|
The
Philosophy of
George
Berkeley
TABLE OF
CONTENTS
I.
General Notions
John Locke had
constructed a theory of knowledge in which the
subject was closed up within himself. The object of
such knowledge was consequently ideas (subjective
impressions) and not things. If ideas are the
immediate object of our knowledge, is it ever
possible to admit an external reality corresponding
to such ideas?
George Berkeley (picture)
denied this theory and reduced the reality of the
external world to the existence of finite spirits
and the infinite spirit (God). There is no material
world. For Berkeley, even Locke's concept of
substance was merely a name devoid of reality.
There exists only the world of spirits, dominated
by God, the Supreme Spirit.
In order to show why the philosophy of Berkeley
results in an immaterial spiritualistic world, it
must be kept in mind that his philosophical
meditations were concentrated on solving the
religious problem. He sought to restore spiritual
and Christian values in the society of his time, in
which the so-called freethinkers, relying on
Locke's theory of knowledge and on his concept of
primary and secondary qualities, fell into
incredulity and actual immorality.
Berkeley tried to prove to these materialists
that in Locke's theory of knowledge there is no
place for their idol -- matter -- and that hence
their whole philosophy is vain. All that exists of
reality is a communion of spirits to whom God is
revealed immediately, and to whom He communicates
the ideas they possess.
II.
Life and Works
George Berkeley was born in County Kilkenny in
Ireland in 1685, the son of an English family that
had migrated there. He studied at Trinity College
in Dublin, where he remained for a long period as a
teacher of theology. In 1709 he became an Anglican
divine.
In later years, between 1713 and 1720, he
traveled to France where he made the acquaintance
of Malebranche, and journeyed also in Italy. In
1728, having conceived the plan of founding a
missionary institute for the Christian education of
native youth in Bermuda, he sailed for America and
got as far as Rhode Island. When the financial
means to implement his plan did not materialize, he
returned to England.
Nominated Bishop of Cloyne in south Ireland, he
dedicated himself to the works of the apostolate.
Death took him at Oxford, where he had gone to
found the missionary institute that he had not been
able to establish in Bermuda. He was sixty-eight
years old.
Berkeley's most important writings are:
Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human
Knowledge, which was rearranged in popular form
in the Three Dialogues Between Hylas and
Philonous. In opposition to freethinkers,
Berkeley wrote seven dialogues under the title
Alciphron, or the Minute Philosopher.
III.
Theory of Knowledge
The most interesting and original part of
Berkeley's thought is his theory of knowledge. He
accepts the Empiricist teaching of Locke that the
immediate object of our knowledge is ideas
(subjective impressions) but rejects the
distinction of Locke regarding primary (objective)
and secondary (subjective) qualities.
The primary qualities (time, space, motion) are
not perceptible separately from the secondary
qualities (color, sound, tactile qualities, etc.).
Indeed we know the primary qualities only in
conjunction with and through the secondary
qualities. If we know means to perceive subjective
impressions, such impressions cannot be divided
into two categories, one subjective and the other
objective; all must be impressions felt by the
subject, and hence all are subjective.
Furthermore, Berkeley refuses to accept Locke's
concept of substance as a mysterious objective
substratum which would be the cause of our
impressions. Berkeley asks whether such a material
substratum, separate from our sensations, can
exist. If it is separate from our impressions, then
it is not perceptible, is reduced to a term void of
significance, and is unknowable and inconceivable.
If it is connected with our impressions as a
support of those impressions, then it resides in
the subject and material substances are cognitive
phenomena and hence are subjective.
It is impossible, therefore, that matter be
something existing in itself, objective, inert,
devoid of thought. When we say that a thing
exists, we mean nothing more than that such
a thing is perceived by us. The being of
things consists in this act of perception:
"Omne esse est
percipi." (To BE is to be
PERCEIVED.)
Primary or secondary qualities, substance and
impressions are nothing other than acts of
perception, that is, mental facts; and their
existence signifies their being perceived as mental
acts. Berkeley's theory of knowledge thus reduces
all reality to phenomena: The material world exists
only as a cognitive act, produced and existing in a
mental act, and hence is subjective and not
objective.
