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Revisiting the Intellectual Heritage of a
Free Society (continued)
The Late Modern
Period
For John-Baptiste
Say (1767-1832), natural law underlies economic
behavior making it universal, orderly, and
predictable. He emphasized the role of reason
noting that people tend to be rational, but also
that they are not omniscient. Say rejected the
labor theory of value and stressed that production
is the cause or source of consumption. Production
is primary and necessary for a person's existence
and metaphysically precedes consumption. He
explained that wealth is created by production (not
by consumption) and that a man's production
determines his ability to demand. Say maintained
that there could be no long run glut of commodities
supplied because prices in a free market will
adjust to bring about proper proportions. He also
championed savings noting that they cause
subsequent growth in capital and in aggregate
output. Furthermore, Say was against taxation and
loans to the government because they reduced the
wealth that would be exchanged in the private
sector.
British defender of individual freedom and
critic of state coercion, Herbert
Spencer (1820-1903), believed that inexorable
human progress develops naturally when people are
free and their moral rights are protected. His law
or doctrine of equal freedom declares that a
person's freedom is restricted only by the equal
freedom of others. When equal freedom is the
ultimate principle of justice individuals are
happier and more flourishing. Spencer states that
happiness can only be attained if a person is
allowed to express his right of freedom to do all
that his faculties induce him to do.
Spencer's case was deterministic and based on
Lamarckian evolutionary theory. His notion of
universal causation leads him to deny any theory of
free will. Spencer maintains that human nature
adapts over time to the conditions of social
existence and that acquired characteristics are
imparted to later generations. He explains that
reason is an adaptive mechanism and an apparatus to
promote an individual's life-sustaining actions.
Spencer says that habitually-repeated
live-affirming actions lead to pleasure and become
intuitive and that new emotions adapt to new
conditions.
Spencer explains that social order does not
require deliberate design and that evolution leads
to differentiation. Spencer thought that
individuation was a value generated by the
evolutionary process. He envisions change from a
homogenous social structure to a heterogeneous one
with the highest stage of community life being one
of laissez-faire capitalism. Distinguishing between
a militant society, in which war prevails and the
government controls the lives of the citizens, and
industrial society where people produce and trade
peacefully, Spencer observes that the state
interferes with natural evolutionary processes. He
anticipates the development toward a society where
conduct is regulated by moral principles and
competitive markets.
In ethics, Spencer argued for a type of rational
egoism. He explains that the evolutionary process
is progressive in a moral sense given the
appropriate conditions of a free society. Spencer
contends there is an innate and evolving moral
sense through which men access moral intuitions and
from which moral conduct can be derived. This moral
sense represents the accumulated efforts of
inherited and instinctual experiences.
Carl
Menger (1840-1921) developed a number of
fundamental Austrian doctrines including the
causal-genetic approach, methodological
individualism, the connection between time and
error, and more. Menger incorporated purposeful
action, uncertainty, the occurrence of errors, the
information acquisition process, learning, and time
into his economic analysis. He was an immanent
realist who considered a priori essences as
existing in reality. As an Aristotelian
essentialist, he wanted to investigate the essences
of economic phenomena. His goal was to discover
invariant principles or laws governing economic
phenomena and to elaborate exact universal laws.
Menger acknowledged the co-existence of different
but complementary approaches to economics &endash;
the realistic-empirical and the exact. To find
strictly ordered exact laws he said we had to omit
principles of individuation such as time and space.
This entails isolation of the economic aspect of
phenomena and abstraction from disturbing factors
such as error, ignorance, and external
compulsion.
Menger taught that there are objective laws of
nature and that goods have objective properties
that make them capable of fulfilling men's needs.
He states that goods have no intrinsic or inherent
value and that value is a judgment made by
economizing individuals regarding the importance of
particular goals for maintaining their lives and
well-being. People have needs as living,
conditional entities. The value of goods is
contextual and emerges from their relationship to
our needs. Subjective value (i.e., based on one's
personal estimation) can be viewed as individual,
agent-relative, and objective. According to Menger,
judgments are subjective but the truth or untruth
of them can be determined objectively. The truth
requires correspondence of facts with the judgment
that is made. Menger thus contends that economic
subjectivism is compatible with philosophical
realism.
