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Mini-Course in Philosophy The Ontological Question |
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Section 2: The Properties of Being Topics:
a) Properties A property of a thing is what belongs to it by natural necessity because the thing is that specific nature. It is not a part of a thing; it is a quality or characteristic of a thing which is necessarily there because the thing is that sort of thing. It follows upon the perfectly constituted nature or working-essence of a thing. Thus, we say that the ability to laugh is a property of man. For when human nature is fully constituted; when nothing (such as immaturity, organic defect, disease, unconsciousness) thwarts the normal functioning of that nature, man will inevitably be able to laugh. Yet the power to laugh is not a part of man's nature; it is something consequent upon that nature when perfectly constituted. A property is sometimes called an attribute. The properties of being are of two classes:
The transcendental properties of being are three:
The general properties of being are two:
b) The Unity of Being Every being has unity inasmuch as it is that one thing, incapable of existing as a multiplication of itself. For unity means undividedness, and to say that a thing has unity is to say that it is undivided. Of course, a thing made of parts can be divided into parts, but the unity of the thing consists in the fact that it is not divided, nor can it be divided and remain that identical thing that it is. A being as such is incapable of becoming a plurality of itself, a multiplication of itself, a series of repetitions of itself. Other things of the same kind may come from it by generation, but each of these things is itself and not the being from which it comes. A bodily thing divided into parts ceases to be that one undivided reality; it has no longer its being as that reality. And each part is now that one part; it is a thing with its necessary unity. The unity of a being is called transcendental because it is limited to no one class of things, but belongs to being as such. Whatever exists, exists in the oneness of its being. Whatever can exist, can exist only inasmuch as it can come into existence as that one thing. Therefore philosophers say Ens et unum convertuntur, "Being and unity are interchangeable." Of course, the concept of being as being is not precisely the same as the concept of being as one; there is a distinction of reason between being and unity; therefore these terms are not perfectly synonymous. Transcendental unity is of several types or aspects. We call it concrete unity when it is the unity of a thing itself, independently of the view of the mind. We call it abstract unity (such as unity of genus or of species) when it is the unity of the mind's concept of a thing. Thus John and his dog are each one concrete thing; but, in the abstract view of the mind these two are one inasmuch as they belong to the one genus, animal. Again, transcendental unity is essential if it is the oneness necessary to an essence, whether the essence be a substance or an accident; this is unity of simplicity in things not composed of parts, and unity of composition in things made of parts. In addition to transcendental unity we may mention here that unity which is proper to bodily things. This is quantitative unity or mathematical unity. In philosophy we call this type of unity predicamental unity. In considering substances, we must inquire what it is that determines the essential and concrete and predicamental unity of each; and we must also inquire what constitutes the thing in its essential and abstract unity as a specific kind of thing or member of a specific class. In a word, we must inquire what is the source or principle of the thing's individuality, and what is the source or principle of the thing's species. Now, among bodily substances, the principle of individuation is found in its material being, its quantified material. The principle of specification is found in that substantial element which makes the bodily substance in question an existing body of this kind; this is called the substantial form of the bodily substance. (Of matter and form we shall speak in some detail in the study of the Cosmological Question.) Here we must add, however, that when there is question of spiritual substances, these are not individuated, since only a bodily thing is, strictly considered, subject to individuation, that is, to quantified identification, to numbering as this one, this integer. Complete spiritual substances (and always we mean created and finite spiritual substances) are pure forms or substantial species, and not individuals. A being, by reason of unity, is that one thing, that idem ens; the Latin term gives us the English identity. A being has identity in or with itself alone, not with other things. It is but looseness of speech that permits us to say, for instance, "These two books are identical." The books are not identical, but alike or similar. We use more accurate speech when we speak of "identifying a person," for then we say who that person is himself, not that he is like some other person. A being is identical with itself, and this is the effect of its unity. The opposite of identity is distinction. Distinction is the absence of identity among two or more things or among two or more ideas of one thing. Distinction among things is real distinction; distinction between or among different mental aspects of one thing is logical distinction or distinction of reason. Logical distinction may be purely rational, lacking a basis in things, or it may have a foundation in reality. The distinction between a man and his weight is a real distinction, for the man is one thing and his weight another. The distinction between animal being and rational being in the one human person is logical, for the one identical being is here both animal and rational, and these terms do not indicate parts of that being, but different real aspects of that which is identical in the undivided person. But this logical distinction has a basis in reality, since there are beings which are animal without being rational (beasts) and beings, too, which are rational without being animal (the human soul after a death; angels, should they exist). The distinction between the meaning of a term and the meaning of its essential definition (and these two are identical meanings; an equals-mark might be placed between them; the definition is only a fuller statement of what the term means) is a purely logical distinction without a basis in reality. The old Latin terms for logical distinction are these:
Among bodily things and their material accidentals, real distinction (which does not necessarily mean separation or separability) results is a multiplicity or a multitudo. Inasmuch as the items of a multiplicity can be measured or counted, they make up a number. And number is defined as "a multiplicity measured by one," that is, a multiplicity which can be counted one by one.
