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Philosophical Quotations |
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What did Aristotle say about: Note: The source book for a quotation is indicated by: NE for Nicomachean Ethics The location of the start of a quotation is given by the 'Berlin number' which designates, by established convention, the consecutively numbered pages of all of Aristotle's works in the original Greek, and a line number on the page ('a' for left and 'b' for right side of the page. The last name of the translator of the quotation is also indicated.
NE [1103a23] (Rackham, II, i, 3) The virtues [moral excellence] therefore are engendered in us neither by nature nor yet in violation of nature; nature gives us the capacity to receive them, and this capacity is brought to maturity by habit. NE [1103b13] (Rackham, II, i, 7) It is by taking part in transactions with our fellow men that some of us become just and others unjust; by acting in dangerous situations and forming a habit of fear or of confidence we become courageous or cowardly. And the same holds good of our dispositions with regard to the appetites, and anger; some men become temperate and gentle, others profligate and irascible, by actually comporting themselves in one way or the other in relation to those passions. In a word, our moral dispositions are formed as a result of the corresponding activities. Hence it is incumbent on us to control the character of our activities, since on the quality of these depends the quality of our dispositions. It is therefore not of small moment whether we are trained from childhood in one set of habits or another; on the contrary it is of very great, or rather of supreme, importance. NE [1104a11] (Rackham, II, ii, 6) . . moral qualities are so constituted as to be destroyed by excess and by deficiency . . . NE [1104b20] (Rackham, II, iii, 5) . . every formed disposition of the soul realizes its full nature in relation to and dealing with that class of objects by which it is its nature to be corrupted or improved. NE [1104b28] (Rackham, II, iii, 6) We assume therefore that moral virtue is the quality of acting in the best way in relation to pleasures and pains, and that vice is the opposite. NE [1105b19](Rackham, II, v, 1) We have next to consider the formal definition of virtue. A state of the soul is either (1) an emotion, (2) a capacity, or (3) a disposition; virtue therefore must be one of these three things. By the emotions, I mean desire, anger, fear, confidence, envy, joy, friendship, hatred, longing, jealousy, pity; and generally those states of consciousness which are accompanied by pleasure or pain. The capacities are the faculties in virtue of which we can be said to be liable to the emotions, for example, capable of feeling anger or fear or pity. The dispositions are the formed states of character in virtue of which we are well or ill disposed in respect of the emotions; for instance, we have a bad disposition in regard to anger if we are disposed to get angry too violently or not violently enough, a good disposition if we habitually feel a moderate amount of anger; and similarly in respect of the other emotions. NE [1106b13] (Rackham, II, vi, 9) . . if then, as we say, good craftsmen look to the mean as they work, and if virtue, like nature, is more accurate and better than any form of art, it will follow that virtue has the quality of hitting the mean. I refer to moral virtue [not intellectual], for this is concerned with emotions and actions, in which one can have excess or deficiency or a due mean. NE [1106b29](Rackham, II, vi, 14) . . . error is multiform (for evil is a form of the unlimited, as in the old Pythagorean imagery, and good of the limited), whereas success is possible in one way only (which is why it is easy to fail and difficult to succeed &endash; easy to miss the target and difficult to hit it); so this is another reason why excess and deficiency are a mark of vice, and observance of the mean a mark of virtue: Goodness is simple, badness is manifold. NE [1107a10] (Rackham, II, vi, 18) Not every action or emotion however admits of the observance of a due mean. Indeed the very names of some directly imply evil, for instance malice, shamelessness, envy, and, of actions, adultery, theft, murder. All these and similar actions and feelings are blamed as being bad in themselves; it is not the excess or deficiency of them that we blame. It is impossible therefore ever to go right in regard to them &endash; one must always be wrong; NE [1109a20] (Rackham, II, ix, 1) moral virtue is a mean . . . between two vices, one of excess and the other of defect; . . . it is such a mean because it aims at hitting the middle point in feelings and in actions. This is why it is a hard task to be good, for it is hard to find the middle point in anything. NE [1113b6] (Rackham, III, v, 2) . . virtue also depends on ourselves. And so also does vice. For where we are free to act we are also free to refrain from acting, and where we are able to say No we are also able to say Yes; if therefore we are responsible for doing a thing when to do it right, we are also responsible for not doing it when not to do it is wrong, and if we are responsible for rightly not doing a thing, we are also responsible for wrongly doing it. NE [1114b16] (Rackham, III, v, 20) . . our virtues are voluntary (and in fact we are in a sense ourselves partly the cause of our moral dispositions, and it is our having a certain character that makes us set up an end of a certain kind), it follows that our vices are voluntary also; they are voluntary in the same manner as our virtues. NE [1124a1] (Rackham, IV, iii, 16) Greatness of Soul seems therefore to be as it were a crowning ornament of the virtues; it enhances their greatness, and