|
The
American Teacher and the Restoration of
Society
by Christopher D. Marsh, M.A., M.A.T.
|
Dis te minorem quod geris,
imperas:
Hinc omne principium; huc refer
exitum.
|
|
HOR.
|
CHAPTER
ONE
Introduction
The others having dropped the ball, the American
public school has been called the institution of
last resort, but it also has failed, as an organ
within a diseased body politic. Our political
system has failed to defend against the relentless
assault of science, or adequately safeguard against
the dangers inherent in every democracy, and
America now suffers from a multitude of social ills
described by David G. Myers in The American
Paradox: Spiritual Hunger in an Age of
Plenty. These social ills, however
serious, are but effects of systemic causes. The
underlying causes must be removed before we can
even hope to have good schools. Only then will it
be possible to establish the conditions necessary
for the cultivation and preservation of the teacher
of the future, without whom good schools are
impossible, and who will be an important instrument
for restoring society, by his ability to help
create citizens who are the best on the basis of
virtue, as well as in relation to the regime.
The problems which plague our schools are
symptoms of an ailing civilization, and the best
way to treat a symptom is to cure the
disease. But the first stage is diagnosis.
CHAPTER
TWO
The
Problems
The Root Causes of America's Social
Recession: Science and Regime
In his book, Myers presents a good case for his
contention that America, although materially
wealthy, is languishing in a "social recession,"
arising from the impoverishment of the human
spirit. Adducing much statistical evidence,
Myers shows that American society is characterized
by "radical individualism" and materialism,
accompanied by culturally high rates of divorce,
depression, violence, incivility, and teen
suicide. Myers is correct in his assessment
that these things warrant serious concern, implying
they may be harbingers and causes of the beginning
of the end of the American political
experiment.
Causation has always been more difficult in the
social sciences than in the physical sciences, and
while Myers does a commendable job within the scope
of his project, he does not dig deeply enough to
uncover the fundamental causes of his "social
recession," of which there are really only two:
science and our regime. I begin with the
former.
Science
Scienza Nuova
In 1543 Copernicus published his De
Revolutionibus, a treatise so specialized and
mathematical that few besides a technically
proficient astronomer can understand anything after
Book 1 (Kuhn, p. 134). But within this work of
technical and textual obscurity is the idea that
the sun is a star and the earth one of a number of
planets revolving around it. This simple
concept, ostensibly a theoretical model to solve
"the problem of the planets" inadequately addressed
by Ptolemy and his successors, initiated what
Thomas Kuhn calls "The Copernican
Revolution." Simply stated, this "revolution"
pulled the earth out from beneath our feet.
From the Middle Ages through the time of
Copernicus, Western man was secure in his knowledge
of his place in the universe. From an
assimilation of ideas from Aristotle, the Bible,
and, later, Aquinas, the Roman Catholic Church
which dominated Western civilization taught that
the earth was stationary and at the center of a
finite universe, a stage upon which the actions of
man were judged by a concerned Creator. Man
enjoyed a privileged position, not only on center
stage of God's creation, but also on its hierarchy,
as a unique and special creature, apart in kind
from the animals.
Science as we know it was not born until 1609,
when Galileo first turned his telescope toward the
moon. What he saw was a rough-hewn surface
characterized by craters, mountains and shadows,
and he concluded that the moon was similar in some
ways to the earth. Although this may not
appear very significant, what Galileo saw
contradicted everything the authorities of the day
said. According to Bryan Appleyard, Galileo saw
"the impossible." For "the entire culture from
which Galileo sprang was based upon the
2,000-year-old certainty that the moon, like all
else in the heavens, could not be like the earth"
(Appleyard, pp. 16-17). Scienza Nuova,
or the "new science," began with Galileo believing
what his eyes told him, by his trust in individual
human reason over the traditional authority of the
Church, and his invention of the scientific
perspective -- the idea of a detached, impartial
observer upon an objective external world
(Appleyard).
The science which existed before Galileo is more
properly called "wisdom," and it differed in every
respect from that which ruled after 1609. Its
foundation "was neither observation nor experiment,
but authority understood through reason. And
it was inseparable from that vast edifice of
explanation, the Roman Catholic Church" (Appleyard,
p. 18).
As Scienza Nuova matured, Bacon nurtured
it with Aristotelian empiricism combined with "the
acceptance of the modern view that we cannot simply
reason our way to the truth. Experiment and
observation are also required" (Appleyard,
p. 48). Descartes, rightly called the
first modern philosopher, provided the "new
science" with its rules and script (Appleyard, p.
47). He published his Discours de la
Methode in 1637, four years after the trial of
Galileo, and the Meditations in
1641. With these works Descartes introduced
the ideas of hyperbolic skepticism, the
disembodiment of mind, and "the reduction of God to
the status of a guarantee that the gaps in rational
argument can be filled" (Alasdair
MacIntyre). And when later philosophers
stressed the lack of necessity of God to the
argument, scientific man was left stranded on the
farther shore of skepticism (Appleyard, p. 57).
