The
Philosophy of
Arthur
Schopenhauer
TABLE OF
CONTENTS
I.
Life and Works
Arthur Schopenhauer (picture)
was born in Danzig in 1788, the son of a wealthy
merchant. He had been educated for the business
world by his father, but as soon as his father died
Schopenhauer turned to the study of philosophy. He
traveled extensively in Holland, England, France,
Switzerland and Italy. He obtained his doctor's
degree at Jena in 1813. A few years later he began
to lecture at Berlin, but his attempts to stem the
tide of Hegel's popularity there were
unsuccessful.
He left the University and traveled again in
Italy. In 1833 he retired to Frankfort on the Main,
where he spent the remainder of his life writing
his books in learned retirement. Always hostile to
Idealism and particularly toward Hegelianism, he
died in 1860, when Hegel's
philosophy was already in its decline.
Schopenhauer's masterpiece of philosophical
writing is The World as Will and Idea, which
was published for the first time in 1818, although
dated 1819. He also published Two Fundamental
Problems of Ethics.
II.
The World as Will and Idea
Schopenhauer was an anti-Hegelian who returned
to Kant with the
intention of determining the nature of the "thing
in itself" by analyzing experience. But
Schopenhauer was a son of Idealism; consequently he
conceived reality monistically. For him the world
was a phenomenal representation.
Kant began with experience and remained there,
declaring that it is impossible to attain knowledge
of the thing in itself. Schopenhauer also began
with experience, but he believed that it is
possible to pass beyond experience and to know the
thing in itself. According to him, if we were
merely rational beings, endowed with sense and
intellect but devoid of volition, we would never be
able to answer the question: "What is the external
cause of our representations?" The world would be
for us a dream, a mere representation, a mysterious
signal devoid of meaning. But each one of us is
also a body, and the corporeal life reveals itself
as tendency, effort, activity, or in a word, as
will. Will,
therefore, is our reality.
Now, because of the monistic concept of
Schopenhauer, the reality which we are (will) must
be extended to all things in nature. Thus
the entire reality is
will. The primordial will is a
blind unreasoning impulse to self-preservation. In
other words, primordial reality is the
will to
live. The blind impulse to life
is the cause impelling the will to display itself
in a multiplicity of natural beings, with the
purpose of becoming conscious. Hence this impulse
makes its appearance in natural bodies in the form
of mechanical forces -- in plants as vegetative
life, in animals as instinct. Finally, by
constructing the brain, the will attains
consciousness in man. Once consciousness is
attained, knowledge appears as the representation
of the world.
Schopenhauer reduces all Kantian cognitive forms
to time, space and mechanical causality. The will,
in so far as it is universal, is beyond all these
determinations of time and space and is lacking in
any other determination. When it objectivates
itself, it determines itself in a series of
phenomena which exist in space and time and are
connected with one another by mechanical
causality.
III.
Pessimism
If reality is the blind will to live, and the
world is the objectivation of such a blind will,
life is painful misery. Schopenhauer makes a broad
and acute analysis of all the various branches of
existence, only to conclude that life is
essentially pain and that it is a mistake to
persevere in the will to live. According to him,
everywhere in the world everything is
desire, because all -- everywhere -- is
will. To desire signifies suffering distress on
account of the lack of what is desired. If the
desire is not satisfied, the distress remains and
increases; if it is satisfied, satiety and
annoyance follow, and this in turn causes new
desires and new distresses.
The will finds thousands of pretexts for
perpetuating this unsatisfied hunger of the will to
live. These pretexts only perpetuate the misery of
life.
- One such pretext and deceit is love.
The will of the species masks itself under the
pleasures of love with the purpose of
perpetuating the desire for life in others. In
so doing, it satisfies its own will to
live.
- Another pretext and deceit is egoism,
which impels us to increase the pains of others
in the hope of gaining some advantage in our own
miserable life.
- Still another deceit and illusion is
progress which, in actuating itself, only
makes more acute the sense of distress.
The Sacred Writer, in Schopenhauer's
interpretation, says that increasing knowledge is
only to increase distress. (Ref. Ecclesiastes 1:14,
18: I have seen all things that are done under
the sun, and behold, all is vanity and a chase
after wind...For in much wisdom there is sorrow and
he who stores up knowledge stores up
grief.)
The whole world is miserable because of the
universal blind will to live. Man can avoid his
share of misery by suppressing the will to
live.
Schopenhauer's philosophy is the antithesis of
that of Hegel. In Hegel, reality and rationality
coincide. Struggle and injustice are nullified and
are justified in the higher synthesis; and,
finally, progress and history entirely justify evil
in its extreme manifestations of war and national
calamities. In Schopenhauer, on the contrary,
reality is blind and therefore essentially
irrational and evil. Love, progress, history do not
justify and annul misery; they are deceits and
illusions behind which the blind, unconscious will
masks itself, for this will is never satisfied with
living and suffering. The systems of Hegel and
Schopenhauer represent different atheistic
conceptions of the world and of life.
IV.
Applications of His Doctrine to Man
In such an irrational world, however, there
exists a morality which is necessarily ascetic and
nullifying. In a pessimistic morality there is no
glorification of life, but nullification and
destruction of the will to live. Indeed, if the
root of all evils is the will to live, there is no
other escape, no other remedy than to suppress this
will. The steps which make possible the suppression
of the instinct to life are three: aesthetics,
ethics, ascetics. Schopenhauer is inspired by
Neo-Platonism in this regard.
Aesthetics
is the activity of man, absorbed in contemplation
of the idea of beauty, untroubled by any desire
and, consequently, by any evil. Wrapped up in
aesthetic contemplation, he is not longer a slave
of the will. But aesthetics is not sufficient, for
the joy which it gives is possible only for
intellectuals, and even in such persons it is of
short duration. Hence it is necessary to ascend to
the second grade, ethics.
Ethics makes
man able to acknowledge that in addition to himself
there are other men endowed with an essence like
his own. Hence he is forced by ethics to suppress
his egoism which, because of the desire for life,
is the root of every evil. The fundamental
characteristic of ethics is compassion. Man is
immoral when he increases the misery of another or
when he remains indifferent to another's suffering.
On the contrary, he is moral when he feels the
distress of those who are his fellow men, and tries
to mitigate their pain. Thus he feels that he is
one with all men, as in truth he is, by reason of
the unity of the Universal Will from which everyone
proceeds. But even ethics does not succeed in
completely eradicating the insidious source of all
evils, and hence it is necessary to ascend still
further, to the third grade, ascetics.
Asceticism
consists in the constant action of nullifying the
will itself. Art suspends will; ethics mortifies
it; ascetics nullifies it. Only the great penitents
and saints have reached this stage. Schopenhauer,
by a complete misunderstanding of spiritual life,
believed the penitents and saints of the Church to
be absolutely indifferent and detached from all
that surrounds them, mentally dead to all things,
while materially they continue to live.
The moral teaching of Schopenhauer, culminating
in his asceticism, the nullifier of life, is
completely opposed to Hegel's morality, which
glorifies life. Both, however, are atheistic on
account of the immanentist prejudice which vitiates
them.
In The Radical
Academy
Elsewhere On the
Internet
|