The Contemporary
Period
Building upon the work of Menger, Ludwig
von Mises (1881-1973) reconstructed economics
upon the foundation of a general theory of human
action. His goal was to develop an edifice of
irrefutable, coherent, universally applicable,
formal economic theory using logical deduction and
the sole axiom of human action without employing
any other empirical or analytical assumptions. He
says that it is possible to deduce the entirety of
the logic of economic behavior from the fundamental
undeniable axiom that men act. Mises contends that
the concept of human action is universal,
intuitive, a priori, and automatically built into
each person's mental structure. His action axiom is
the introspectively known fact that men act. As a
neo-Kantian, Mises sees the category of action as
part of the human mind. He contends that all of the
categories, theories, or laws of economics are
implied by the action axiom.
Not only was Mises dissatisfied with Menger's
Aristotelian methodology, he was also critical of
Menger's value theory. He said Menger's value
theory was not consistent enough and that it
retained elements of the objective value theory of
the classical economists. Mises' sense of value is
formal and indicates nothing about whether an end
is, in fact, valuable. He speaks of nonnormative,
personal, and subjective acts of valuation. His
subjective view of value takes human ends as the
ultimate given. All action is therefore viewed as
rational. For Mises, economics is a value-free
science of means rather than ends.
Mises' utilitarianism proceeds from the method
of axiomatic reasoning from true premises &endash;
his utilitarianism is a priori. He deduces that
division of labor and social cooperation are more
effective and more efficient than social conflict
as a means of attaining one's self-interest. Social
cooperation is voluntary, contractual, maximizes
individual free choice, and results in greater
prosperity in society. Mises views social
cooperation and coordination as a proxy for
happiness which is similar to the Aristotelian
notion of human flourishing. He says that although
economics is value-free and apolitical, it is still
the foundation for a free polity. Mises explains
that value-free economics leads a person to form a
free society because the achievement of one's goal
is far more likely when people are left free than
when they are not. He maintains that it is by means
of its subjectivity that praxeological economics
develops into objective science. Mises, the
praxeologist, takes individual values as given and
assumes that individuals have different motivations
and prefer different things.
The philosophy of Ayn
Rand (1905-1982) is a systematic and integrated
unity that is founded on the axioms of existence,
identity, and consciousness. Rand explains that
knowledge is based on the observation of reality
and that to attain knowledge a person employs the
processes of induction, deduction, and synthesis.
Her epistemology transcends both apriorism and
empiricism. She contends that it is possible to
obtain objective knowledge of both facts and
values. Rand says that the essential
characteristics of a concept are epistemological
(she really means contextual and relational) rather
than metaphysical.
Rand maintains that values are epistemologically
objective when they are discovered through
objective conceptual processes and that they are
metaphysically objective when their achievement
requires conforming to reality. She argues that
man's life is the ultimate value and the standard
of value for a human being &endash; a creature
possessing volitional consciousness. Her
naturalistic value theory states that it is the
concept of life that makes the concept of value
possible and that reason is a man's only judge of
value. Rand states that it is possible for a person
to pursue objective values that are consonant with
his own rational self-interest. According to Rand,
ethics is rational, objective, and personal. Her
rational egoism is based on the Aristotelian idea
that the objective and rational end of a human
being is his flourishing and happiness &endash;
egoism is a virtue because nature requires it. A
person has the natural right to initiate his own
conduct in line with his own judgment. She views
rights as the link between a person's moral code
and society's legal code.
Murray
Rothbard (1926-1995) did not accept Mises'
neo-Kantianism, but still argued that the action
axiom is true-he says that a person becomes aware
of action through experience in this world.
Rothbard, working within an Aristotelian or
Thomistic tradition, maintains that the action
axiom is a law of reality that is empirical rather
than a priori.
