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The Great Thinkers of Western Philosophy |
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The sensible world is presented to us under a twofold aspect, the first rational, the second irrational, corresponding respectively to form (essence) and matter. Let us take a tree as an example. We know that it is a tree because it has the form of a tree. If we prescind from that form and from any other form whatsoever, what remains? There remains an element without form and hence unintelligible. Now if we follow this line of abstraction with reference to all things in the sensible world, if we thus prescind from all form, we find ourselves confronting a space without form but filled with formless matter. This is Chaos, Platonic non-being, called such not because it is nothing, but because there is in it no form (intelligible being). These two aspects of sensible reality correspond to two metaphysical states, preexistent to the sensible world. Thus there is had on one hand non-being (chaos, unformed matter) and on the other being (Ideas), co-eternal and opposed to each other. But how are these two opposed worlds united to form this sensible world, which is presented under the aspect of being and non-being? To resolve this problem Plato has recourse to Demiurge, a divine artificer, the intermediary between unformed matter and the world of Ideas. Demiurge first infuses a soul into matter, by means of which space takes on life and form. Then, with successive infusions of souls, it forms the heavens and the earth. Demiurge is directed in its labor according to the order of the world of Ideas, which are as it were models in ordering the matter. In this way matter has become a participant in the intelligible world, and through this participation the world of experience is made up of a combination of rational and irrational elements, of being and non-being. Matter, in the order given to it by Demiurge, remains always an opaque, irrational element which tends to resist complete penetration by the form, and hence is the root of multiplicity of beings and also of their imperfections. (Evil takes its origin from matter.) The rational element is represented by the form. But how is the form made present in matter by Demiurge? Plato gives various answers. At times he speaks of the descent of idea into matter; at other times he speaks of imitation. The Soul We have said that Plato, once having admitted that knowledge of Ideas is anterior to sensitive cognition, is presented with the question of when and how the soul came into possession of this knowledge. To solve this difficulty, Plato has recourse to the Pythagorean theory of preexistence. Souls exist before their bodies, and as Ideas and unformed matter are eternal. From eternity they exist together with Ideas, and it is thus that they have come to know Ideas. Cast out of the ideal world because of some mysterious fault, souls carry within themselves the knowledge of these Ideas (Innatism). Such knowledge, however, from the very moment the soul was banished from the ideal world and was united to the body, falls into a kind of lethargy. It will be the sensation, as we shall presently see, that shakes the mind from its sleep and brings it once more to the realization of the presence of Ideas within itself. The soul which descends from the invisible world to put on the mortal remains which it must keep for the course of earthly life, finds that the body already has an irrational soul subdivided into two parts: the irascible (impulsive and disdainful), with its seat in the heart; and the consupiscible, residing in the bowels and inclined to the ignoble pleasures of the senses. The rational soul is that which comes from the invisible world and takes its seat in the head. Its union with the body is extrinsic; the body is as it were its tomb, and it must regulate the impulse of the irascible soul and repress the desires of the concupiscible soul if it wishes to live according to reason. The immortality of the soul is a consequence of the doctrine of the preexistence of souls. If souls existed before the body the latter is not necessary for their existence, and hence with death souls return to live as before this union. In the Phaedo, Plato has other more valid arguments, such as that deduced from the nature of the knowledge of Ideas, from which he deduces the fact that the soul must be by nature similar to Ideas, i.e., simple and not subject to changes. Cognition as reminiscence The fundamental grades of cognition are two: sensitive and intellective. The first is bound up with the object which appears to our senses, hence it is bound up with matter, and deprived of all necessity and universality. It generates opinion, which is a knowledge of the particular; it is incapable of being taken as a basis of science, which must transcend the particular and is founded on the necessary and absolute. Intellective cognition, on the other hand, is real knowledge and forms the basis of science. As we have said, the one is inderivable from the other. Thus sensitive cognition, containing the image (though faded) of the invisible world, offers to the intellective soul the occasion of awakening again in itself knowledge of the Ideas which it already had in the suprasensitive world. The soul, in the presence of the image offered by the senses, acts like a slave who, bound to the door of a cave, recognizes from the shadow projected on the cave's depths whose image the shadow may be. ("The Myth of the Cave," Republic, VII, 1-3.) Intellective cognition for Plato is not the acquisition of new content, but the reawakening of a knowledge already possessed: it is nothing other than reminiscence. The ethics of Plato is an application in practice of the principles which had been reached in the metaphysical field. We know that the soul, which was happy in the contemplation of the ideal world, now finds itself imprisoned in the body and impelled by the pleasures of sense. To give in to these impulses would mean to strengthen yet more the bonds with matter and to render oneself ever more distant from true happiness, which is in the world of Ideas. Reason wills, therefore, that the soul overcome the obstacles which render it unworthy of participating again in the ideal world and living according to reason. The soul can be compared to the driver of a chariot drawn by two horses, one fast and the other slow: it is the duty of the driver to restrain the first and to urge on the second. These two horses are the two aspects of the irrational soul, the irascible and concupiscible. The driver, the rational soul, must restrain the first from its inconsiderate impulses, and must incite the second to good whenever it stops before the pleasures of sense. Mastery over irascible and concupiscible impulses gives origin to two virtues, fortitude and temperance. One who is strong tempers the impulses of anger and eager enthusiasm; he who is temperate moderates the pleasures of the senses by bringing them under the dominion of reason. The actuation of fortitude and temperance is not possible without a third virtue, namely, justice. Justice is fundamental in Plato's philosophy in so far as, granted the destiny of the soul, justice wills that during the course of earthly life the rational soul must live by dominating the two aspects of the irrational soul without being overcome by them. All three of the virtues mentioned, justice, fortitude and temperance, have their origin in a fourth, wisdom, the contemplation of the truth of the ideal world, which is in itself virtue and happiness. This wisdom which is now found sleeping in the soul must be aroused through the images of it which are found in sensible things, and from sensible things it must arise to the invisible and supreme beauty, which is nether born nor dies. (Symposium.) In so far as we draw near to the contemplation of this supreme beauty, by so much are we separated from the illusory life. Hence Plato calls philosophy "the contemplation of death." Regarding the destiny of souls after death, Plato is dependent not only on his philosophy but also on the Orphic-Dionysian mysteries. In general he distinguishes three classes of souls:
