The
Philosophy of
The
Stoics
TABLE OF
CONTENTS
I.
General Notions
The founder of the Stoic School was Zeno
(picture), who was born
about 336 B.C., at Citium on the island of Cyprus;
Zeno dies about 254. He seems to have followed his
father in commercial activity. Coming to Athens, he
learned philosophy and became a disciple of Crates
the Cynic. About the year 300 B.C., he founded his
own philosophical school, which took its name from
the Stoa or Porch from which he lectured.
Zeno's writings were lost and we possess only
fragments. He was the first to divide the Stoic
doctrine into logic, physics (which takes the place
of metaphysics), and ethics. For Zeno, philosophy
is practical knowledge, and it must resolve the
problem of life; hence ethics will occupy the
central position.
Because of the different predominant tendencies,
Stoicism may be divided into three periods:
- Early Stoicism, by which is meant the
School of Zeno;
- Middle Stoicism, by which is meant
the tendency of Stoicism to assume Eclecticism,
in accordance with the thought of the
times;
- Neo-Stoicism, who predominant
tendency was interested in religion -- during
this period, Stoics like Seneca and Epictetus
were directors of the spiritual life, and under
this form Stoicism was widely diffused
throughout the Roman empire.
II.
Theory of Knowledge
The Stoics held that all knowledge is restricted
to sensation. The soul is a "tabula rasa" (blank
sheet) upon which the impressions of sensations are
received, and these and their combinations form the
whole of our knowledge (empiricism). The general
notions (universal ideas) are nothing other than
the repetition of similar sensations, in which
common characteristics remain while particular
notes are canceled. Memory and the word (speech)
assist in fixing and reawakening the content of
previous sensations.
The recalling or reawakening of the content of
preceding sensations in the memory consists in that
which the Stoics called anticipations. By awakening
in ourselves the sensitive content had in previous
times and fixed in the memory, we feel in
anticipation what we will sense if the object
should be presented again to our cognitive
faculties. But since not all sensations are true
(e.g., a stick immersed in water appears broken,
whereas it is not), to distinguish the true from
the false the Stoics had recourse to the criterion
of truth, which they made to consist in assent --
that is, a judgment we give on the data of
sensations. There are sensations which are
presented in such a manner that they compel the
reason to assent, and these are true; the others,
which do not have this power to claim assent, are
false.
III.
Physics (Metaphysics)
The Stoics conceived of the universe as a great
living organism, composed of soul and body, both of
a material nature. The body (earth and water)
represents the passive element; the soul (fire and
air) represents the active element. The soul of the
universe, although of a material nature, has all
the divine attributes: God is immanent in the world
(pantheism). God is conceived of as Heraclitean
Fire which contains the germs of all things and
actuates their becoming. Reason and providence are
the coordinators of all things unto good. Hence
everything that happens is the best that can happen
(optimism). What we call evil is ordained for the
attainment of the universal good of nature and
consequently is not a real evil.
Every activity is reduced to movement and finds
its root in mechanical necessity. What happens must
happen and it is not possible for it to happen
otherwise (Democritean fatalism).
The human soul is a spark of the original Fire,
God; but as it is of a material nature it is
submitted to the universal laws of fatal necessity.
The soul alone enjoys a temporary afterlife until
such time as the great palingenesis (rebirth) of
the world, which will resolve everything into the
primitive Fire. Then will begin another cycle in
the form of the descending and ascending stairway
of Heraclitus (the law of eternal return).
In such a concept there is no place for liberty
-- either for God or for man. Everything happens
according to the inexorable laws of movement,
whether in God or in man. This physics, departing
from the visible world, and speaking of itself as
the root of all things, is at bottom a metaphysics.
But it is a decadent and contradictory
metaphysics.
IV.
Ethics
Virtue is the sole good, in so far as it is,
considered in itself, happiness for the sage. Hence
virtue should be desired as a virtue and not for
the sum of pleasures which can be derived from it.
Virtue is an end in itself and not a means to
attaining the good. In the earlier philosophies,
virtue had also been considered as a means to
attaining peace of soul, in which the ideal of the
sage was made to consist.
As virtue is the "summum bonum," so also is vice
the greatest evil. All that is neither virtue nor
vice is indifferent (riches, pleasures, life,
death, etc.). These will be good if coordinated
with virtue; otherwise they will be evil. But just
what did the Stoics mean by virtue and vice? Virtue
signifies living according to reason. Since reason
tells us that all that happens must happen and that
it happens so as to actuate a superior good willed
by the providence of God, virtue consists not only
in not desiring anything except what happens, but
in accepting with eagerness anything that does
happen. He is foolish who desires other than what
happens, while he is a sage who knows how to give
his assent only to what happens, not only without
regret for the contrary but without any desire for
that which does not occur.
The life of the sage is not only made up of
reason but also of passions and the emotions to
which they give life. For the Stoic the passions
and the emotions represent the irrational, because
they tend to turn away reason from that which
indeed must happen. In this opposition vice
consists. Vice, hence, is everything that tends to
oppose itself to reason, every desire or emotion
which opposes itself to the natural development of
nature.
Since the Stoic sage must avoid every surprise
that can come from this irrational world, not only
must he control the passions, as Aristotle
asserted, but he must also eradicate them, strive
never to feel their presence, and be indifferent to
every emotion whether directed toward cruelty or
toward piety. It is in this complete domination of
reason over the passions and the emotions that
Stoic apathy consists. In a word, the Stoic must be
like a god who, closed up in his reason, passes
among men without a care for all that happens.
Nothing must ever disturb this solemn
indifference of reason for human events. If such
events threaten to disturb this indifference of
reason, the Stoic sage will have recourse to death,
because death, as we have noted, is in itself
indifferent and is good if coordinated with virtue.
It is better to flee life than to lose tranquillity
of spirit. Suicide, so common among the Stoics, is
in contradiction to that forcefulness of spirit so
affected by them.
Stoic theories were diffused widely in the
ancient world on account of their alluring
qualities -- the praise of virtue, the sole good.
Also the theories produced various goods, such as
the overcoming of racial sentiment and the
supplanting of it with cosmopolitanism. The Stoic
is a citizen of the world because wherever he is,
he lives according to reason, and is at home in the
midst of his own.
The Stoic theories also brought about a certain
alleviation of the condition of slaves, since,
considering all men as particles of Fire and hence
of God, there was no further motive for some men to
dominate others. Such dominion proceeded from the
irrational part of nature. The practical effects,
however, of philanthropy were modest. Indeed, as a
consequence of another important principle of their
theory -- that the virtuous man must not have any
connection with vicious man -- Stoics were led to
put an uncompromising distance between the sage and
the multitude of men; i.e., between the Stoic who
lives according to reason and the others who live
according to their passions. Of such a disparity
the Stoic is conscious and proud.
Thus the Stoic seems like a god among the
multitude of the foolish, unmoved by the accidents
of nature and insensible to the miseries of others.
Stoic virtue then is reduced to intellectual pride
through which the Stoic shuts himself up within
himself, setting himself apart from all others. He
has no care for others, and indeed despises them
because they are not wise. In this, Stoic virtue is
distinguished, for instance, from the concept of
later Christian virtue, which is based on humility
and charity.
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