|
|
||
 |
|
|
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
|
|
||
|
|
 |
|
||
|
|
||||
|
|
||
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
||||
|
In discussing the sources of morality, we can speak of right reason. In a sense, we can also say that right reason is a source of morality, but it is more precise to speak of it as the measure of morality or, as it is sometimes called, the norm of morality. In addition, then, to the sources of morality as an answer to the question of how human acts become good or evil, we must consider right reason as the measure of morality. It is proper to a human being to live according to reason, the power by which man grasps what is true. It is this characteristic which distinguishes the human being from other living things. We know, also, that human acts are human insofar as they are voluntary acts, i.e. inasmuch as we will them. The rational and the voluntary both characterize human action in such a way that we will our actions according to what we know. To be moral is, first of all, to be subject to reason. But we must reason rightly. The measure of morality is not just reason, but right reason. What precisely does "right" mean here? It does not mean right reasoning in the sense that logical thinking is "right." Such reasoning belongs to the purely speculative order and to theoretical knowledge, whereas we are dealing with the practical order and specifically with the moral order. In the practical order we know that the end is primary and that we must be concerned with action as ordered to some end. We reason rightly in this order when we judge rightly of the end with the intention to will accordingly. Human reason, therefore, is the measure of morality in the sense that it is a rule for the human will by which the goodness of the will is measured. This observation, however, is a very general one, and presumably too general for an effective measure of morality. Let us try to make the role of human reason as the norm of morality more specific. We know, as we have mentioned, that in the practical order we must consider action as ordered to an end. Is it enough to judge rightly in relation to the absolutely ultimate end? True enough, all action is finally ordered to such an end, and if we do know what the ultimate end is and can see that because of such an end this or that action is to be done or avoided, such knowledge measures the morality of the action. For example, we can know through right reason that to murder someone turns us away from the ultimate end, even if we only know somewhat vaguely the ultimate end as happiness. But often the ultimate end seems to be remote for an action here and now. Our experience tells us that usually we seek a more proximate end by this or that means. In the previous chapter, we summarized the complex human act in terms of twelve steps which carry out the act. The first four steps concerning the end and, particularly, the judgment about the end and the intention of the end, locate where and how right reason operates as the measure of morality. It is through reason we judge the end sought; the rightness of the reason comes from our true judgment and from our intending the end we judge as truly good. As the measure of morality, then, right reason is true knowledge of moral principles, that is, of the ends of human action by virtue of which we know what is right to do. However, we cannot ignore altogether the order of means. As we know, once we intend an end seriously we then deliberate, consent, make a practical judgment, and finally choose the means leading to the attainment of the end sought. This is the completely practical order, the realm of prudence. This order of prudent action presupposes and follows upon the judgment of right reason in such a way that we can say right reason extends secondarily to the judgment of prudence in the completely practical order. The judgment of prudence, consequently, is directed by the right desire of a good end proposed by the intellect, that is, by right reason in its primary and essential function. The virtuous life -- that good moral life which is the indispensable means to happiness -- is the life of right reason in action. Knowing what the virtues are, we can seek to realize the good of the different virtues in our action. The good of justice, for example, will be judged as something we should will to possess in this action; similarly, with the good of temperance, fortitude, prudence, and so on. When we say, then, that right reason is concerned with judging action as related to some end we mean especially the good of virtue, for the good of virtue is an end constantly proposed through reason. This good of virtue is not the absolutely ultimate end, nor the most immediate end, but a relatively ultimate end -- the sort of end that is indispensable for leading us to the absolutely ultimate end. Two final points remain with respect to right reason. The first concerns the development of right reason in us: how do we come to reason rightly in the moral order? It may be presumed that ethics will be helpful, but the study of ethics is auxiliary at best. We need to turn to experience for a complete answer. We begin developing and forming right reason when we are very young, with our parents or guardians providing help and examples. As we grow older, we learn from the guidance and examples of teachers, friends and others, as well as from our own knowledge and experience. The laws of the community in which we live, both religious and political, give us further determinations of right reason as it is to operate in us. We come to know in time that what political laws express are to be obeyed not merely because law-givers say so but because they reflect, in varying ways, what we might call the law to which the state itself is bound, the universal or natural moral law. No state does and no state can make a law, for example, that murder must be done, because if it did it would violate a more fundamental law at once universal and natural. Right reason, then, is generated in us by external sources as well as by the natural development of reason within us. For those in the Christian and Judaic traditions, a second point follows directly from the first. Right reason, as far as it extends, operates effectively as a measure of morality. But right reason itself has a measure; it is subordinate to a more ultimate rule of morality beyond even that of the natural moral law. This more ultimate rule of morality is, again, reason -- not human but divine. Recognizing through human reason as we can that God exists, we recognize also that divine reason is a more ultimate measure of the morality of our action than our own reason. Human right reason, in fact, is the bridge between divine reason and our action. Apart from what we can know through human reason, divine reason is made manifest to us through revelation and becomes our supreme measure of morality. Adapted from Ethics: The Introduction to Moral Science, by John A. Oesterle, Ph.D. |
||||
|
Enrich Your Life With a Philosophy Book... Enrich Your Life With a Philosophy Magazine...
|
||||
|
|
|
|
||
|
|
||
[Homepage] [Newsletter] [Search] [Support the Academy] [Link to Us] [Contact the Academy] [Citing Articles from Our Website] [Privacy Policy & Disclaimer]
Copyright 1998-99, 2000-01, & 2002-03 by The Radical Academy. All Rights Reserved.