it cannot exist without them. Hence it is hard to be truly great-souled, for greatness of soul is impossible without moral nobility. NE [1127b1] (Rackham, IV, vii, 7) . . of cases where a man is truthful both in speech and conduct when no considerations of honesty come in, from an habitual sincerity of disposition. Such sincerity may be esteemed a moral excellence; for the lover of truth, who is truthful even when nothing depends on it, will a fortiori be truthful when some interest is at stake, since having all along avoided falsehood for its own sake, he will assuredly avoid it when it is morally base; and this is a disposition that we praise. NE [1138b35] (Rackham, VI, i, 4) . . we have divided the Virtues of the Soul into two groups, the Virtues of the Character and the Virtues of the Intellect. NE [1139a21] (Rackham, VI, ii, 2) Pursuit and avoidance in the sphere of Desire correspond to affirmation and denial in the sphere of the Intellect. Hence inasmuch as moral virtue is a disposition of the mind in regard to choice, and choice is deliberate desire, it follows that, if the choice is to be good, both the principle must be true and the desire right, and that desire must pursue the same thing as principle affirms. We are here speaking of practical thinking, and of the attainment of truth in regard to action; with speculative thought, which is not concerned with action or production, right and wrong functioning consist in the attainment of truth and falsehood respectively. The attainment of truth is indeed the function of every part of the intellect, but that of the practical intellect is the attainment of truth corresponding to right desire [i.e. truth about the means to the attainment of the rightly desired End]. NE [1139a20] (Ross) What affirmation and negation are in thinking, pursuit and avoidance are in desire; so that since moral virtue is a state of character concerned with choice, and choice is deliberate desire, therefore both the reasoning must be true and the desire right, if the choice is to be good, and the latter must pursue just what the former asserts. Now this kind of intellect and of truth is practical; of the intellect which is contemplative, not practical nor productive, the good and the bad state are truth and falsity respectively (for this is the work of everything intellectual); while of the part which is practical and intellectual the good state is truth in agreement with right desire. NE [1144a7] (Rackham, VI, xii, 6) Prudence as well as Moral Virtue determines the complete performance of a man's proper function: Virtue ensures the rightness of the end we aim at, Prudence ensures the rightness of the means we adopt to gain that end. NE [1144a21] (Rackham, VI, xii, 8) . . rightness in our choice of an end is secured by [Moral] Virtue; NE [1144a29] (Rackham, VI, xii, 10) . . that eye of the soul [mature intelligence] of which we spoke cannot acquire the quality of Prudence without possessing Virtue. This we have said before, and it is manifestly true. For deductive inferences about matters of conduct always have a major premise of the form 'Since the End of Supreme Good is so and so' (whatever it may be, since we may take it as anything we like for the sake of the argument); but the Supreme Good only appears good to the good man: vice perverts the mind and causes it to hold false views about the first principles of conduct. Hence it is clear that we cannot be prudent without being good. NE [1144b4] (Rackham, VI, xiii, 1) All are agreed that the various moral qualities are in a sense bestowed by nature: we are just, and capable of temperance, and brave, and possessed of the other virtues from the moment of our birth. But nevertheless we expect to find that true goodness is something different, and that the virtues in the true sense come to belong to us in another way. For even children and wild animals possess the natural dispositions, yet without Intelligence these may manifestly be harmful. NE [1144b13] (Rackham, VI, xiii, 2) . . if a man of good natural disposition acquires Intelligence [as a whole], then he excels in conduct, and the disposition which previously only resembled Virtue, will now be Virtue in the true sense. Hence just as with the faculty of forming opinions [the calculative faculty] there are two qualities, Cleverness and Prudence, so also in the moral part of the soul there are two qualities, natural virtue and true Virtue; and true Virtue cannot exist without Prudence. NE [1144b21] (Rackham, VI, xiii, 4) [the virtues] cannot exist without Prudence. A proof of this is that everyone, even at the present day, in defining Virtue, after saying what disposition it is [i.e. moral virtue] and specifying the things with which it is concerned, adds that it is a disposition determined by the right principle; and the right principle is the principle determined by Prudence. NE [1144b25] (Rackham, VI, xiii, 5) Virtue is not merely a disposition conforming to right principle, but one co-operating with right principle; and Prudence is [the knowledge of] right principle in matters of conduct. NE [1144b30] (Rackham, VI, xiii, 6) . . it is not possible to be good in the true sense without Prudence, nor to be prudent without Moral Virtue. (Moreover, this might supply an answer to the dialectical argument that might be put forward to prove that the virtues can exist in isolation from each other, on the grounds that the same man does not possess the greatest natural capacity for all of them, so that he may have already attained one when he has not yet attained another. In regard to the natural virtues this is possible; but it is not possible in regard to those virtues which entitle a man to be called good without qualification. For if a man have the one virtue of Prudence he will also have all the Moral