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Aristotle
on Friendship
"Man is by nature a social animal," says
Aristotle. Thus, there is a strong and even
instinctual impulse to live in the company of
others. Why then are not small tribal enclaves the
final form of social life? What is it about the
polis that makes it the end toward which
other and more primitive forms of affiliation
evolve? The reason for the polis cannot be
simply self-defense or trade. Pirates defend
themselves and trade is possible among those with
no settled communities at all. The polis is
a lawful realm which imposes duties and discipline,
thus creating obligations and selfless commitments;
it is the setting in which the most significant
aspects of our humanity can be realized. The model
of the good polis lies in the nature of
friendship.
Friendships are formed and maintained on
different grounds. There are those who maintain
friendship solely for the sensual pleasure it
affords, but such pleasure must be ephemeral. The
friendship lasts only as long as the pleasure is
reciprocated and forthcoming.
There are those who maintain friendship for
reasons of utility, such that John befriends Peter
owing to Peter's being useful to John and vice
versa. Utility, too, is not enduring; the
friendship lasts only as long as it is useful and
others may prove to be more useful or the
usefulness may no longer be reciprocated.
Then there is friendship grounded in virtue,
such that one desires for one's friend what is
best for one's friend, and this for the sake of
one's friend. This perfected or completed
friendship, for its aims do not go outside the
friendship itself. Such friendships are virtuous
because they conduce to the good. But perfected or
completed friendships is not characteristic of most
friendships.
Virtuous or perfected friendship is possible
only between those who are relevantly equal, though
the measure of equality is not quantitative but
proportional. As the the audience and the great
performer are not equal, but each grants to the
other what is due: that is sufficient equality. The
only degree of inequality that would entirely
negate the possibility of friendship would be that
which divides humanity from the gods.
Virtuous friendship is the ground and model for
the good polis. But what does Aristotle mean
by virtue? Virtue includes the intellectual
abilities that are central to our human life --
greatness in art, learning, leadership. These
virtues are partly innate but largely learned from
masters. Moral excellence is also learned. Rather
than being intuitive or residing in the soul of
superior individuals, it is acquired by lifelong
practice -- the habit of virtue.
Moral virtue is a mean between excesses, a
balance point. The goal of virtue is perfection,
conceived of as just the proper relation of
elements -- the golden mean, the middle way. Anger
is natural; all men are endowed with it by nature,
and nature does nothing by chance. What must be
practiced in order to be virtuous is anger at the
right objects: anger at injustice, for instance, is
proper. Rage is not virtuous because it is
excessive and uncontrolled. Courage is the virtue
at the balance point between heedlessness and
cowardice, which are both excessive forms of the
same thing. Virtuous actions can only be done by
conscious individuals making choices.
Men of virtue form a minority, though they are
able to promote what in fact are the greatest of
human interests. Mob rule is the rule of passion.
Virtue is possessed by the few. Those fit for
virtuous or perfected friendship are also those fit
for rule. The few can rule generally only by
law.
The polis, Aristotle says, precedes the
individual; that is, it is the family, the original
polis, and the social group from which our
natures as individuals, as mother, father, friend,
teacher, arise. The developed polis depends
on friendly relations among members, and lasting
friendly relations depend on virtue.
Aristotle also identifies the attraction we have
to the rule of law as arising from the law's
philikon, or "friendliness" towards us. That
is, by bringing out what is best in us, the law
functions as would the virtuous friend to whom we
are attracted by, again, what is best in us.
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