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Essays, Opinion, & Commentary |
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PROOF FOR EFFICIENT CAUSALITY In proving the existence of efficient causality among things, it will be necessary first to show that the assumptions which underlie the position of the opponents are unwarranted; then it will be necessary to adduce the positive evidence which supports the view that efficient causality actually is present in nature. The opposition against the existence of efficient cause is based primarily on an adverse theory of knowledge, and not on the facts themselves. As such, the denial is made primarily on epistemological grounds. Kant, since he maintained that we can have no knowledge of things-in-themselves, naturally had to deny any knowledge of efficient causality as existing among these things-in-themselves. It is the purpose of epistemology to vindicate the sources of our knowledge, among them being sense-perception, consciousness, and reason. In this connection we will restrict ourselves to one consideration. If Kant's fundamental assumption were correct, we could know nothing of the existence and activity of other minds beside our own, because these "other minds" are evidently things-in-themselves. But we have a knowledge of other minds. This is proved conclusively by the fact of language, whether spoken or written or printed. We do not use language to converse with ourselves; conversation is essentially a dialogue between our mind and "other minds." Hence, we can do acquire knowledge of things-in-themselves, as they exist in themselves, through the medium of language. Kant's fundamental assumption is, therefore, incorrect. Consequently Kant is wrong, when he asserts that we could know nothing of efficient causality if it existed among things. If we can show that efficient causality exists in ourselves, we prove that efficient causes exist in nature, because we ourselves are a part of nature. Hume, Mill, and others, denied efficient causality because of their phenomenalism. According to their assumption, all we can perceive are the phenomena, and phenomena are revealed to us in our senses merely as events in "invariable sequence." Whenever, then, we perceive phenomena as invariably succeeding each other in place and time, we are prompted by habit and the association of ideas to imagine a causal connection to exist between them, so that the earlier event is the "cause" and the later event the "effect." This, in their view, the origin within our mind of the concept of efficient causality. This is a deplorable error. The fact is, we clearly distinguish between mere "invariable sequence" and "real causality." We notice, for example, an invariable sequence between day and night every twenty-four hours, and we are convinced that this sequence has been maintained throughout the ages; at any rate, we have never experienced a single exception in this sequence. We also notice, when the day is hot and humid, and a sudden, decisive drop in temperature occurs, that a rainstorm develops; this sequence, however, is by far not as invariable as the sequence between day and night. No one, however, dreams of considering day and night as being in any causal connection, as if the day "produced" or "caused" the night. On the other hand, we certainly are convinced of the existence of a causal connection between the states of the weather, although the occurrence has by no means the invariability of the sequence we observe between day and night. Hence, the fundamental assumption of the phenomenalists, that our observation of "invariable sequence" is the basis of our concept of "efficient causality" is opposed to fact. In accordance with their principle, the phenomenalists must maintain a parity in all cases of invariable sequence. We, however, do not judge the cases to be the same. There must, then, be some other reason why we judge a causal connection to exist between phenomena, between things and events. Besides this, we clearly distinguish between conditions and causes, even if there be an invariable succession between them. We know by experience that we are unable to see objects except in the presence of light (that is, without the use of special modern gadgetry). In the dark all objects are invisible; light must first be admitted before we can see. There is an invariable sequence between the presence of light and the seeing of objects. According to the phenomenalists' principle, therefore, we should judge that light is the "cause" of vision, because its presence invariably precedes vision. But we do not so judge. We consider light to be the condition, not the cause, of vision, although vision must always "follow after" the admission of light in sound eyes. And so it is with all "conditions." It is entirely untrue to assert that we obtain out concept of cause and effect from the observation of the frequency of an occurrence through habit and the association of ideas. We judge of the presence of causality even in single cases. When the first steam engine, or the first telephone, or the first automobile, went into operation, no one waited for the hundredth or thousandth appearance or operation in order to apply the principle of causality; this was done immediately. Similarly, when an accident or disaster occurs, we do not wait until it occurs frequently before we think of cause and effect; we look for the causal connection as soon as it occurs. On the other hand, though we a million automobiles follow each other down the highway, we never think of the one being the cause of the other, due to association of ideas or habit. Hence, mere sequence, no matter how frequent and invariable, is not the principle which forces us to accept the concept of efficient cause and causal connection