil and Canon Law, which became separate and
autonomous sciences in the twelfth century.
They derive their particularity:
- (a) From the material object, which is
particular. They are concerned only with a
restricted section of the corporeal world.
Botany, for instance, has nothing to do with
economic wealth.
- (b) From their formal object, which, in
consequence of what we have just said, cannot be
grasped or abstracted from all reality, but only
from a more or less restricted section of
it.
But the detailed study of the sensible world by
sections does not satisfy the mind. After the
details, we seek for a comprehensive view of the
whole, and this can only be furnished by
philosophy. The man of science is like a stranger
who explores a city bit by bit, and walks through
the streets, avenues, parks, museums and buildings
one after another. When at length he has wandered
over the city in all directions, there still
remains another way of becoming acquainted with it:
from the top of a tower, the city would present to
him another aspect, -- its divisions, its general
plan, and the relative disposition of its parts.
The philosopher is just such a man: he views the
world from above as it were, and tries to realize
its general structure, for philosophy is a
generalized knowledge of things, a synthetic view
of that material world of which alone we have
direct and proper knowledge, and then by extension,
of all that is or can be (III, B). It is human
wisdom (sapientia), science par
excellence. This general science or philosophy
constitutes the second stage of knowledge.
In contrast to the particular sciences,
philosophy derives its generality,
- (a) From its material object, -- which is
all that exists or can exist. The man who takes
in, by a single glance, the whole of a city from
the top of his tower does not exclude any part
from his regard, but he only looks for the
general aspect of the whole, that which belongs
to all and not merely to some of its parts. In
the same way philosophy, instead of dealing with
only one department of reality, takes in all the
real.
- (b) From its formal object which consists of
points of view that affect and are found in all
reality. Indeed these comprehensive views are
possible only because the mind seizes in the
immensity of reality certain aspects which are
present everywhere and in everything, and which
in consequence belong to the very essence of
reality. Philosophy is defined as the
investigation of all things by means of that
which is fundamental in them and common to all.
Sapientia est scientia quae considerat primas
et universales causas [1].
In other words, philosophy is a science which
coordinates or makes a synthesis, for the materials
it studies and the point of view from which it
studies them are both characterized by generality.
What are these general and comprehensive points of
view or aspects which the human mind discovers in
its study of the universe? This question brings us
to the division of philosophy.
B. Division of
Philosophy
Starting from a well-known classification of
Aristotle, Thomas remarks that philosophical
sciences admit of a first subdivision into
theoretical and practical. The human mind (for all
science, as we have seen, is a work of the mind)
can come into contact with the real in general, or,
as it was then called, the 'universal order,' in
two ways. In the first place we may study this
universal order such as it is in and for itself,
and look for its general features, without
subordinating this knowledge to ourselves. This
constitutes a speculative or theoretic philosophy,
the end of which is knowledge for its own sake. Or,
in the second place one may study the universal
order of things not as such, but in so far as it
enters into relation with our conscious life
(knowing, willing, producing). It is in this sense
that this part of philosophy is called
practical.
Each of these two groups admits of further
subdivision. Speculative philosophy comprises
Physics (in the Aristotelian sense)
[2], Mathematics,
Metaphysics. Practical philosophy includes
Logic, Moral Philosophy, Esthetics.
Let us consider these various classifications in
the light of the scholastic teaching concerning the
construction of the sciences.
C. Speculative
Philosophy
The division of speculative philosophy into
Physics, Mathematics, Metaphysics does not
correspond to three separate sections of being in
the universe [3], but results from the
varying profundity of point of view or degree of
abstraction with which we study the totality of
things. Physics, mathematics, and metaphysics, all
study the material universe as a whole, but each
studies a particular aspect of all reality, change,
quantity, and being, respectively.
(a) Physics.