Rothbard contends that economics as a science is
value-free and that economics and ethics are
separate disciplines. He does go beyond economics
to formulate a metanormative objective ethics that
affirms the essential value of liberty. Rothbard
explains that liberty deals with matters of private
property, consent, and contract. He maintains that
liberty supplies a universal ethic for human
conduct and provides a moral axiom &endash; the
nonagression axiom which holds for all persons no
matter their location in time or space.
Rothbard derives a radical dualistic separation
between political ethics and personal ethics. He
distinguishes between the metanormative sphere of
politics and the normative domain concerned with
moral or ethical principles of one's flourishing
&endash; there is a huge difference between having
natural rights and the morality or immorality of
the exercise of those rights. He considers
nonaggression to be an absolute principle prior to
any foundation for personal morality. An
individual's personal moral values are separate
from, but dependent upon, the existence of a
liberal social order. Being morally neutral
regarding various individuals' values and goals,
Rothbard ended his ethics at the metanormative
level. Considering the state to be a totally evil
coercive institution, he was an anarcho-capitalist
who advocated natural order with competing
security, defense, conflict resolution, and
insurance suppliers.
Friedrich
A. Hayek (1899-1992) was concerned with the
nature, scope, limits, use, and abuse of reason and
formulated a largely antirationalist theory of a
free society based on the inevitable ignorance and
fatal conceit of intellectuals who think that they
can design an economy better than what would result
from the voluntary interactions of individuals.
Developing an elaborate attack on constructivist
rationalism, Hayek explains how little men know
about what they design. He says that bureaucrats,
whose fated conceit is their undue faith in reason,
have no way to make intelligent decisions with
respect to deliberately designing or planning an
economy. Hayek observes that centralized policy
leads to the suppression of creativity, growth, and
progress. He argues that relevant knowledge cannot
be centralized in the hands of a person or a group
who make such policy. Seeing a very limited role
for reason, Hayek says that any person's knowledge
is limited, incomplete, and uncertain. He,
therefore, favors concrete practical knowledge and
institutions and social order that are the product
of human actions but not of human design.
Emphasizing the importance of decentralized
decision making, Hayek explains that markets employ
knowledge beyond what could be acquired by a
central authority. He says that knowledge is a
product of trial, error, and adaptation resulting
in unplanned evolutionary progress. For Hayek, all
knowledge is essentially tacit existing in the
habits or dispositions of people to act in a
rule-governed manner. He views social institutions
and rules of conduct as vehicles of knowledge.
According to Hayek, moral conventions are not
objective, invariant, or immutable and they are a
part of the evolving and spontaneous social order.
He states that moral conventions frequently are
unable to be articulated. His evolutionary
epistemology and ethics emphasize the
socially-constructed nature of man &endash; norms
are ingrained in the biological and social
structure of men and their markets. Hayek contends
that people develop ideas passively and
intuitively. Hayek does not defend free will
&endash; he says that free will is a phantom
problem. As a post-Kantian, he believes that the
categories of men's minds evolve. Hayek has a
mechanistic and evolutionary concept of science and
does not acknowledge natural laws or natural
rights.
He does say that society requires rules of
conduct that are minimal and spontaneously
generated. Hayek distinguishes between two types of
law &endash; general rules of justice (i.e.,
general principles of conduct) and rules concerning
the internal operations of government. Despite
this, he ultimately accepts some form of welfare
safety net. In the end, Hayek was not a consistent
thinker and he failed to complete a systematic
political and economic philosophy.
The neo-classical Chicago School economist,
Milton
Friedman (1912- ), did not provide a
philosophical case for a free society. Instead, he
relied on skepticism, ethical subjectivism, the
notion of the greatest happiness for the greatest
number of people, and the results of detailed
empirical studies of government intervention.
Friedman explains the errors of statism, skillfully
refutes interventionist arguments, and applauds the
coordinating mechanism of the free market, but has
little to say about the nature of man or the
ethical basis of capitalism. His highest ethical
principle is the absence of coercion &endash; he
explained that political freedom could not be
attained without economic freedom including private
property. Friedman attempts to demonstrate the
superiority of a free society on purely empirical
grounds.
