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Essays, Opinion, & Commentary |
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The Traditional View of Classical Realism
Scientists and philosophers often speak a different language when they discuss questions referring to "cause" and "causality." The scientist, as a scientist, is not supposed to be a philosopher or metaphysician. He is not interested in the ultimate explanation of things, but in those which are relatively proximate in character. In his proper field of research the term "cause" has a different meaning for him than it has for the metaphysician who seeks to penetrate into the deeper reasons of things. What the scientist calls "physical causes" are but the necessitating and indispensable conditions or antecedents of physical events, not the "producing agencies" which exert a positive influence in bringing things from non-existence to existence through a process of productive change or through creation. Thus, John Stuart Mill says:
As long as the scientist restricts himself to this negative attitude, the philosopher need not quarrel with him. But sometimes the scientist surreptitiously turns metaphysician and denies the validity of the concept of efficient causality as proposed by the philosopher. According to him the "physical causes," in the sense just indicated, are the only true causes; "efficient causes" simply do not exist in nature. It thus becomes imperative to vindicate the validity of the concept of "efficient causes" and "efficient causality" in a philosophic sense. CAUSE, CONDITION, OCCASION The efficient cause is that by which something is produced. A being of one kind is changed into a being of another kind by means of the action of the agent or efficient cause. In order to arrive at a better understanding of the problem, it will be necessary to compare the nature of an efficient cause with the concepts of "condition" and "occasion." These concepts are closely allied. A condition is something required in order than an efficient cause can act, but it does not contribute any positive influence toward the production of the effect itself. That the filament of an electric bulb may become incandescent, it is necessary to push the button of the switch, so that the electric circuit will be closed; but the pushing of the button does not make the filament glow. Clear weather is a condition for effective artillery action; but the weather has in itself nothing to do with shooting off a cannon. If a condition is so necessary that the efficient cause cannot produce its effect under any circumstances without it, it is called a conditio sine qua non, i.e., "a condition without which the cause does not act." Thus, the knowledge of a good is the conditio sine qua non for an appetitive faculty to strive for the good. Light is the conditio sine qua non for the act of seeing. It is obvious, however, that the intellect itself does not "strive" for the good, but the appetitive faculty; nor does the light "see," but the eyes. Sometimes the "condition" consists merely in the removal of an obstacle for the cause; the presence of the obstacle hinder the cause from acting. Thus, if a person's feet are tied, it is a necessary condition for walking that the impediment be removed. If a person is locked in a room, the door must first be unlocked before he can leave the room. The rope and the locked door are obstacles which must be removed; but that the person actually walks, that is due to the person's own efficient causality. An occasion is a circumstance or combination of circumstances which affords an opportunity for an efficient cause to act. A crowd is an occasion for a pickpocket to ply his trade. A tavern may be the occasion for a drunkard to indulge his pet vice. Election time is the occasion for political oratory. The meeting with a friend may be the occasion of a confidential chat. The difference between and "occasion" and a "condition" should be fairly obvious. A condition is such that its fulfillment or presence is required in order that an efficient cause can act; an occasion is not a requirement for action, but its presence is something which merely gives the opportunity for action. Thus, the presence of a tavern gives a drunkard the opportunity to obtain the liquor needed to get intoxicated, and the tavern is for this reason an "occasion" for intoxication; but the possession of a quantity of liquor, sufficient to become intoxicated, is required, and this possession is, therefore, a "condition" for intoxication. Neither a condition nor an occasion amounts to the causality of an efficient cause. They exert an indirect influence on an agent to act, but it is the action of the agent which positively influences the production of something; and efficient causality consists precisely in this productive action of the agent. To take the example just mentioned; it is neither the presence of the tavern (occasion) nor the possession of the liquor (condition) which makes the drunkard intoxicated, but the actual drinking (action) of the man himself (agent). KINDS OF EFFICIENT CAUSES Efficient causes may be viewed from a variety of standpoints. This gives rise to a number of classification. First Cause and Second Cause By "First Cause" we understand one whose causality is absolutely independent of any other cause or being, and on which all other causality depends. This is God or Supreme Being. God is the uncaused Cause of all things. Since He is the source of all being, He must be independent of all beings in everything He is. And since all beings owe their essence and existence to Him, their causality is ultimately dependent on Him. By "second cause" we understand one whose causality is dependent on some other cause or being. Since all creatural beings are dependent in their essence and existence on God, the First Cause, their causality is also dependent on Him. Hence, creatural beings are "second causes." Physical and Moral Cause A "physical" cause is one which produces an effect by its own direct action. For example: the carpenter who makes a table, the boxer who defeats his opponent by knocking him unconscious, the boy who throws a snowball through a window, the violinist who draws his bow across the strings, the philosopher who thinks, the orator who gives a speech. A "moral" cause is one which inclines a free agent to act; this may be done by an appeal, by a threat, by a promise, etc. The politician is a moral cause, when he induces an official to give him a position by paying him a sum of money. A criminal who extracts money from his victim by means of blackmail, is a moral cause. The detective who wrings a confession from a suspect by threats of the "third degree," is a moral cause. Principal and Instrumental Cause A "principal" cause is an efficient cause which produces an effect in virtue of its own power. An "instrumental" cause is an efficient cause which produces an effect in virtue of the power of another cause. Principal and instrumental causes are correlatives; the one implies the other. A carpenter uses a saw to cut a board; the saw is the instrumental cause, the carpenter is the principal cause. A hunter kills a deer by shooting it with his rifle; the rifle is the instrumental cause performing its action under the direction and control of the hunter. It should be noted that both causes exert their own peculiar causality. The saw