Virtues together with it.) NE [1145a3] (Rackham, VI, xiii, 7) [Prudence] is the virtue of that part of the intellect [the calculative] to which it belongs; and . . . our choice of actions will not be right without Prudence any more than without Moral Virtue, since, while Moral Virtue enables us to achieve the end, Prudence makes us adopt the right means to the end. NE [1177a12] (Rackham, X, vii, 1) . . if happiness consists in activity in accordance with virtue, it is reasonable that it should be activity in accordance with the highest virtue; and this will be the virtue of the best part of us. Whether then this be the intellect, or whatever else it be that is thought to rule and lead us by nature, and to have cognizance of what is noble and divine, either as being itself also actually divine, or as being relatively the divinest part of us, it is the activity of this part of us in accordance with the virtue proper to it that will constitute perfect happiness; and it has been stated already [VI. V. 3., xiii. 8.] that this activity is the activity of contemplation. NE [1179b1] (Rackham, X, ix, 2) . . to know what virtue is is not enough; we must endeavor to possess and to practice it, or in some other manner actually ourselves to become good. NE [1177b34] (Rackham, X, vii, 8) . . we ought so far as possible to achieve immortality, and do all that man may to live in accordance with the highest thing in him; for though this be small in bulk, in power and value it far surpasses all the rest. POL [1288a37] (Jowett) . . the virtue of the good man is necessarily the same as the virtue of the citizen of the perfect state. POL [1293b5] (Jowett) In the perfect state the good man is absolutely the same as the good citizen; whereas in other states the good citizen is only good relatively to his own form of government. POL [1295a35] (Jowett) . . if what was said in the Ethics is true, that the happy life is the life according to virtue lived without impediment, and that virtue is a mean, then the life which is in a mean, and in a mean attainable by every one, must be the best. And the same principles of virtue and vice are characteristic of cities and of constitutions; for the constitution is in a figure the life of the city. POL [1332a8] (Jowett) We maintain, and have said in the Ethics, if the arguments there adduced are of any value, that happiness is the realization and perfect exercise of virtue, and this not conditional, but absolute. And I used the term 'conditional' to express that which is indispensable, and 'absolute' to express that which is good in itself. POL [1332a11] (Jowett) Take the case of just actions; just punishments and chastisements do indeed spring from a good principle, but they are good only because we cannot do without them - it would be better that neither individuals nor states should need anything of the sort - but actions which aim at honor and advantage are absolutely the best. The conditional action is only the choice of a lesser evil; whereas these are the foundation and creation of good. A good man may make the best even of poverty and disease, and the other ills of life; POL [1332a31] (Jowett) . . virtue and goodness in the state are not a matter of chance but the result of knowledge and purpose. A city can be virtuous only when the citizens who have a share in the government are virtuous, and in our state all the citizens share in the government; POL [1332a37] (Jowett) . . even if we could suppose the citizen body to be virtuous, without each of them being so, yet the latter would be better, for in the virtue of each the virtue of all is involved. NE [1140b20] (Rackham, VI, v, 6) Prudence is a truth-attaining rational quality, concerned with action in relation to the things that are good for human beings. NE [1141a16] (Rackham, VI, vii, 3) Wisdom must be the most perfect of the modes of knowledge. The wise man therefore must not only know the conclusions that follow from his first principles, but also have a true conception of those principles themselves. Hence Wisdom must be a combination of Intelligence and Scientific Knowledge: it must be a consummated knowledge of the most exalted objects. NE [1141b2] (Rackham, VI, vii, 5) Wisdom is both Scientific Knowledge and Intuitive Intelligence as regards the things of the most exalted nature. NE [1142a25] (Rackham, VI, viii, 9) Prudence then stands opposite to Intelligence; for Intelligence apprehends definitions [the first principles of science], which cannot be proved by reasoning, while Prudence deals with the ultimate particular thing, which cannot be apprehended by Scientific Knowledge, but only by perception: not the perception of the special senses, but the sort of intuition whereby we perceive that the ultimate figure in mathematics is a triangle; NE [1142b21] (Rackham, VI, ix, 6) Deliberative Excellence . . . is correctness of deliberation as regards what is advantageous, arriving at the right conclusion on the right grounds at the right time. NE [1142b31] (Rackham, VI, ix, 7) If therefore to have deliberated well is a characteristic of prudent men, Deliberative Excellence must be correctness of deliberation with regard to what is expedient as a means to the end, a true conception of which constitutes Prudence. NE [1145a3] (Rackham, VI, xiii, 7) [Prudence] is the virtue of that part of the intellect [the calculative] to which it belongs; and . . . our choice of actions will not be right without Prudence any more than without Moral Virtue, since, while Moral Virtue enables us to achieve the end, Prudence makes us adopt the right means to the end. NE [1144a5] (Rackham, VI, xii, 5) Wisdom is a part of Virtue as a whole, and therefore by its possession, or rather by its exercise, renders a man happy. |
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