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Philosophy
of Education and Wittgenstein's Concept of
Language-Games
by Jonathan Dolhenty, Ph.D.
Introduction
This essay is an excerpt from a much larger work
I wrote in 1978 about the linguistic muddle which
permeated educational theory and practice at the
time. I suggested that some of the contributions
made by the modern analytic movement in philosophy
could help educators, and particularly educational
philosophers, deal with some of the murky and
confusing terms and concepts which existed in the
field of education. I particularly endorsed Ludwig
Wittgenstein's concept of language-games as one of
the techniques which could prove valuable.
Since 1978, in my opinion, nothing much has been
done about analyzing and clarifying the terms used
in educational theory and practice. So, while I
have made a few minor corrections to the original
manuscript, nothing in the content of the text has
been substantially changed. Why change the text?
The problem remains much as it was in 1978, over
twenty years ago. Indeed, I think the situation is
much worse now. It needs to be addressed. It has
not been. This essay is a brief look at how
Wittgenstein may help educational philosophers and
practitioners with the linguistic and conceptual
problems they face in discussing their
discipline.
Fundamental to an understanding of the
philosophical views of Ludwig Wittgenstein
(1889-1951) and his concept of language-games is an
appreciation for the way in which he conceptualized
the function of philosophy. Philosophers have not
always agreed on what the purpose of philosophy is
and this problem has profound implications for the
application of philosophical thought to the
questions investigated by scholars in all
disciplines of knowledge, including educational
theory and practice. So let's begin with a little
background information.
Traditional Philosophy
Historically, philosophy has been concerned with
the rational explanation of existence or, as some
philosophers would have it, the search for a
comprehensive view of nature, a universal
explanation of everything. This conception of the
purpose of philosophy led to the formulation of
philosophical systems which attempted to present an
all-encompassing, completely unified, theory of
reality. Philosophy has, in the words of John
Dewey, "implied a certain totality, generality, and
ultimateness of both subject and method."
[1] The traditional conception of
philosophy has presented philosophy as a
fundamental or architectonic discipline, laying the
foundation for all other disciplines of knowledge.
The philosopher becomes an investigator into all
knowledge and philosophy is the summary of all
branches of knowledge. [2]
Traditional philosophy has generally been
organized into subdivisions, each with its own
particular questions and problems. The nature of
all reality in its most general aspects has been
the subject of study of the branch of philosophy
referred to as metaphysics and the nature of
truth and knowledge, including the establishment of
the criteria of truth, has usually been the subject
of study of the branch called epistemology.
Various other subdivisions of philosophy have been
ethics or moral philosophy, political philosophy,
and aesthetics. [3] Philosophy of education
as a subdivision of general philosophy has emerged
quite recently and has been the subject of much
attention.
Philosophy of Education
Philosophy of education, as a scholarly
discipline, has, for the most part, applied the
traditional conception of philosophy to the theory
and practice of education. Most philosophers of
education have concerned themselves with the
problems of the nature of man, the nature of truth,
and the nature of value, with an eye to the ways in
which solutions to these problems may help to
unravel some of the problems specific to the
educational enterprise. [4] Textbooks in
philosophy of education have tended to reflect the
traditional conception of philosophy and spend a
large proportion of their time discussing the
various systems of philosophy, realism, idealism,
experimentalism, and so forth, and their
application to educational concerns.
[5]
Kneller suggested that philosophy of education
could be thought of as an activity in three modes
or styles: speculative, prescriptive, and analytic.
[6] Speculative educational philosophy
attempts a synthesis of knowledge about
everything that exists, a search for order and
wholeness in all knowledge and experience. It seeks
to establish theories of the nature of man and
reality so as to order and interpret the facts of
educational theory and practice.
Prescriptive educational philosophy, also called
normative educational philosophy, attempts to
formulate goals, norms, and standards for
conducting the process of education. It
attempts to assess values and judge conduct,
seeking to discover and to recommend principles
which can be used for decisions made in the
practice of education.
Analytic educational philosophy, a relatively
recent development in the philosophy of education,
attempts to clarify the statements made in
speculative and prescriptive educational
philosophy, subjecting the terms and propositions
of educational thought and practice to rigorous
scrutiny. It examines the premises on which
educational conclusions rest, analyzes the language
of education, and looks at the kind of evidence
which can be used to confirm or refute educational
propositions.