as valid in nature. The facts themselves compel our reason to judge that the relation of cause and effect exists between things. Our Experience Proves Causality. A critical analysis of our internal states and of external nature convinces us of its reality. Internal consciousness is an indubitable witness to the fact that our mental activities not only take place in us, but that they are also produced by us. Such are the activities of thinking, imagining, desiring, willing. They are clearly observed to be "produced" by ourselves, and this production is observed to be due to our own action, so that their existence is intrinsically dependent on this productive action. Thus, we are conscious that we deliberately set about to solve a certain mental problem by combining ideas into judgments, judgments into inferences, and a whole chain of inferences into an extended argumentation. With the help of our imagination we work out poems, essays, melodies, pictorial scenes, machines, etc., before they ever appear outside the mind. We desire certain things and consciously will them; and we are fully aware that we are the responsible agents of these desires and acts of the will, because we produce them by direct action. No one can deny these facts; they are present for anyone to observe. But if the conscious knowledge of ourselves as the active agents in the production of these internal activities is unreliable and false, all our knowledge, of whatever character, must be adjudged an illusion, because knowledge rests ultimately on the testimony of consciousness. In that case, however, universal skepticism is the logical outcome, and that means the bankruptcy of all science and philosophy. Hence, our consciousness is a trustworthy witness to the fact of efficient causality within us. External experience proves the same. We speak. Language is an external expression of our internal ideas. It is impossible for us to doubt that we actually produce the sounds of language which express our own thoughts. We intend to express these thoughts in conversation, and we actually do; and we are conscious of the fact that we are the agents in this process. If I am a painter, I set up my canvas, mix the paints, apply the colors, and with much effort project my mental images upon the canvas in form and color; I know that all this is not a mere "sequence of events," but a production of something in virtue of my own actions. So, too, if I take pen and ink and write something on paper, I not only perceive one word following the other, but I am also convinced beyond the possibility of any rational doubt that I am the "author" of the words appearing on the paper. Neither Hume, nor Mill, nor any other phenomenalist, disclaimed the authorship of the books which appeared in their name, nor would they refuse to accept royalties from their publishers on the plea that they were not the efficient causes of these books. Again, we are convinced that many bodily actions are of a voluntary nature. I move my hand, my arm, my head, and I know that these members move because I make them move. If I am set for a sprint, and the gun goes off, I jump into action. But I am conscious that there is not a mere sequence between the shot and my running; and I am also conscious that the shot does not make my limbs move so rapidly; it is I myself who decide to run and who deliberately produce this action of running. This is all the more obvious to me, when I compare this sort of action with the action of the heart or of the liver, etc., over which I have no control under ordinary circumstances. I clearly distinguish between "sequence" and "causality." Hume, as we have seen, claims that we cannot know of this causal connection between our will and our bodily movements, because we cannot "feel" the energy involved in this operation. This merely proves that we do not observe the whole process. Of the fact of causation itself we are most assuredly aware, and we are also aware of the exertion and fatigue involved in producing these effects; but if we "produced" nothing, or if there were no energy expended in the production (for instance, in walking, working, running, making a speech, etc.), why should we feel exertion or fatigue? And thus our external experience also testifies to the fact that we ourselves are efficient causes which produce definite effects. In order to disprove the opponents' contention, no more is required than to prove a single case of causality. We could, therefore, rest our case with the above argument taken from the internal and external experience of our own selves. However, we contend that the existence of other efficient causes in nature is also capable of proof. Reason demands efficient causality in nature. If reason demands that we admit the existence of efficient cause acting in the universe, the philosopher cannot refuse to accept the verdict of reason, because science and philosophy are based on the operations of reason. Now, if I am convinced beyond doubt that I am the cause of the picture I paint, what am I to conclude, when I see someone else paint a picture? I must conclude that he is doing what I did, when I went through the same series of actions. Of course, all that my senses can observe is a "sequence" of actions; my reason, however, demands that he, too, must be the "producer" of his picture, just as I am of mine. This is common sense and sound logic. And the same principle applies to all actions performed by others, when I observe them doing the same things that I do or have done: if I am an efficient cause, they must be efficient causes for the same reason. There is a complete parity between my actions and their actions, and so I know, through a conclusion of reason, that real causality exists in nature in these and similar cases. It is only a