Souls in the last two categories are reborn and reincarnated in order to receive their due punishment or reward. According to Phaedo, a fourth class of souls must be added, that of the philosophers, seers of the idea, who are free forever from the temporal life. The politics of Plato are the rigid application of all that he had already recognized as true in metaphysics and ethics. He does not regard the empirical reality which surrounds him, the various constitutions of Grecian cities, but has in view the ideal world which is the norm of the true and the good and hence of every virtue. He traces the lines of a republic in which men must be organized in such a way that they may realize to the maximum extent that which it is given them to know of the ideal world. And animated by the conviction that material reality must be sacrificed to the ideal, Plato is not brought to a stop even by those consequences which at first sight seem paradoxes, such as the partial abolition of property and of the family. Although Plato treats of state organization in Politics and in Laws, his fundamental treatise is the ten books of the Republic. His thought can be summarized as follows: First of all Plato finds that the necessity for society and the state resides in human nature itself. No one is sufficient in himself; everyone needs the aid of others in order to live a life worthy of man. Hence man must live with others in society in order to make use of them both materially and morally. From the moment society arises out of the necessity of meeting the needs of man, the members which make up society must be organized into different classes according to the diversity of works to be be performed. Led by the theory that in man there are two different souls, one of which has two aspects, Plato establishes the teaching that in society also there must be three different organizations or classes: philosophers, warriors, and producers, corresponding to the rational soul and the two aspects of the irrational soul (the irascible and the concupiscible). Each of these classes has its special work to fulfill:
Thus Plato's state is eminently aristocratic. Its direction is confided to a few philosophers who, granted the Platonic identification of wisdom and virtue, are also the best and hence are worthy of directing all the others. The philosophers, who live in the contemplation of the ideal world, are, in the state, the representatives of wisdom, which is the fundamental virtue, as we have seen. The philosophers, because they are wise, also know the essence of the state and can show the other two classes the way that must be followed in order to attain the end of the state. They must restrain the warriors from their irrational impulses, and thus there arises rational fortitude; they must restrain the passions and greed of the producers; this restraint gives rise to the virtue of temperance. Thus is attained the virtue of justice, which we know to be, after wisdom, the fundamental virtue of human life. The state must also take care of education in order to procure new leaders. Practically speaking, education is restricted to the warrior class, from which the (philosophers) were elected to the head of the state. The producers' class is not considered because of the Greek prejudice against manual labor. Education comprises music and gymnastics, the first to render the spirit amiable; music includes not only music properly speaking, but also poetry, history, and so forth -- all the activities presided over by the Muses. Hence the name "music." Gymnastics serves to render the body shapely and strong, and must be subordinated to music because physical development, if not regulated by the mind, produces unmannerly and materialistic people. Hence Plato has a certain aversion to physical exercise. The state thus thought out by Plato is an ethico-religious organism which must care for the material good of the citizens and above all lead them to the attainment of the ideal of virtue. The citizens of Plato's state must concern themselves with living in accord with the transcendent world and not give in to the inclinations of sense and passion. The great personage is not the one who does great things, but the one who knows how to live wisely. Plato is ready to sacrifice everything. Thus he denied the family and the right of private property to the philosopher and warrior classes. He understood that attachment to one's own family and greed for material goods could be grave impediments preventing these two classes from fulfilling their duty, in view of the fact that the latter have to defend the state even at the cost of their lives and the former have to live completely in the contemplation of virtue. In Plato private property and the family find place only in the class called producers. To see Plato as the precursor of present-day Socialism and Communism is to misconstrue his entire ethical teaching. He denied the family and the right to property to two classes in the state because these classes must be completely freed from the shackles of material goods and intent on attaining a grade of spiritualization. On the contrary, Socialism and Communism of the present day deny private property and would abolish the institution of the family for a thoroughly materialistic purpose, that is, to make possible greater material prosperity. In Book X of the Republic, Plato strives to prove that art is a secondhand imitation (a shadow of a shadow) of being and of good, but that only the wise (the philosophers) have a knowledge of these. He concludes that, with the exception of lyric poetry in honor of the gods and heroes, art has no place in the well-organized state. Art, according to Plato, is a copy of empirical reality. A bed which the artist reproduces upon canvas is only a copy of a bed which he finds in the multiplicity of nature, and this in turn is a copy of a bed in se which exists in the world of Ideas. Poetry, both because of its unrealistic content (Homer represents Zeus as a bird, and the souls of the deceased as a swarm of bees), and because of its end, which is to excite the passions that have their seat in the concupiscible soul, is an imitation which is far from the true and the good; hence poetry must be banished from a well-organized city, where men must live in such a way as to ascend to the ideal world. It is the usual preoccupation with morals which induces Plato to condemn art in so far as he sees in it the danger of corruption rather than a means of elevation. But as an artist-philosopher, Plato could understand that art is not a simple imitation, a reproducing of empirical reality. In the Symposium he affirms that art is a mania, a divine madness which places the artist above the common run of man, and he concludes that a person who does not have this divine influence knocks in vain at the door of art.
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