Friedman's major achievements occur in the
fields of monetary history, monetary theory, and
consumption analysis. His economics is actually
somewhat Keynesian in that it is macro-economic and
demand-focused. Friedman's positive economics says
that a theory is useful if the theory allows
individuals to predict occurrences of some
phenomenon. He desires accurate predictions and
simplified assumptions. Friedman rejected
introspection and the realism of assumptions. He
even applauds the virtues of descriptively false
assumptions and has said that wildly inaccurate
representations of reality in assumptions are
acceptable if accurate predictions occur. Friedman
is a falsificationist who states that confirming a
proposition does not add to the probability that a
theory is true. For him, abstraction involves a
theory in which many actual characteristics are
disregarded as absent in the theory. Friedman views
any theory as deficient and false when it does not
specify all of the characteristics of reality
including all irrelevant, non-explanatory, and
extraneous ones.
Public Choice economist, James
M. Buchanan (1919- ) has analyzed the nature,
workings, and failings of governmental, political
and bureaucratic processes. Expanding economic
analysis to politics, he built upon contractual and
constitutional foundations in his theory of
political and economic decision making. Buchanan's
methodology includes rational choice, individual
utility maximization, contractarian rights, and
politics as exchange.
Buchanan employs deductive logic and conjectural
history to discover how a constitutional order
could have come about. He states that a legitimate
social structure must ultimately stem from
individual choice. His proceduralist
contractarianism uses the Hobbesian model when he
deduces contractarian consent for limited
government as an alternative to anarchy and
lawlessness. Buchanan's social contractarian
approach repudiates the possibility of natural law,
natural rights, and objective moral values.
Although Buchanan's hypothetical state of nature is
somewhat Hobbesian, he also believes that man has
Lockean characteristics &endash; Buchanan is not as
pessimistic as Hobbes.
Buchanan's contract theory of the state explains
that people agree to a social contract because of
their desire to survive. He observes that men make
constitutional decisions under a veil of ignorance
or uncertainty and that under this veil unanimity
is both conceivable and likely. He argues strongly
for the principle of unanimity at the
constitutional stage of collective choice. Buchanan
states that constitutional-level law places
restrictions on individual freedom that permits
people to progress. It follows that a coercive
agency, the state, originates by necessity to
enforce the social contract.
Buchanan discusses two levels of public choice
&endash; the first or constitutional level
establishes the rules of the game and the second or
post-constitutional level deals with playing the
game within the rules. Constitutional politics sets
boundaries for what ordinary politics is allowed to
do. According to Buchanan, ordinary political
decisions are often made by majority voting
&endash; the unanimity principle is not feasible at
this stage. Buchanan wants a new constitution that
requires much higher than majority agreement at the
post-constitutional level in order to make it more
difficult to fund government activities.
Harvard philosopher, Robert
Nozick (1938-2002), tried to justify the state
and to dismiss anarchy. Nozick begins by merely
assuming the existence of Lockean individual rights
&endash; he makes no attempt to derive them from a
philosophical examination of human nature. He sees
natural rights as limits to action or as boundaries
that circumscribe the "moral space" around an
individual. Unfortunately, his moral space doctrine
and Lockean natural rights are not underpinned by a
convincing moral theory. Nozick's sole reason for
his theory of rights is a deontological appeal
based on intuition. As a Kantian deontologist, he
has also said that there exists no unambiguous
concept of human nature that always defends
individualism. As many have observed, there is an
incoherence, inconsistency, and incompleteness in
Nozick's body of thought.
Nozick says that in the state of nature, a man
may enforce his own rights by defending himself. He
contends that it is from this state of nature that
rational and rights-respecting behavior will lead
to a limited government form of political order. He
attempts to show how a state would arise from
anarchy through a process involving no morally
impermissible actions. Nozick explains the
emergence of the state, as dominant protection
agency, through self-interested choices of people
in the state of nature. He says that a monopolistic
defense agency will arise and agree to supply
protection to all those who have contracted with
smaller protection agencies that it drives out of
business. Many critics have commented that, if
force had been used to establish the state's
monopoly, then the state may have come about
immorally. Nozick's entitlement theory of justice
emphasizes just acquisition of property and is
based on Lockean ideas. He explains the role of the
government is to protect natural rights including
property rights. Nozick also defends the idea of
process equality which means equal treatment before
the law.