short step from instances of such activities to productive activities in the world at large. A farmer places seed into the soil. After a period of time it sprouts, grows, and eventually matures into an abundant harvest. Here something new has originated. And so with animals and men. We were not here a hundred years ago; but we are here now. We perceive new living beings coming into existence daily. They are new realities. But if they did not exist always and do exist now, they must have received existence. Consequently, they must either have given themselves existence, or some other being did. In either case their existence is a "produced" existence, a "caused" reality, because they were brought from non-existence to existence. That, however, which exerts a positive influence through its action in the production of another, is an efficient cause. Here again, scientists admit the thing, though some of them will not admit the name. In general, of course, scientists do not deny the existence of efficient causality. Efficient causes, therefore, exist in nature. We must, then, reject phenomenalism as false and accept efficient causality as the only adequate interpretation of the facts as observed. THE PRINCIPLE OF CAUSALITY The Principle of Causality is formulated in a variety of ways: Nothing happens without a cause; whatever begins to exist must have an efficient cause for its being and existence. One might put it into the following form: Whatever passes from a state of non-existence into a state of existence, must have an efficient cause for its existence. This latter formulation includes every kind of real production, whether absolute or relative. A real production is absolute, if the total being passes from non-existence to existence without being produced out of the potentiality of pre-existing matter; this is "creation." It is relative, if the being is produced out of the potentiality of pre-existing matter, or if it passes from one kind of being into another kind of being; this substantial or accidental "change." In either case the principle demands an efficient cause to account for the real production. The validity of the Principle of Causality has been rejected by only a few philosophers. Among these is Hume. He says:
The position of Hume and of the phenomenalists is logical, when we consider that they deny the existence of efficient causes in general and admit nothing but an invariable sequence of events in time and space. The majority of scientists admit that there must be a cause for every effect. In this sense, the Principle of Causality is the basis of all sciences. Unfortunately, however, for the interests of harmonious thought and understanding between philosophers and scientists, the latter at times understand by the "Principle of Causality" something different from the traditional interpretation as given above. A perusal of the writings of modern physicists might lead the unwary reader to the view that these scientists reject, or at least doubt, the principle that every effect must have a cause. They speak of the necessity of "reformulating" or "reinterpreting" the "Principle of Causality." Some even assert that its validity has been disproved by modern physics. A careful examination of their views, however, will show that they are speaking of the purely scientific, not philosophic, Principle of Causality. What is the scientific Principle of Causality? Briefly, it can be stated thus: When a future event can be predicted with complete certainty from the occurrence of a previous event, they are connected in such a manner that the future event is caused by the previous event. The predictability of the future event is the test or criterion of causality. This does not mean, of course, that the future event is considered to be causeless, of it cannot be forecast with accuracy by the scientist; it merely means that the scientist in that case cannot be certain which particular event is the particular cause of such and such a particular effect. The scientist, therefore, attempts, with his Principle of Causality, or predictability, to deduce from a present event the existence of a future event, so that he can conclude from cause to effect: if the cause is given, what effect must follow and can be predicted? It will be seen from this that the "scientific" Principle of Causality is quite different in meaning and scope from the "philosophic" Principle of Causality. The "philosophic" principle argues the other way around, namely, from effect to cause; if a being passes from non-existence to existence, it must be a "produced" being (effect) and as such demands an adequate efficient cause to bring it to existence. While the scientist is interested in deducing a specific effect from a specific cause, the philosopher is interested in discovering whether any and every effect must have a cause. It would be wrong, therefore, to think that the scientists are in opposition to the philosophers regarding the validity of the Principle of Causality in its philosophic meaning. The scientists merely quarrel among themselves about the validity of their own "scientific" principle, namely, whether effects can be accurately predicted from a scientific knowledge of the physical causes. Their question does not affect the question of the philosophic Principle of Causality in its traditional meaning. After these preliminary remarks, we must now turn to the problem and ask ourselves: Must every being passing from non-existence to existence, whether relatively or absolutely, be brought to existence through the active influence of an adequate efficient cause? The answer is affirmative. An analysis of the ideas contained in the Principle of Causality will make the principle evident. In other words, the Principle of Causality is an analytical