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by David Kramer
Wittgenstein did NOT solve the problem of universals, as some students of philosophy have maintained. That was done quite well by Thomas Aquinas in the 13th century. Wittgenstein was NOT even dealing with the problem of universals, which is a problem regarding IDEAS and not meanings per se, nor words per se, nor even language per se. Of the four general theories about "universals" (ultra-realism, nominalism, conceptualism, and "moderate" realism), only moderate realism ("Universals are formally in the mind, but fundamentally in the things themselves") seems best for providing an adequate explanation of the status of universal ideas. Wittgenstein was dealing with a methodology, a technique, called "philosophical analysis" in which he raised issues regarding the "use" of terms in ordinary language. Philosophical analysis is a way of clarifying terms, concepts, and propositions. It is an "activity" which should prevent one from being led astray by the sometimes misleading appearances of language. It has sometimes been thought, erroneously, that Wittgenstein presented a "theory" of meaning which would aid philosophers in analyzing the meanings of words used in propositions. But Wittgenstein eschewed the idea that philosophy results in theories. For Wittgenstein, philosophy does not really have "content" and at most philosophy involves "description" and not "explanation." Philosophy's job was the "uncovering of one or another piece of plain nonsense." (in Philosophical Investigations) Philosophy simply puts everything in front of us but it does not explain or deduce anything. It does, however, untie "knots in our thinking," so "its results must simple," although "philosophizing has to be as complicated as the knots it unties." (quotes appear in Wittgenstein's Zettel) When we see 'more,' according to Wittgenstein, "our philosophical dissatisfaction will disappear." (in Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics) Seeing more should result in the disappearance of philosophical problems. Philosophy has the tools for the solution of philosophical problems at hand. So what is the purpose of philosophy? Wittgenstein answered that it was "to show the fly the way out of the fly-bottle." (in Philosophical Investigations) One of Wittgenstein's main contributions to modern philosophical thought was his "concept" of language-games, but there is not a "theory" of meaning nor a "theory" of language-games in Wittgenstein's work. Meaning and language-games are "concepts" related to each other and language-games are a way of getting at the meanings of words in any given language. James Bogen, in his "Wittgenstein's Philosophy of Language: Some Aspects of Its Development" (Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1972), suggested that "language games belong to a 'technique' for examining uses of words and sentences in ordinary language..." And, the way to clarify our propositions, according to Anthony Kenny's interpretation of Wittgenstein ("Wittgenstein" - The Penguin Press, 1973), is "to show how they are applied in language-games." The way to understand the meaning of a word is to consider it within the language-game to which it belongs. According to Wittgenstein, "For a 'large' class of cases - though not for all - in which we employ the word 'meaning' it can be defined thus: the meaning of a word is its use in the language." (in Philosophical Investigations) To understand the meaning of a word, then, is very much like understanding an action which does not make sense until one notices what the act does and, then, realize what the action is for, what its purpose is, and what meaning it has. The language-game in which a word is used is critical in understanding the meaning of the word. Language itself is a comprehensive form of life combining the most diverse elements according to rules which are flexible and varied. The language-game is representative of a form of life and words have meanings only within the context of the language-game. In sum, Wittgenstein's concept (not "theory") of language-games dealt with the way in which language is USED in discussions, including philosophical discussions. It dealt with CONTEXT as well as "family-resemblances." Wittgenstein did not propound philosophical theories; he was doing philosophical analysis. And he suggested a way of clarifying propositions by paying attention to the way words are USED. And I generally agree with his analysis. The so-called "problem of universals," which deals with the "status" of ideas (idea meaning the intellectual representation of a thing), has nothing to do essentially with the language-game concept. The problem of universals deals with IDEAS; Wittgenstein's work was with "terms" (words) and the USE of terms in particular contexts. Wittgenstein never developed a "philosophy," as many of us understand that term. Practically speaking, most of his intellectual life was devoted to methods and/or techniques of analysis. He did talk about ethics, for instance, but it was not ethics, strictly speaking, he was talking about, but how to clarify propositions used within ethics. The same applies to the other traditional divisions of philosophy. He never developed a metaphysics; he didn't even understand what it was. He never dealt with issues in the philosophy of inanimate nature (cosmology) or animate nature (rational psychology); he didn't have a cosmology in philosophical terms. And so on and on. To speak of a "Philosophy of Ludwig Wittgenstein" is to use the term "philosophy" in a very loose sense. There is simply no "system" of philosophy in Wittgenstein, at least not in the sense in which we talk about Spinoza's system, or Aristotle's system, or Kant's system. This does not, of course, disparage Wittgenstein's contributions to philosophical analysis. I am merely trying to point out that Wittgenstein did not solve the "problem of the universals," as some have asserted, and, in fact, did not really deal with the "problem." Furthermore, Wittgenstein never developed a comprehensive philosophy in terms of content; he was concerned with philosophy as an "activity." As for the matter of "truth," for those who do not know, Wittgenstein accepted a correspondence theory of truth, in which truth is viewed as a relation between an idea or proposition and its object, which seems to place him in the general (and maybe "moderate") realistic thread of thought in which we find Aristotle and many others. |
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