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The Great Thinkers of Western Philosophy |
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1265 or 66-1308 "The Subtle Doctor" TABLE OF CONTENTS
John Duns Scotus (picture) was born in Scotland, probably in the village of Maxton (now Littledean), in 1265 or 1266. While very young, he entered the Franciscan Order. After his ordination to the priesthood in 1291, he was sent to Paris to study at the famous university there, and on his return to England he taught at Oxford. In 1303, as a student at the University of Paris, he wrote his commentary on the Book of Sentences. He returned to Oxford but by 1304 was teaching in Paris. Here he propounded his celebrated thesis on the Immaculate Conception of the Blessed Virgin. In 1308 Scotus was in Cologne as lector in the Franciscan Scholasticate, and there on the eighth of November of the same year he died. His principal works are: Opus Oxoniense (named so from Oxford), his great commentary on the Sentences of Peter Lombard (this work contains the better part of Scotus' thought); Quaestiones subtilissimae in metaphysicam Aristotelis; Reportata Parisiensia, which are new notations on his commentary on the Sentences; Quaestiones quodlibetales, which contains twenty-one questions; De primo principio, which contains a profound exposition of Scotist theodicy. General Note on the Thought of Scotus Scotus is the greatest champion of Franciscan Augustianianism. The reconstruction of Augustinianism by St. Bonaventure, likewise the reconstruction of Aristotelianism by St. Thomas had already been made before Scotus began to teach. But Scotus was not a mechanical repeater of either of them. A serious and constructive thinker, he was convinced that truth may shine more brightly as a result of profound investigation: "In progressu generationis humanae semper crevit notitia veritatis." Endowed with extraordinary subtle penetration of mind, Scotus became the faithful servant of truth by undertaking the task of criticism in regard to his predecessors' work. In his teachings he abandons certain theses which were dear to the Augustinian tradition, while he interprets others in the light of the new contribution of Aristotelianism. From this treatment flows a new and original view of the major philosophical problems which has come to be known as Scotism or Scotist thought. Scotus does not accept Augustinian illumination. Instead, he bolds that intellectual cognition takes its origin from sensation through the process of abstraction. He distinguishes, however, between the proper object of the intellect and its de facto object. The proper object of this faculty is "being" -- the entire field of being without restriction ("ens in quantum ens") -- through which the intellect can know immaterial essences, even without the aid of sensations. In the field of fact (Scotus' "objectum de facto") or in actual conditions and as a consequence of original sin, what moves the intellect is only those things that are presented to sensation ("quidditas rei sensibilis"). The passage between sensation and intellectual cognition (ideas, concepts) is abstraction. Now, for St. Thomas abstraction consists in an act on the part of the active intellect which illuminates the phantasm (sense image). But for Scotus the universal concept is the result of causality by which the phantasm itself supplies the physical universal. The intellect, determined in a certain causal way by the physical universal, gives it intentional being -- or in other words, makes it a real concept predicable of many. From this mutual causality comes the logical universal which exists in the intellect; the objectivity of this logical universal is founded upon the physical universal that exists in individuals outside the mind. General Metaphysics As a general metaphysics Scotus accepts the Aristotelian principle of matter and form, but to these two elements he gives a different interpretation than St. Thomas does. For St. Thomas prime matter takes its act of existence from the form. For Scotus existence belongs to the matter, independent of the form, because one cannot conceive of a being constituted outside its cause without the act of existence. Consequently, according to Scotus, prime matter can exist as such, separate from the form. Furthermore, there is no real distinction between essence and existence. Matter, then, is a constitutive element of every being, even of the separate forms, such as angels, in whom spiritual matter is present. Regarding the concept of being, Scotus holds that it is univocal, as against St. Thomas, who teaches that it is an analogous concept. Still, the division of the univocal concept of being into "ens a se" and "ens ab alio," into substance and accident, is not to be conceived of as a reduction of the genus to its specific differences. "Ens a se" and ens ab alio" are not specific differences but transcendental notes which clothe the entire essence of being under difference aspects. More profound is the difference between St. Thomas and Scotus regarding the principle of individuation. St. Thomas had affirmed that the reason for the contraction of the form to the individual depends upon "materia quantitate signata" -- matter signed with quantity. Scotus does not accept this solution, but observes that quantity is an accident, that therefore in St. Thomas' system individuality would be reduced to the level of an accident. Thus, according to the Subtle Doctor, individuality must be derived from the form, which is the basis of being. This new entitative perfection, which comes to the species (forma) and which indicates the passage from specific difference to individual determination, Scotus calls "haecceitas" or "thisness." This "haecceitas" is the ultimate step of the form (and hence of the entire composite) toward real existence. "This reality of the individual is never meant as a new form, but precisely as the ultimate reality of the form." Theodicy Scotus, in opposition to the