c) The Truth of Being Every being, inasmuch as it is a being, is knowable by an adequate mind. And inasmuch as it is knowable, a being is the basis of the truth which exists or can exist in the mind which is adequate to know it. And this constitutes what we call the truth or trueness of being. The truth we speak of here is ontological truth, or truth of things, or truth of being, which is discussed in the study of the Epistemological Question. Truth involves mind. A thing or being is what it is. And it is knowable as such by an adequate mind. In this its truth consists. Indeed, mind comes first, for created being depends for it possibility upon the knowledge of it in the Creator's mind before it had any existence. Increate Being is Infinite Truth Itself, identified in perfect simplicity with Infinite Mind. Every being is true; every true thing is being. Omne ens est verum; ens et verum convertuntur. Being regarded as being is distinct by a logical distinction from being regarded as what is true; but between being and truth (that is, being and true being) there is no real distinction. Hence, there is no transcendental or ontological falsity.
d) The Goodness of Being Goodness is desirability or appetizability. A thing is good inasmuch as it can be the object of a tendency, appetite, or desire. Now being as such is capable of having the character of the goal or object of appetite. Therefore, being as such is good. We can say here, as we said when speaking of the unity and the truth of being, "Every being is good; every good thing is a being," Omne ens est bonum; ens et bonum convertuntur. There is a logical distinction between being as being and being as what is good, but not a real distinction. The goodness of which we speak here is ontological goodness. It is the goodness of things, of reality, of being. It is transcendental goodness, for it is coextensive with being which is transcendental. It consists in the fact that being as such (that is, anything positively existible) can be the aim, object, purpose, or goal of an appetency or desire. There are two other basic types of goodness, physical goodness and moral goodness.
Thus we notice that both physical goodness and moral goodness fit in with our general description of goodness as desirability or appetizability. The opposite of goodness is evil or badness. Evil is not being, but absence, lack, or defect of being. Inasmuch as positive being exists it is necessarily good by ontological or transcendental goodness. There is no ontological evil. But there is physical evil, and there is moral evil.
We can readily see from all this what is meant by the axiom Bonum ex integra causa, malum ex quocumque defectu, "For a thing to be (physically or morally) good, it must be wholly good; it is made evil by any deficiency or lack." We do not say that a thing is necessarily entirely bad because of one lack or defect, but it is in so far bad, and if the lack be of great importance it may be wholly bad, as in the case of the watch which lacks but a hairspring and is wholly useless for purposes of recording time. And, on the other hand, a thing, in so far as it approaches the full character of what it ought to be, is good. Thus we may say of bread that it is of good flavor but poor (or bad) texture.
e) Beauty and Perfection of Being Unity, truth, goodness, are transcendental properties of being, for they are coextensive with being; they are really (though not logically) identified with being itself. Along with being, these three properties are sometimes listed as "the transcendentals." The properties we are now to mention, that is beauty and perfection of being, are not transcendental, for, while they are properties of most beings, they are not properties of all; that is, they are not properties of being as such.
Summary of the Section In this Section we have defined property or attribute, and have indicated the meaning of transcendental property and of general property of being. We have defined and classified the unity of being, and have determined the principle of individuation and the principle of specification of creatural being. We have studied identity and distinction. We have learned what is meant by the truth of being and by the goodness of being. We have seen that the transcendental properties of being are coextensive with being itself, and distinct from being by only a logical distinction. Incidental to our discussion of transcendental unity, goodness, truth, was some account of multiplicity, of physical and moral evil, and of logical and moral falsity. We have briefly described the beauty of being, and have listed its objective and its subjective elements. We have mentioned the expression of beauty in the fine arts. We have defined perfection and have mentioned various types, phases, and degrees in which it appears.
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