Everything is carried along on the stream of
change, which the Schoolmen called
motus (from moveri). The study
of change in its inmost nature and its implications
is the first step in a general understanding of the
universe. It is the task which belongs to Physics
or to the philosophy of nature. Since man forms
part of the world of sense reality, psychology is a
department of physics, and the epistemological
inquiry belongs to psychology.
(b)
Mathematics. But there is in the sensible universe
something more profound than change, -- namely,
quantity. For every change is closely bound up with
conditions of time and space in which the change
takes place, while quantity, on the contrary, as
studied in numbers and geometric figures, is
grasped apart from the sensible condition of real
quantified beings. Mathematics, which studies
quantity and its implications, is for the Schoolmen
a general and therefore a philosophical science, --
a conception to which contemporary mathematicians
tend to return.
(c)
Metaphysics. Lastly, beyond change and quantity,
metaphysics seizes in the things of experience the
most profound aspects of reality, the strata which
underlie all the others: being and the general
determinations of being such as essence, existence,
substance, unity, goodness, action, totality,
causality, etc. These most general aspects of
reality themselves constitute a synthetic view of
the material universe. But while change, which
implies duration in time, and while quantity, which
is the primary attribute of bodies, depends on the
material state of the universe, this state is not
essential to the notion of being or those other
ideas which are correlative to it. If there should
be suprasensible beings, such as God, or the soul,
then these metaphysical notions would be applicable
to them, with certain necessary corrections. In
this way natural theology and the non-experimental
part of scholastic psychology really form part of
metaphysics.
D. Practical
Philosophy
Practical philosophy is equally general in
character, since through our conscious powers of
knowing, willing, and producing we enter into
relation with all reality. This general category
includes logic, moral philosophy or ethics, and the
philosophy of art or esthetics. Logic draws up a
scheme of all that we know, and the method of
constructing the sciences; as there is nothing that
the human mind cannot know in some imperfect way,
logic is a general science. Ethics, again, studies
the realm of human conduct, and there is nothing in
human life that cannot become the subject of
morality. It is to be noted that politics and
domestic ethics are, like individual ethics, merely
applications of general moral philosophy. The
philosophy of art deals with the order achieved by
man externally through the guidance of reason, as
when, for example, "he builds a house, or makes a
piece of furniture." Philosophy of art here
includes the study of the mechanical as well as the
fine arts.
It is easy to realize that we have adopted this
philosophical classification in the preceding parts
of this work [4].
Particular sciences precede philosophy, and the
latter must be in a sense based upon them. The
programme of the Faculty of Arts in the
Universities of Paris and Oxford was inspired by
this principle. The arrangement by which the
particular sciences form the threshold of
philosophy gives to the latter an experimental
basis, or, as we should say today, a scientific
foundation. General views presuppose particular or
detailed one to a certain extent.
(Editor's Note: Detailed diagrams of the
Aristotelian, Thomistic, Wolffian, and Dolhenty
classifications of philosophy are available on this
website at Diagram:
Divisions of Philosophy.)
Notes:
1. In Metaph., I, lect. 2.
2. From the Greek word for nature. Not to be
confused with "Physics" in the modern sense, which
is a particular science.
3. As in the division introduced by Wolf, for
whom speculative philosophy concerns itself with
(a) nature other than man, i.e., Cosmology, (b)
man, (Psychology), (c) God, i.e., Natural Theology
or Theodicy. Wolf reserves the name Metaphysics for
considerations common to all three groups. For a
chart describing the Wolffian division, see
Diagram: Divisions
of Philosophy in the Adventures of Philosophy
section.
4. As for mathematics, and the controversies of
the thirteenth century concerning numbers,
quantity, mathematical infinity, and so on, a clear
understanding of these questions is not essential
to our present aim, and we therefore pass over them
in silence. It will be noticed that in the above
classification the philosophy of art is placed in
the group of practical sciences. We might, however,
regard it instead as a third and separate group,
corresponding to the poetical sciences of
Aristotle.
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