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Mini-Course in Philosophy The Development of Philosophy - Part II |
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A Mini-Course in The Philosophy of Aristotle (Continued)
Section 4: Metaphysics The word metaphysics is not Aristotle's own. It was used by Andronicus of Rhodes (about 70 B.C.) as a label for those works of Aristotle which were arranged to follow after his treatises on physics; for the Greek meta means "after." Metaphysics deals with reality, not as limited to this nature (physis) or that, but as viewed apart from material limitations. Its proper scope includes spiritual being and also all being in so far as it can be considered as free from every material determinant and restriction, from all that makes it this or that class or kind. Thus metaphysics does come "after" (or reaches beyond) the more special studies in philosophy which consider (a) material being, as physics does, or (b) logical being, as logic does, or (c) moral being, as ethics does. Metaphysics is the science of non-material real being. It is no airy or imaginative philosophizing about abstractions that no one can understand; it is not something "away up in the air"; it is the deepest philosophy of reality; it is the very heart of philosophy. The basic idea of metaphysics is that of being (ens in Latin; on in Greek). In this idea all others are rooted, for every idea is the idea of some thing, that is, of some being. Anything that can be thought of as existing in the order of reality, independently of the creatural mind, is real being. Anything that can be thought of as existing in the mind and dependently on the mind (such as, subject, predicate, species -- as predicable) is rational or logical being. Anything that can be known in reference to the law which marks the boundary between right and wrong, is moral being. Now, logical being and moral being have place and value only in a world of real being. And it is with this world of real being, universally and most penetratingly considered, that metaphysics deals. The idea of being (and of real being) is transcendental. That is, it soars over the fences of classification. For the idea of being is the idea of being as such, and knows not kinds or sorts. Every being is being, and even the distinction that marks off one class of thing from another is being. Still the meaning of being is not precisely the same in all references. God is a being, man is a being, a tree is a being, the color of a rose is a being, the distinction between man and tree is a being. But God is infinite, self-existent, necessary being. Creatures are not necessary beings; they are contingent beings, that is they are produced beings and as such are dependent or contingent upon their causes. Of contingent beings, some are substantial (man, tree, rose); some are accidental (color of a rose). Hence, while all things are beings (and real beings in so far as they are existible in the extramental universe) all things are not identical in possessing every implication of the term being. The philosopher expresses this truth in some such way as this: The transcendental idea of being does not apply to its inferiors or subjects (that is, to the things it designates or denotes) in a univocal manner (that is, in precisely the same sense in each case), nor in an equivocal manner (that is, in a manner utterly different and unrelated in any two cases), but in an analogous manner (that is, in a manner partly identical and partly different in various cases). In a word, while all conceivable things are beings, there are classifications of beings on the score of necessity, contingency, substantiality, accidence. Out of the root-idea of being Aristotle draws certain self-evident truths or "first principles." The truly first "first principle" in the order of all thought and knowledge is called the principle of contradiction. Now, a principle is a source, in any sense; and a source of knowledge and thought is a guiding truth. The basic guiding truth is this: that a thing cannot be, at one and the same time and under the same aspect, both existent and non-existent. This is the principle of contradiction. It emerges from the idea of being when it is considered as something which cannot simultaneously be nothing. Unless this principle be acknowledged (and it is perforce acknowledged even by those who try to doubt or deny it), all thought and all expression of thought become impossible. For if this principle be fallacious, the very word "fallacious" might also mean "true." Out of the principle of contradiction come other self-evident principles, such as the principle of identity and difference ("What is, is; what is not, is not"), and the principle of the excluded middle state ("A thing either is or is not; there is nothing midway or neutral between being and non-being"). In his metaphysics Aristotle also considers being as cause, being as effect, being as one or in unity; being as true; being as good; being as predicamental (i.e., classified in the categories); being as actual (or existing); being as potential (i.e., capable or apt for existing). Being as actual (or being in actu) is existing being. Being as potential (or being in potentia) is existible being. A thing is actually what it is; a thing is potentially what it may become. The potentiality of a being is either sheer possibility, and then the being is objectively potential; or the potentiality is the capacity of an existing thing to realize its capabilities which actually exist, and then we have subjective potentiality. A boy is actually a boy; potentially he is a grown man, and this potentiality resides in the boy as in its subject; here we have subjective potentiality. Again, the boy is potentially President of the United States; this is objective potentiality or sheer possibility, for there is not in the boy any natural or arranged direction or drive tending towards such an end. The more actuality a thing has, the more perfect it is. For the more it is actual the more it is, and the more, so to speak, it has. In other words, the greater the actuality of a thing, the less is its capacity for being perfected. Still more briefly, the greater the actuality, the less the potentiality. Now, as reason sees, there must a a First Being that is entirely actual, with no perfectibility or potentiality about it. Thus Pure Actuality is a name and a definition