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Chance,
Luck, Accident
The Traditional
Position of Classical
Realism
Terms like "chance," "luck," "accident," and
similar expressions are found in all languages.
They show the firm conviction of people that many
things happen in this world which are beyond the
control of any regulative principle in nature. Such
occurrences are, therefore, conceived as happening
without being the result of purposive action: no
end or purpose and consequently no final cause
determines their course. What truth is there in
this view?
The following are instances of the occurrences
which are usually considered to be the result of
"chance" or "luck" or "accident." A man spades his
garden, in order to plant some vegetables, and
uncovers a hidden treasure of which he had no
knowledge. This is a case of "good luck," and he is
said to find this treasure by "chance" or
"accident"; it is also spoken of as "good fortune."
Years after a war, a farmer plows a field which had
been the scene of a battle, hits a hidden shell,
and is hurt by the explosion. He had "bad luck" or
"misfortune," and his injury was the result of an
"accident." Two cars, speeding along separate
highways which cross each other at right angles,
meet at the intersection, and a collision occurs.
The meeting of the cars was "by chance," and the
collision was an "accident." What is chance,
or luck, or accident?
The Principle of Causality guarantees that no
effect can happen without an adequate efficient
cause to account for it. "Chance" results,
therefore, must never be understood in the sense
that effects occur without a cause: such events
would be impossible. But what is meant by chance
results is that certain effects are not
intended by the active agents under these
particular circumstances. An effect may be
"intended" by directly willing it, if the
agent is free in its activity; or it may be
"intended" because a thing has the natural
tendency to produce a definite effect.
Thus, if I deliberately throw a ball, I "intend"
the movement of the ball through the air. Gravity
has the natural tendency to bring the ball back to
earth; it also "intends" this downward motion.
Neither of these two movements is due to "chance,"
"luck," or "accident." When, however, a certain
effect is not intended freely or naturally, as just
explained, it is said to be due to "chance,"
"luck," or "accident." For instance, when I throw a
ball, and the ball, without my intending it, hits a
man on the head, this is an "accident." Because,
although I freely "intended" to throw the ball, I
did not intend the man's head as the target for my
marksmanship; and so, too, although gravity
attracted the ball in virtue of a natural tendency
and thus "intended" its downward course, it had no
natural tendency to attract the ball in such a
manner that it would alight upon the man's head.
That the ball struck his head was due to an
unfortunate conjuncture of causes which was
intended neither by me nor by nature.
In accidental occurrences two distinct
factors must be considered. Each efficient
cause intends a certain result, either freely or
because of a natural tendency, and the causality of
the efficient cause is directed and determined by
an end or purpose which the efficient cause seeks
to realize as the direct effect of its action; the
action of each cause is, therefore, intended
separately and independently of the other,
so that there is no concerted action intended by
the different causes with relation to each other.
The coincidence of these separate and
independent lines of action, therefore, is not
intended by these efficient causes and lies outside
the scope of their individual ends and purposes;
therein lies the element of "chance," "luck," and
"accident," because no regulative principle
controls the meeting of these separate and
independent actions: their meeting or conjuncture
just "happens." Accidents thus occur
incidentally to some intended action.
Aristotle therefore defines chance, or
luck, or accident (for they mean essentially the
same thing) as
- the incidental
production of some significant result by a cause
that took its place in the causal chain
incidentally, and without the result in question
being contemplated.
And he goes on to say:
- Clearly then luck
itself, regarded as a cause, is the name we give
to causation which incidentally inheres in
deliberately purposeful action taken with
respect to some other end but leading to the
event we call fortunate [or
unfortunate].
(Physics, Bk. II,
Ch.V.)
Aristotle's observation here is very acute and
is borne out by the analysis of an accidental
occurrence. Two automobile drivers take their cars
out into the country. One drives from east to west,
and the other from north to south. Their action is
purposeful; each intends to ride, and drives his
car in accordance with his purpose. That the two
cars, driven at their respective speeds, will meet
at the intersection of the two highways at a
particular moment and thus cause a collision, is
something unforeseen and unintended by both
drivers. Hence, the conjuncture of these two
sets of efficient causality is only
incidental to the purposeful action of each
driver and is beyond their knowledge and
control.
Since there is no finite controlling factor
which brings about this conjuncture of efficient
causalities, such accidental effects cannot be
foreseen and foretold with any degree of certainty.
Irregularity and lack of constancy
are the characteristic marks of events that happen
by chance. It follows that events and phenomena,
which occur regularly and constantly in nature
according to physical law, cannot be the result of
chance; whatever is constant, normal, and according
to type, is contrary to the very concept of
chance.
Is the universe, then, governed by chance
or purpose? The law, order, and harmony
manifest everywhere in nature is the best evidence
that the universe is governed by purposeful
design. Aristotle expresses his view on this
question as follows:
- In general, the
theory [of chance, as the dominant factor in
the universe] does away with the whole order
of Nature, and indeed with Nature's self. For
natural things are exactly those which do move
continuously, in virtue of a principle inherent
in themselves, toward a determined goal; and the
final development which results from any one
such principle is not identical for any two
species, nor yet is it any random result; but in
each there is always a tendency toward an
identical result, if nothing interferes with the
process.
-
- A desirable result
and the means to it may also be produced by
chance, as for instance we say it was "by luck"
that the stranger came and ransomed the prisoner
before he left, where the ransoming is done as
if the man had come for that purpose, though in
fact he did not. In this case the desirable
result is incidental; for, as we have explained,
chance is an incidental cause.
-
- But when the
desirable result is effected invariably or
normally, it is not an incidental or chance
occurrence; and in the course of Nature the
result always is achieved either invariably or
normally, if nothing hinders. It is absurd to
suppose that there is no purpose because in
Nature we can never detect the moving power in
the act of deliberation...That Nature is a
cause, then, and a goal-directed cause, is above
dispute.
(Physics, Bk. II, Ch.
VIII.)
Nature, of course, has no intelligence of its
own and as such cannot select the goal of its
action as an end or purpose for which to strive.
Nevertheless, intelligence is required in order
that nature can be "a goal-directed cause,"
striving toward the realization of its
all-encompassing purpose according to precise laws.
Hence, the presence of a purpose or goal in nature
demands the existence of a Supreme Intelligence
outside itself.
One of the most eminent of modern physicists,
Max Planck, says: "The most perfect harmony and
consequently the strictest causality in any case,
culminates in the assumption that there is an ideal
spirit having a full knowledge of the action of the
natural forces as well as of the events in the
intellectual life of men; a knowledge extending to
every detail and embracing present, past, and
future." (in his work The
Philosophy of Physics.)
Most Classical Realists have argued, of course,
that this "ideal spirit" is God.
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