Thus, in Appleyard's eloquent words, science
"trapped us all in our private reasons. It
divided us from the world, locked us in the armored
turrets of our consciousness. Outside was an
alien landscape which was either illusory or
meaningless, inside was the only possession of
which we could be sure -- the continual, anxious
chattering of our own self-awareness. Our
souls were removed from our bodies" (pp.
56-57).
Although Galileo lost the battle to traditional
authority, he won the war. Copernicus took
away our privileged place in the universe,
Descartes our certainty. This "humbling of
man" was continued by succeeding scientists: Darwin
took away our conception of ourselves as unique and
special creations of a benevolent God, and after
Hutton, we were not only lost in space, but lost in
time. Finally, Freud took away even our
mastery of our minds (Appleyard).
I define "science," therefore, as "the
procedures and body of knowledge that sprang from
the innovations -- technical and intellectual -- of
the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries"
(Appleyard, p. 245), the view that "there is an
objective world outside ourselves which is
completely accessible to our observation and
reason" (Appleyard, p. 132). I assert that
science is a specialized type or subset of human
reason, that it is human reason in its purest form,
since science attempts to be perfectly objective
and impartial and entirely exclude emotions and
values. Therefore, what can be said of science
can also be said of human reason, with this
important note: that the converse of this
proposition is invalid.
And, finally, I preserve within the definition
that which prevailed up to 1900 -- sometimes called
"classical science" -- since many, if not most,
scientists retain an essentially classical outlook:
that science is the path to truth (Appleyard, p.
245).
Rationalism
Another term which needs defined is
"rationalism," since I contend that science grew
out of it. By "rationalism," I mean a faith in
human reason.
Appleyard says America "has had to abandon the
role of the state as spiritual provider" (p.
13). Although this is correct, it does not
mean that the modern liberal state does not have an
official religion. I agree with Walter
Lippmann that a state religion exists in the United
States, and that it is the religion of reason (p.
54).
In Colonial America, most of the states had
established religions. In Virginia, for
example, the state religion was Anglicanism.
But Thomas Jefferson disestablished the religion of
his state with his Statute for Religious Freedom,
which eventually found expression in the First
Amendment to the Constitution. According to
Lippmann, Anglicanism had "a creed as to how the
world originated, how it is governed, and what men
must do to be saved," and that "this creed was a
revelation from God" (p. 53). But after
Jefferson, "officially [Virginia's
citizens] had to believe that human reason and
not divine revelation was the source of truth"
(Lippmann, p. 57).
Now, few would disagree that a collective belief
in divine revelation as the source of truth
constitutes a religion, as with Anglicanism, but
what of a collective belief in human reason as the
source of truth?
Lippmann points out that it is the nature of
human reason to regard the conclusions to which it
arrives as tentative. So we can never fully
trust the conclusions reached by
reason. Therefore, as Lippmann says, it
requires "faith to believe that reason, though
never wholly successful, will at last conquer
reality" (p. 57). Thus, since faith is a
defining characteristic of a religion, and since
reason, like religion, presumes to explain reality,
there exists a religion of reason.
Science, as the purest offspring of rationalism,
enjoys uncontested the highest place within the
religion of our country. Science is the
holiest form of rationalism, and scientists are our
priests (Appleyard). Science is the
authoritative element of rationalism, its guiding
force.
One way science serves rationalism is by
providing it with a system of
morals. According to Appleyard, "Science, with
its denial of meanings and purpose as scientific
issues, can be seen as the opposite of
religion. But the way it turns this denial
into the social and ethical system of liberalism
means that it behaves like a religion" (p.
245).
I have therefore established that the United
States has an official religion, and that it is
rationalism, in which science holds the highest
place. So it remains to determine what sort of
religion this is.
First, it is clear that no rule in the moral
system of rationalism can be regarded as absolute,
since reason requires all propositions to be held
provisionally. And faced with strong
temptation, few will be restrained by a moral
imperative they suspect is only temporary, liable
to change or disappear as new knowledge is
discovered.
Second, the existence of a rule in this morality
depends solely upon the argument which supports
it. If a man, therefore, as a rational being,
is not persuaded by the logic of the supporting
argument, he is under no obligation to conform to
the rule. But even were he so persuaded, there
are few for whom this is sufficient for a change of
opinion, let alone motivation for an action toward
which one is naturally disinclined, as per
Franklin's famous quote, "So convenient a thing it
is to be a reasonable creature, since it enables
one to find a reason for every thing one has a mind
to do" (Franklin, p. 32). Therefore, with the
moral system of rationalism, each individual is
free to decide for himself which rules, if any,
should be followed. But it is difficult to
determine how this differs from no moral
system.