of God. At the other end of the scale of perfection is unmixed potentiality or pure potentiality; this is a definition of prime matter. Aristotle indicates that God is the final cause of the universe (that is, the end or goal of all things), and he uses this truth to show further that God is also the first effecting or producing cause of things. Aristotle mentions creatural causes (or secondary causes), and notable among these are certain "separate intelligences" (which we might call spirits or angels) who have change of the heavenly bodies. Our sketch of Aristotle's metaphysics is a very thin sketch indeed; in the nature of things, it cannot be complete or very detailed even as far as it goes. It is presented merely to give the student a general grasp of the scope and character of the science of metaphysics, and to afford him or her some opportunity of appreciating the notable work achieved by Aristotle in rounding that science into acceptable form. Section 5: Ethics The Greek word ethos which gives us the term ethics is the same in meaning as the Latin mos (stem mor-) which gives us the term morals. It means that which is characteristic of man. Now, the real characteristic of man, his hallmark so to say, is found in the fact that he can act freely, self-directingly, and responsibly. In a word, the distinctive mark of human activity is this: it comes from a free-will. Thus ethics is the science of "free-will actions." Now, free-will actions will lie in line with reason or will conflict with reason; they will, in other words, fit harmoniously with the purpose for which man exists, and for which free-will is given to him, or they will clash with that purpose. Accordingly, such actions will be right and good, or they will be wrong and evil. Ethics, therefore, deals with the morality of freely-willed human conduct. The end an purpose of man's existence, and the end and purpose to which all his deliberate action ought to be directed, is the good, that is, the boundless good. In the achieving of that good, man is to find the completion of himself, the filling up of every rational tendency and appetency; and this will be his beatitude, his happiness. For the achieving of the boundless good (the summum bonum) and beatitude man must seek to know and love truth and to act in conformity with it. In particular, man must rightly know and appreciate his own character and place and duty as man. An important item in this knowledge is the fact that man is by nature a social being; he lives with others of his kind and has rights and duties in their regard. Man is inclined towards conjugal society or marriage; he requires civil society or the State. As to the form of government in the State, times, circumstances, and temperaments will be the determinants. There is also a master-and-slave society which is useful (and perhaps necessary, Aristotle seems to say) but which does not involve slave-ownership. Master and slave should be friends; slaves must never be subjected to cruel treatment. Aristotle's ethics is not a perfect moral science. He omits the necessary eternal sanctions for the moral law. He wrongly supposes that the mastery of slaves is a good, and perhaps a naturally necessary thing. But he is worlds ahead of Plato in his clear discernment that the State is the instrument of the citizens, not their owner. He rightly holds that some civil rule (i.e., the State) is naturally required by men living in society, but that its form is for the citizens to determine. Summary of Part II of The Development of Philosophy We have outlined, in Part II, the philosophy of Aristotle, prince of philosophers. We have seen that Aristotle is the inventor of Logic and have noticed that he also rounded this science into completeness. In Physics, we have seen the matter-and-form doctrine, known as hylomorphism, as Aristotle's philosophy of the bodily world. No more acceptable theory of matter (that is, cosmology) has as yet been formulated. Aristotle was, of course, very deficient in point of experimental physics. His times did not afford the opportunities and the instruments for accurate physical and chemical research. He assumed as his hypothesis in the matter of experimental science the doctrine of Empedocles on the "four elements," and so did all philosophers and scientists up to the Middle Ages. Still, Aristotle's philosophy of matter is not to be undervalued because of his inadequate knowledge of experimental physics; philosophy does not depend upon the laboratory, even though it uses the findings of science for telling illustration and for direction in its investigations. Aristotle was not, after all, directly or deeply concerned with the proximate principles of bodies; his was a philosophic quest; he sought ultimate principles. And the Aristotelian cosmology, while often challenged and questioned, has managed to outlive all objections and objectors; it has held its own for over two thousand years. Hylomorphism may not be the last word in the philosophy of bodies; it may come to suffer modification and even essential change. It leaves things to explain, it is not without many difficulties; but its difficulties and deficiencies are neither so many nor so baffling as those involved in the several theories of matter which have tried to supplant it. In metaphysics Aristotle is on undebatable ground; here true philosophy suffers neither doubt nor hesitation. We have seen that metaphysics is the philosophical science of non-material real being. We have noticed the first principles involved in the very concept or idea of being, and we have seen that these principles are the indemonstrable but necessary and indubitable truths upon which all knowledge and all the sciences ultimately depend. We have discussed the doctrine of actuality and potentiality in being. In our brief consideration of Aristotle's ethics we have noted his doctrine of man's purpose in existence and of the means available for the achievement of that purpose. We have seen that Aristotle taught, with perfect truth, that man is, by his very nature, a social being; that he is in natural need of civil society or the State; that the State is not the owner of the citizens nor the end for which they exist. Our vocabulary of philosophical terms and phrases has been enriched as we learned the meaning of:
[ To Part III: The Course of Philosophy After Aristotle]
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