principle, independent of observation and the inductive inferences of science. By the very fact that a being passes from on-existence to existence, it is assumed and stated that at first it was non-existent. In that condition it was as such only possible, i.e., capable of existing. In this state of possibility the "act" or perfection of "existence" was not present in any form within the possible being; otherwise it would have been existent at the very time it was non-existent, which is impossible because contradictory. If and when this non-existent but possible being passed into a state of existence, it must have received the act of existence from somewhere and someone. Now, there are only three possible ways in which this being could have received its act of existence: either it received it from "nothing," or from itself, or from some other being. It is impossible that it could have received existence from "nothing." Since "nothing" possesses no entity or existence within itself, it cannot give anything and cannot account for anything. If this possible being depended on "nothing" for its existence, it could never receive the act of existence and would remain forever merely possible, i.e., non-existent. Hence, it could not pass from non-existence to existence. But the supposition is that it did become existent. Consequently, it did not receive its act of existence from "nothing." Could this possible being have received existence from itself? It could not. A possible being, from the standpoint of physical actuality and physical entity is nothing: this lies in the fact that it is only a possible being. As a possible being it is as yet in a condition of non-existence, and it becomes actual by receiving the act of existence. If it were to give itself existence, it would be necessary that it produce itself. A being, however, that does not as yet exist and is actually nothing, cannot produce anything, least of all itself. This is evident. To "produce" would mean to "act"; and to "act" would mean to "exist," because no being can "act" before it "exists." Hence, under the above supposition it would exist, because it acts and produces; and it would not exist, because its existence is assumed to be the effect of its own act. That is, however, impossible, because it involves a contradiction: it would exist and not exist at the same time. Consequently, a being that passes from non-existence to existence cannot receive this existence from itself. The sufficient reason, why a possible being passes from non-existence to existence, is not found in "nothing," nor is it found in this possible being itself. But it is supposed to pass from non-existence to existence. Hence, by a process of elimination, it is clear that some other being must give to it the act of existence. To "give the act of existence," however, means to produce it by a positive influence. If it did not exert any "positive influence," it would not do anything and could not give anything; but in that case nothing would happen to the possible being, and the latter would remain in its condition of mere possibility, which is non-existence. This other being must, then, be an existing thing itself and give existence to the possible being by means of a positive influence. But to produce a being, i.e., to bring it from non-existence to existence, by the positive influence of its own action, is the definition of an efficient cause. We have thus established the truth of the Principle of Causality: Whatever passes from non-existence to existence, must have an efficient cause for its existence. AXIOMS REGARDING EFFICIENT CAUSES Cause and effect are proportionate. The effect cannot be greater than the cause producing it. Otherwise a part of the effect would be without a cause, and that is contrary to the Principle of Causality. Again, the cause cannot have an actually exerted causality which is greater than is required to produce the effect. Otherwise the cause would (partly) not be a "cause," since that part of its action would not produce any effect. No effect can be more perfect than its adequate cause. This is obvious. Otherwise there would be an effect, or part of an effect, without a cause to produce it and give it existence. This would be in violation of the Principle of Causality. The cause must contain within itself the perfection of the effect. No being can give what it does not possess. Hence, the cause must contain the perfections of its effects either formally, virtually, or eminently. Nothing can come from nothing; ex nihilo nihil fit. The meaning is: whatever happens must have an efficient cause to account for its happening. Nothing has nothing to give; therefore, it cannot produce anything. This follows from the Principle of Causality, as just explained. Every Agent acts in a manner similar to itself. Action flows from the nature of the agent. Since the action depends on the nature of the agent, the nature cannot give rise to an action which would be at variance with itself: the agent, therefore, can act only in a manner similar to its nature, i.e., to itself. For this reason the effect must also, in some way, resemble its cause, otherwise the cause would not have contained the perfection of the effect. Action follows being; agere sequitur esse. All actions are the exercise of the operative powers of a thing. These operative powers proceed from the nature or being of the thing. Hence, the action of a thing must be proportionate to the being and follow the manner of this being.
Notes: 1. System of Logic, III, V, para. 2. 2. An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, Section VII, Part I, para. 50. 3. Ibid., para. 52. 4. System of Logic, III, 5, para. 2. 5. Treatise on Human Nature, Bk. I, Part III, para. 3.
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