Berkeley denied general or universal ideas. The
mind cannot represent a general color which would
be neither red nor white nor any determined color,
such as the universal concept of color must be.
Hence, only particular, determined ideas exist. The
so-called universal ideas are names, not
ideas, and exist neither in the mind (because they
are not ideas) nor outside the mind (because it is
absurd that there be a color which is not
determined).
Berkeley's nominalism is more radical than
Locke's in so far as he denies all value to general
and abstract ideas, whereas Locke had only imposed
restrictions upon them.
IV.
The Nature of the Universe
Berkeley, while denying the existence of a
material world and reducing it to a phenomenon of
knowledge, did not deny the existence of the world
of spirits. He believed that he had proved the
existence of the subjective spirit from the very
presence of ideas, for ideas can be produced only
by a spirit.
Having thus assured himself of the existence of
his own spirit, Berkeley devoted himself to
determining its nature: the spirit is both
active, a producer of ideas, and
passive, a receptacle for ideas. Its
activity is revealed in the imagination and in the
memory, with which we produce or recall ideas, but
more still in the coordination of ideas. Passivity,
as we have said, is revealed in the fact that the
spirit receives ideas that it has not produced. For
example, it is not within my power to see or not to
see the objects that are in my room.
The passivity of the spirit gave Berkeley the
means of proving the existence of other finite
spirits, independent of his own, and the existence
of God. In fact, he asked, what is the origin of
these ideas that are imposed on my spirit and of
which I am not the origin -- for instance, the
objects I mentioned before as being present in my
room?
They are produced by the will of other spirits,
since I perceive, besides my own spirit, other
particular agents like myself, who participate with
me in the production of many ideas. Besides, there
are ideas that I perceive which are not only not
produced by my spirit, but are not produced by any
finite spirit -- for instance, the regularity of
natural phenomena. Fire always burns, independently
of any will. Such ideas presuppose a cause superior
to all finite spirits -- God, who exists, whole
infinite will produces the order and harmony and
constancy of natural phenomena.
Having thus demonstrated the existence of God,
Berkeley believed that he had solved all the
difficulties that could be raised against his
idealistic phenomenalism. If, for example, one asks
whether the objects in my room exist when I am
outside and there is no one in my house, Berkeley
answers in the affirmative; because if the objects
are not perceived by a finite spirit they are
perceived by God. If one should inquire about the
difference between real fire and painted fire, why
one burns and the other does not, Berkeley would
have answered that God, the producer and supreme
ruler of all ideas, unites to the first (real fire)
the idea of burning, and denies it to the second
(fire depicted in a painting).
In a word, the phenomenal world of Berkeley is
not unlike the phenomenal world that everyone
knows, with this difference: While commonly it is
believed that natural phenomena are the product of
a physical, material world, for Berkeley this
material world does not exist. That which we
attribute to matter, he says, must be referred to
God, the exciter and revealer of ideas
corresponding to material things.
We are on the ground of the occasionalism of
Malebranche: God presents to our souls -- produces
in them -- the ideas that impress us. The constant
relationship with which God determines the ideas of
our spirits are the so-called laws of nature. They
are the language with which God reveals Himself and
speaks to us.
Thus Berkeley believed that he had carried out
the work he had set for himself: to justify theism
against the attacks of incredulity; and to point
out the emptiness of materialism by proving that
the world as conceived by the materialist does not
exist.
But did Berkeley really attain his goal? The
existence of the (finite) spirit as something
distinct from ideas implies the concept of
spiritual substance; the activity and passivity of
the spirit imply the concept of cause; the
affirmation of the existence of God implies both
the concepts of substance and of cause.
Now, all these concepts should have been
established in a preliminary metaphysical study;
this Berkeley did not do, and because of his
empiristic position, he could not do it. The
development of Empiricism toward complete
phenomenalism stops halfway in Berkeley.
It was David
Hume who drew the logical consequences from
Empiricism, and affirmed complete phenomenalism not
only in reference to matter, as Berkeley had done,
but also in reference to spiritual substance, the
concept of cause, and the concept of God.
In The Radical
Academy
Elsewhere On the
Internet
Enrich
Your Life With a Philosophy Book...
Enrich
Your Life With a Philosophy
Magazine...
|