Augustinian doctrine and in accord with Thomism, holds that the existence of God is not intuitive, but is only demonstrable a posteriori. The proofs for the existence of God adopted by Scotus can be reduced to two processes. The first is entirely an a posteriori process. The objects of our experience are changing realities, or beings in the course of "becoming." Now that which changes possesses in itself neither the sufficient reason for its existence nor for its activity. Hence we are led to admit the existence of a being that is outside the chain of succession and change, and that justifies the existence and action of beings in various stages of becoming. Substantially, this process had its philosophical development in the first three ways of St. Thomas. The second process consists in a development of the argument of St. Anselm. To give validity to this, Scotus inserts a posteriori elements, i.e., the analysis of the possibility (contingency) that is affirmed by our experience. For Scotus, to say that God is "Id quo majus cogitari non potest" is to say that God is infinite. Now, according to Scotus, the weakness of St. Anselm's argument does not rest with the transition from possibility to real existence, but in this: that St. Anselm did not prove that the concept of the infinite is possible. Scotus proves this possibility negatively by showing that the concepts of an "ens infinitum" involves no contradiction. If it did involve a contradiction, our mind, which has for its object "ens in quantum ens," would notice it. Positively, Scotus begins with the data of experience, which tells us that many things are possible. But all possible series of beings are related to the Uncaused Being, which, since it is uncaused, is infinite Perfection. Hence an infinite being not only is possible, but actually exists. "Thus, absolutely speaking, the primary efficient cause can exist in its own right; hence it exists by itself." (Opus Oxoniense, n. 16.) Regarding the attributes of God, Scotus holds that the essential attribute is His infinity. In regard to the other attributes, Scotus does not differ from the common opinion of the Scholastics, i.e., that God is one, uncaused, the Creator, and so forth. The World: Cosmological Doctrine In determining the relationship between the world and God, Scotus accepts the common doctrine of Scholastic tradition. On certain points, however, he withdraws from tradition and gives us a new and personal contribution. First of all, he is not in accord with St. Thomas on the foundation of the essences of created and creatable things. Certainly God knows the essences of real and possible beings; but what is their foundation? St. Thomas had said that the essences, the "rationes aeternae," drew their origin from the divine essence, which is by nature imitable in an infinite manner; the divine intellect took cognizance of this imitability. This manner of explaining the origin of essences is snot accepted by Scotus for the simple motive that if it were accepted the divine intellect would lose the dignity of its independence. Hence it seems to Scotus that the origin of the possibles must be placed in the very intellect of God, which, in knowing the divine nature, produces such essences in their intelligible "esse"; as a consequence of this, possibles are imitable "ad extra." The eternal ideal existence of things is not distinct from the act by which God conceives them. Furthermore, in opposition to Thomistic intellectualism, Scotus, at one with the whole Augustinian tradition, affirms the primacy of the will, a primacy which he extends also to God. God has created the world through an act of His will. For Scotus there could not be free essences in secondary causes (man) if these did not proceed from a free cause, i.e., from the divine will. This Scotist voluntarism profoundly affects not only Scotus' cosmology but also his theory of knowledge and psychology. Everything becomes radically contingent. Thus God in creating has assigned to every thing its own nature: to fire that of heating, to water that of being cold, to the air that of being lighter than earth, and so forth. But since God is free, His will cannot be bound to any object. Hence it is not absurd that fire be cold, water hot, earth lighter than air -- in other words, that the universe be ruled by laws opposite to those which presently govern it. Of Scotus' psychology we shall speak in a moment. Concerning the theory of knowledge, Scotus' voluntarist doctrine reveals that many metaphysical and theological truths which are for St. Thomas demonstrable by reason are not so for Scotus once he advances the principle that the passage or transition from effect to cause is not always legitimate. The Human Soul Scotus, led by his doctrine that prime matter has a complete essence, separate and distinct from that of form, admits that in every individual there is a multiplicity of forms. In man there would be the form of the body and that of the soul, and the unity of the person would result from this: that the form of the body is coordinated with that of the soul. The soul is complete in itself and hence can exist even without the body; and granted, as we have said, that the proportionate object of the intellect is "ens in quantum ens," the human soul can know the essences of things even when the soul is separated from the body. Concerning the immortality of the soul, the argument of St. Thomas and of the entire Scholastic tradition is that the immaterial nature and hence the spirituality and immortality of the soul are deduced from the fact that the object of the intellect is the immaterial essences of things. For Scotus this argument has the value only of possibility, of non-repugnance. Since the will of God is not bound to any contingent thing, and is free to do anything that does not imply contradiction, Scotus concludes that the alternative is also possible; namely, that the soul can perish with the body. Hence Scotus affirms that we must rely upon faith for the truth of the