Third, God will play no part in any moral system
which rationalism may provide, since God is beyond
the purview of science. Thus, even if the
morality is noble and highly beneficial, it will
not have much power with the majority, since a
morality which lacks God is simply not
compelling. Throughout history there have
always been exceptions -- a few disciplined
Epicureans and Stoics, a few "pure and
disinterested spirits" among the scientists and
academics -- but these unusual men constitute a
"trifling minority" (Lippmann, p.
62). According to Lippmann, for "the great
humdrum mass of mankind" "the moral life is due not
to the acceptance of a set of rules but to a
transformation of the will" (p. 62). And for
most people this transformation requires submission
to a divine will (Lippmann, p. 61), not simply
"something greater than one's self," an expression
with currency these days. Indeed, when
challenged, the Modernist in Lippmann cannot
produce a single example from all of human history
of a "popular morality" "which has not had some
sort of supernatural sanction" (p. 62).
Science grew out of rationalism as a refined and
potent form of human reason, and it has proven an
extremely successful species. As Appleyard
notes, science cannot "coexist with alternative
explanations of belief systems" (p. 10). This
he convincingly demonstrates in the case of the
Western doctor and the primitive
tribe. Moreover, he asserts that this happens
"when [science] competes with other systems
within a single nation" (p. 10), science proving so
extraordinarily effective in comparison to these
other systems.
Science "is spiritually corrosive, burning away
ancient authorities and traditions" (Appleyard, p.
9). This is due not only to science's
devastating effectiveness, but also its basis of
authority, for science settles all questions at the
tribunal of human reason, whereas Protestantism,
for example, relies upon that of divine revelation
(Lippmann, p. 56). When science damages the
claims of a religion, it also undermines its source
of authority, for reason, as has been stated, holds
everything in doubt, and doubt, according to
Lippmann, is the negation of faith (p. 65).
Thus, science cannot provide a compelling
morality and disposes of any competing belief
system which is based on tradition, myth, received
opinion, poetic feeling, or divine
revelation. It is no surprise, therefore,
that, as the religion of the state, rationalism
leaves citizens in a "bewildered quandary"
(Appleyard, p. 13) and perpetual state of unease,
in which the comfortable prejudices and fictions we
need to live are under constant pressure. For
"science is not neutral, it invades any private
certainties we may establish as a defense against
the bland noncommittal world of liberalism.
It saps our energy" (Appleyard, p. 13).
Appleyard states, "At any one time scientific
man can only regard his knowledge as provisional
because something more effective might come along"
(p. 10). Here the expression "scientific man"
may be replaced with "American citizen," since,
privately, an American citizen can believe anything
he wants, but publicly, as a citizen, he must
regard his knowledge as provisional (Lippmann, pp.
53-54), since the official religion of his country
is rationalism.
But Lippmann teaches that "the common people
hate reason, and that reason is the religion of an
elite" (p. 56). This religion requires faith, but
Lippmann thinks "more faith than the ordinary man
can feel" (p. 57). He says most men
- cannot endure not being confident of their
conclusions. . . . [They] have no time
for speculation. They have too many
immediate worries. Ideas are of no use to
them unless they provide means of dealing with
the things that worry them. They feel
insecure. They have to make a living, and
they are constantly menaced by this and that, by
drought and plagues, by wars and oppressions, by
disease and death. An easy and tolerant
skepticism is not for them. They want ideas
which they can count upon, sure cures, absolute
promises, and no shilly-shallying with a lot of
ifs and perhapses. The faith of the people
is always hard, practical, and definite. And
that is why your religion of reason is not for
them. (p. 58)
Thus, our state religion requires more faith
than most of us are capable of, but nonetheless
affects us with the considerable force only a
religion is capable of exerting. We are
indoctrinated in science by our media, high
schools, universities and other institutions. Its
trappings, the products of technology -- the
practical application of science -- are
ubiquitous. Propagandists like Bronowski,
Hawking, and Sagan praise science and celebrate its
accomplishments without the appearance of being
offensive or misleading (Appleyard, p. 2). The
result of the pervasive influence of science,
according to Appleyard, is to make "it
progressively more difficult to sustain either a
morality or a spiritual conviction" (p.
11). Science is thus a fundamental cause of
the "social recession" described by Myers. The
other is our system of government.
-- Next
Page --
Copyright 2001, by Christopher D. Marsh. All
Rights Reserved. Reprinted here by permission of
the author.
Christopher D. Marsh received a B.S. degree
(summa cum laude) from the University of
Pittsburgh, an M.A. from Duquesne University, and
an M.A.T. degree from California University of
Pennsylvania. He holds a teaching certificate in
mathematics and lives in Pennsylvania.
|