The traditional conception of the philosophy of
education has been primarily speculative and
prescriptive or normative. Speculative philosophy
of education has generally laid the foundation for
educational thought and educational thought has
been, as Kneller pointed out, largely prescriptive.
[7] Analytic educational philosophy is
relatively new and has become quite popular as a
means of attempting to clarify the terms and
propositions of speculative and prescriptive
educational philosophy.
Analytic Philosophy and Education
The analytic movement in philosophy tended to
oppose the traditional conception of philosophy
and, at least in England and America today,
philosophical inquiry is largely analytical in
temperament and method. [8] While there is
disagreement among analytic philosophers about many
aspects of analysis, they do generally agree that
the function of philosophy does not consist of
building philosophical systems which attempt to
explain all of existence but, rather, the function
of philosophy is the clarification of language.
[9]
Ayer, one of the early proponents of analytic
philosophy, argued that the philosopher must
"confine himself to works of clarification" because
"the propositions of philosophy are not factual,
but linguistic in character" and the propositions
of philosophy "express definitions, or the formal
consequences of definitions." [10] Pap
observed that the term "philosophy" is an ambiguous
word and stated:
- ... though we recognize the unfortunate
ambiguity of this word, we do contend that if it
is used to refer to a cognitive activity
distinct from experimental science and
mathematical reasoning, it can only mean logical
analysis. [11]
Logical analysis is an analysis of language,
specifically the language in which concepts are
expressed. It searches for clarity and precision
and exposes vagueness, ambiguity, and logical and
linguistic fallacies. Analysis results in
"conceptual revision." [12]
As was noted previously, philosophy of education
has generally been approached with the traditional
conception of philosophy in mind. Philosophy of
education has been primarily speculative and
prescriptive in character. During the past few
decades, however, some philosophers of education
became interested in the application of analytic
philosophy to educational theory and practice.
Scheffler, for example, called for the use of
philosophical analysis within education because
- ... such a proposal aims explicitly at
improving our understanding of education
by clarification of our conceptual apparatus --
the ways in which we formulate our beliefs,
arguments, assumptions, and judgments concerning
such topics as learning and teaching, character
and intellect, subject-matter and skill,
desirable ends and appropriate means of
schooling. [13]
The same idea was suggested by Kazepides and he
considered the primary task of philosophy of
education to be the elucidation of the "conceptual
foundations of educational thought."
[14]
The analytic philosopher of education avoids any
comprehensive description of reality and is not
interested in prescriptive theories as such. He is
interested, rather, in the careful investigation of
the many different ways in which one talks about
educational experiences. Phenix stated:
- ... Much of the analysts' attention has been
devoted to the careful discussion of the various
uses to which such educational terms as
"teaching," "learning" and "knowing" are put,
with the aim of demonstrating by typical
examples that no single definition will suffice,
but that a number of different interrelated
logical constructions must be distinguished. In
view of these distinctions, the analysts show
that broad generalizations about the process of
education, which are standard for the
speculative and ideological types of educational
philosophy, have no specifiable meaning, but
serve mainly as slogans for the propagation of
special pedagogical interests. [15]
The conception of philosophy proposed by the
analytic philosophers, its aims, techniques, and
suggestions for clarifying the concepts of and the
way in which one speaks about education, appears to
some philosophers of education to be especially
relevant in light of the many conflicting
ideologies which confront professional educators as
well as the concerned layman. [16] Analytic
philosophy can help, not only by analyzing and
clarifying the language one uses in discussing
educational matters but, according to Newsome, can
also provide models of theory, statements of
criteria for meaning and verification, and help in
unsnarling "the logical and linguistic tangles in
pedagogical knowledge." [17]
It was suggested earlier that some differences
exist within the analytic movement regarding
techniques of analysis even though there is general
agreement on the purposes, function, and ends
sought by analytic philosophers. Kneller identified
two general categories of analysis which he called
"formal" analysis and "informal" analysis.