cuts and the rifle shoots; but they would not act at all and not in this particular manner, were it not for the direction and control of the principal cause. Cause per se and Cause per accidens A cause is said to be a cause per se, it it has the natural tendency to produce a particular effect or, if it be a free agent, if it intends freely to produce it. It is a cause per accidens, if it produces an effect toward which it has no natural tendency and which the free will (if that be the cause in question) does not intend. When I take a hammer and deliberately drive a nail into a board, I am the cause per se that the nail enters the wood; but if I thereby hit my finger, I am the cause per accidens for that, because I did not intend that particular effect as the result of my attempts at carpentering. Proximate and Remote Causes A "proximate" cause is one which produces its effects directly, in virtue of its own action, without using the action of some intermediate cause. When I walk, eat, push a cart, swing a stick, catch a ball, etc., I am the proximate cause of these effects, because they are the results of my own direct action. In melting snow, in boiling water, in making a piece of iron glow, in expanding the mercury in a thermometer, etc., heat is the proximate cause, because these phenomena are the direct result of the heat's action. A "remote" cause is one which produces an effect through the direct action of some intermediary cause or causes. When my finger pulls the trigger of a rifle and explodes the charge of the cartridge, a bullet is ejected which travels through the air and kills a deer at a considerable distance; the bullet is the proximate cause of the death of the deer, while the exploding charge, the action of my hand and arm, and the deciding influence of my will, are the remote causes of the killing. Naturally, the ultimate cause in this particular chain of causes is my will. Total and Partial Cause A cause is said to be the "total" cause, when the entire effect is produced by its action; if only a part of the entire effect can be attributed to a particular cause, it is a "partial" cause. The masons, carpenters, plumbers, plasterers, etc., who assist in the construction of a building, are all part-causes of the construction. But when I lift a plank, push a table, walk a mile, dig a hole, throw a ball, etc., I am the total cause of these effects. Univocal and Equivocal Cause A "univocal" cause is one which produces an effect similar to itself in nature. Thus, the oak produces an oak, the maple a maple, the dog a dog, the robin a robin, man a man. Living beings, therefore, which reproduce their own kind, are univocal causes in this respect, because these effects are similar to themselves in nature. An "equivocal" cause is one which produces an effect dissimilar to itself in nature. When a dog, for example, gnaws a bone, the splintering of the bone is an effect dissimilar to the nature of the dog; the dog is the equivocal cause of this effect. When a robin builds a nest, the robin is an equivocal cause of the nest. A painter is the equivocal cause of his paintings, a writers of his writings, a builder of his buildings, because the effects are different in nature from himself as their cause. Necessary and Free Cause A "necessary" cause is a cause which is determined by its nature to produce a certain effect, provided the requisite conditions are present. If I throw a stone into the air, gravity must pull it back to the earth, because gravity is a necessary cause and is determined to a definite line of action without choice. A "free" cause is a cause which is not compelled to act, even though all the requisite conditions for action are present. Thus, man is free in very many of his actions, like walking, eating, smoking, playing, etc. He can perform them or omit them, as he chooses. After this brief enumeration and explanation of the various classes of efficient causes, as handed down to us by the traditions of philosophy, we must turn our attention to the far more important question of the existence of such efficient causes. In considering this question, we must accept the term "efficient" cause in the meaning previously given: as something which, through its positive action, produces something. THE EXISTENCE OF EFFICIENT CAUSES Briefly, the status of the question is this: Is there really a causal connection between things? Does the being and existence of things really depend intrinsically upon other things? Does one reality actually produce another reality? In a word, are there efficient causes in the universe? Phenomenalism in its various guises denies the existence of efficient causes. It contends that we cannot possibly know anything of the reality of "causes." "Cause" is an obscure metaphysical notion without any objective foundation in the things or in the events of nature. Our knowledge is restricted to sense-perception; and the senses can contact only the phenomena or appearances of things, but not their inner nature or energy. Hence, according to phenomenalistic philosophers, the only facts accessible to our knowledge are objects in a local and temporal sequence: things are perceived as following each other; that is the total extent of our valid knowledge. We perceive antecedents and consequents, nothing more. Man arbitrarily changes this local and temporal sequence in serial happenings into an imagined "causal connection," in virtue of which the later phenomenon is considered to be "produced" by the earlier. David Hume attacks efficient causality in the following words:
He then takes the case of the will commanding bodily members to act, and argues:
John Stuart Mill agrees with this view of Hume:
For Kant and his disciples, a knowledge of efficient causes in the world is also impossible, but for a very different reason. According to the traditional view, these efficient causes would be the things-in-themselves, as they exist outside the mind in the universe. The mind, however, according to Kant, cannot know such things-in-themselves. "Causality" is a category of the mind, and the "category" is an innate, a priori mental form which acts as a regulative principle in arranging our judgments. But the category of causality is not derived from our experience of things and events as they actually exist in nature, and as such tells us nothing about the efficient causality of such things. The causal connection which we place between things and events is purely mind-made and has value only for the mind and its operations. The occasionalists, like Malebranche and some others, accept the efficient causality of God, but deny it altogether of creatures. God is the only efficient cause in existence. If creatures seem to produce effects, this is only a mistaken notion on our part: it is God alone who acts, using the creatures as His instruments. In opposition to these views, traditional Classical Realists contend that the concept of efficient cause is an objectively valid concept, based on the data furnished by experience and demanded by reason as the only true explanation of the facts. What must be proved, of course, is, that a mere "invariable sequence of antecedents and consequents" is not sufficient to account for our concepts of "cause and effect," but that there exists the actual production of one thing or event by another thing or event. |
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