immortality of the soul. It is faith which gives us the assurance that the immortality of the soul has real foundation. Thus in Scotus we find a resurgence of the Augustinian doctrine that there is no clear distinction between reason and faith, and that reason needs the assistance of faith in many of the conclusions which for St. Thomas are simply rational truths. Let us note that the voluntarism of Scotus does not destroy the principle of contradiction but holds that God is free to choose any alternative only in the field of the contingent and provided the opposite is not contradictory; the will of God is therefore not bound to one side more securely than to the other. (Thus, for example, it would not be contradictory for fire to have a different action, so that would not burn.) The absolute truths, which are over and above the field of contingency, and whose opposite would be contradictory, do not depend upon the will of God but upon His essence; such truths are always valid, and their opposite is certainly false -- for example, the statement "Being is." In his ethics, Scotus reaffirms the voluntarist doctrine against the intellectualism of St. Thomas. However, Scotist voluntarism does not, as has often been falsely charged, give place to moral positivism in which the just and the unjust depend on the exclusive will of God. Indeed, this mild voluntarism leads to principles and conclusions that are common Church doctrine. In God, as in man, the will has primacy over the intellect. This does not mean that the will of God is blind and directed by caprice: God, Scotus declares, is "intelligentissime et ordinatissime volens." This means that the will of God is illumined by the divine intellect and that the primacy of the will of God does not negate this natural order, which is valid also in God. Presupposing the action of the intellect, which points out to the will all the possible modes of the divine essence, the actual realization of one series of possibles rather than another depends not on the intellect but on the divine will. God finds within His will the motives for self-determination. But even in determining itself to the realization of one series of possibles rather than another, the will of God does not act capriciously. First of all, says Scotus, "the will of God of necessity loves God's goodness." Consequently, all that is essentially bound up with the essence of God is also willed necessarily by the divine will -- as, for example, the first three commandments of the Decalogue. Regarding the rest of the entire field of possibles which forms, as we have noted, the field of pure contingency, the will of God is free; but this is not to say that it acts indeliberately. From the moment God is "intelligentissime et ordinatissime volens," He chooses that order in which His goodness is more greatly manifest, without being necessarily bound to this particular order of contingency (God is bound only to will His own essence). Hence He is always free to will the opposite when this change contributes more greatly to His goodness. Scotist voluntarism therefore contains nothing that contradicts Church orthodoxy. The moral act for Scotus is the result of due proportion between the potency (the will which must be free), the object (which must be good in itself), and the end (which must tend toward God in place, time, and manner). While for St. Thomas an object which in itself is evil, but which through ignorance is apprehended as good, is the object of a morally good act, Scotus denies that this can be so: the object also must be good. This is the basis for another point of divergence from St. Thomas; in other words, for Scotus there is a third class lying between morally good and evil acts: indifferent acts, that is, acts which have nothing to do with progress or retrogression in the matter of attaining the ultimate end. Furthermore, Scotus, along with St. Augustine and in opposition to Aristotle and St. Thomas, affirms that virtue is an act of love which directs us to God. And finally he holds that the essence of eternal life does not consist, as St. Thomas states, in the beatific vision of God, but in love of God. There is no contradiction here, for love and knowledge are not of the same order. Distinct acts of distinct faculties cannot be opposed in such a way. In all created beings, the act of loving is really distinct from the act of knowledge. One and the same thing can be the object of knowledge and of love, but the viewpoint is different; for as regards knowledge, the thing is "truth," and as regards will, or love, it is "good." So the question: Is God Truth before Goodness or Goodness before Truth, does not make any sense. Considered as the object of love, God is Goodness. Considered as the object of knowledge, God is Truth. Which comes first? Again this question makes no sense. Considering the rational subject in the act of his intelligence, he knows God as Truth. Considering him in his act of love, he adheres to God as Goodness. There is no priority, but merely a difference in viewpoint. The Beatific Vision is an act of possession of the unity of God by the soul, in the highest degree of its own unity. To put the same thing in other words, do we know in order to love, or do we love in order to know? Both these questions are wrongly directed. We are, in order to possess. By being men, we have both rational intellectual and rational appetitive faculties; these are coexisting and simultaneous. By our knowledge we are informed of the object of our love. By our love, we are attracted to the object of our knowledge. We can love only what we know. We can know only what we are affectively in contact with. Whenever we possess an object, we do so both through our intellect, by understanding the object, and through our will, by reacting affectively to it. In The Radical Academy Elsewhere On the Internet Enrich Your Life With a Philosophy Book... Enrich Your Life With a Philosophy Magazine...
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