[18]
Formal analysis is appropriate especially when
used in analyzing the technical language of science
and the "formalist" tends to limit the use of
ordinary language as a tool of analysis,
preferring, instead, to reconstruct concepts
through the use of scientific or technical language
or the creating of artificial language systems.
Informal analysis tends toward the analysis of
ordinary language, the language of more general
thinking, the language in which common discourse
takes place, the language of many disciplines of
knowledge outside of the sphere of science as it
has become understood. Informal analysis is more
inclusive, casual, and unsystematic, attempting to
examine concepts and statements in the language in
which they occur. [19]
Formal analysis, according to Kneller, "can help
to raise the standards of educational research by
analyzing the logical structure of presented
knowledge, by reconstructing technical language,
and by proposing canons ... for research itself to
observe." [20] But it is to informal
analysis that one turns when interested in
clarifying the language of ordinary discourse. The
language of education tends to be that of ordinary
discourse.
Ludwig Wittgenstein, in his later years of
philosophical inquiry, began to develop techniques
for the analysis of ordinary language. One of the
major contributions that he made to informal
analysis was his concept of language-games.
Ludwig Wittgenstein and Philosophy
In order to understand the philosophical views
and analytic techniques developed by Wittgenstein,
it is necessary to understand the way in which he
conceptualized the purpose of philosophical
investigation. In his commentary on Wittgenstein,
Fann pointed out that it was in his method that
Wittgenstein made his most important contribution
to philosophy and that Wittgenstein was really an
artist creating "a new style of thinking, a new way
of looking at things." [21] Binkley
discussed this notion at length and argued that the
analyses performed by Wittgenstein were similar to
a stylistic analysis not unlike those that might be
performed by someone talking about a painting.
According to Binkley, Wittgenstein's analysis is "a
skill like criticism" and "like the best criticism,
the best philosophy is also an art."
[22]
Early in the Tractatus, Wittgenstein
maintained that philosophy is not one of the
natural sciences. Furthermore, philosophy does not
result in philosophical propositions. Instead, "the
object of philosophy is the logical clarification
of thoughts." [23] Philosophy is an
activity, the result of which is the clarification
of ideas, an attempt to make propositions clear.
Later, in the Philosophical Investigations,
Wittgenstein maintains that philosophy involves
description and not explanation:
- We must do away with all explanation,
and description alone must take its place. And
this description gets its light, that is to say
its purpose -- from the philosophical problems.
These are, of course, not empirical problems;
they are solved, rather, by looking into the
workings of our language, and that in such a way
as to make us recognize those workings; in
despite of an urge to misunderstand them.
The problems are solved, not by giving new
information, but by arranging what we have
always known. Philosophy is a battle against the
bewitchment of our intelligence by means of
language. [24]
Philosophy, therefore, results in the
"uncovering of one or another piece of plain
nonsense." [25] Philosophy simply puts
everything in front of us but it does not explain
or deduce anything. It does, however, untie "knots
in our thinking," so "its results must be simple,"
although "philosophizing has to be as complicated
as the knots it unties." [26] When we see
more, according to Wittgenstein, our
philosophical dissatisfaction will disappear.
[27] See more should result in the
disappearance of philosophical problems. Philosophy
has the tools for the solution of philosophical
problems at hand.
So what is the purpose of philosophy?
Wittgenstein answered that it was "to show the fly
the way out of the fly-bottle." [28]
Wittgenstein often compared the treatment of a
question in philosophy to the treatment of an
illness. [29] But, he pointed out, "we may
not terminate a disease of thought" so it
"must run its natural course, and slow cure
is all important." [30] Again, the results
of philosophy, the untying of the knots in our
thinking, are simple, but the process itself can be
complex because "the philosopher is the man who has
to cure himself of many sicknesses of the
understanding before he can arrive at the notions
of the sound human understanding." [31]
Hence, philosophy becomes a kind of therapy, a
way of ridding ourselves of intellectual illnesses.
Since philosophy does not give injections or pills,
therapy of this type will help us to cure the
disease by uncovering nonsense, clarifying what we
say, and critically examining the language we use.
But in the end, says Wittgenstein, "philosophy may
in no way interfere with the actual use of
language: it can in the end only describe it."
[32]
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