Nozick wants people to be free to voluntarily
join together in the pursuit of a good life. He has
said that the minimal state should go no further
than enforcing the most basic level of ethics
required for peaceful cooperation &endash; a state
limited to protection against force, fraud, and
theft and concerned with enforcing contracts is
justified. According to Nozick, only negative
rights (i.e., the ethics of respect) should be
coercively enforced by the state. The ethics of
respect requires voluntary cooperation to mutual
benefit and its principles mandate the respect of
another's life and autonomy. He says that the
ethics of respect is the foundation that should be
compulsory across all societies &endash; all other
ethical levels are optional and concerns of
personal choice. Nozick emphasizes that there is a
duty not to interfere with another individual's
domain of choice.
Thomas
Sowell (1930- ) draws from Hobbes, Smith, Hayek
and Friedman in developing his constrained or
tragic vision of man and society. Accepting the
realities of the human condition, Sowell sees
trade-offs but no solutions. He explains that a
man's personal knowledge is far less than organized
systemic knowledge and that markets economize on
the knowledge needed by any one individual &endash;
no one has to possess complete information in order
for the economy to convey relevant information
through prices. Championing the supremacy of
systemic rationality, Sowell states that knowledge
consists largely of the unarticulated experiences
and rationality embedded in traditions, customs,
and systemic processes such as markets, families,
and languages. He maintains that individuals lack
the intellectual and moral ability for deliberate
comprehensive planning based on intentional
rationality. Sowell views freedom as a process
characteristic and rights as boundaries or
rigidities that limit the exercise of government
power and establish areas for individual
discretion.
A leading Catholic social theorist, Michael
Novak (1933- ), relies on he work of Aristotle,
Aquinas and the Scholastics, Tocqueville, Maritain,
Locke, Smith, and the Austrians to develop his
concept of democratic capitalism which consists of
a market economy, a limited democratic government,
and a pluralistic moral-cultural system. Novak
particularly heralds the Austrian School of
Economics for its contributions to the restoration
of economics as a field worthy of study by moral
philosophers. He views personalism as described in
Catholic papal encyclicals especially Pope John
Paul II's view of the human person as subject, to
be consonant with Austrian economic theory. Novak
is thus concerned with "the acting person."
Novak explains that the human person is free,
self-responsible, and accountable before God. He
says that the right of personal economic initiative
fulfills the image of God inherent in every person
because each one of us is capable of insight and
love. Concerned with the moral virtue of
creativity, Novak maintains that people need a
social system to enable them to create wealth in a
systematic and sustained manner. Explaining that
the human mind is the cause of wealth, he describes
human economic progress as the capacity to create
more in a lifetime than one consumes. Novak sees
the free market and private ownership leading to
positive-sum transactions in which each party
benefits.
Skeptical of state power, Novak sees the limited
state and the rule of law as man-made means of
securing liberty and justice for all men. He
espouses the principle of subsidiary, freedom of
association, and the importance of mediating
institutions. Novak has done much to improve upon
and update the teachings of Aquinas and to bring
the Catholic Church ever closer to embracing
capitalism.
Lessons
Learned
This brief review has shown that throughout
history thinkers have held a range of perspectives
with respect to the theoretical defense of a free
society. We can learn a great deal from a survey of
political and economic thinkers. We can draw from
and integrate the teachings of many of them in our
efforts to construct a conceptual foundation and
edifice for a free society.
My next essay will see what we can use to
elucidate a theory of the best possible political
regime on the basis of proper conception of the
nature of man, his actions, and society. Such a
paradigm for a free society will address a range of
issues in metaphysics, epistemology, value theory,
economics, ethics, and so on in a systematic
fashion. We will find that many of the ideas
employed have had origins deep in the history of
political and economic thought. There are a number
of contemporary thinkers whose writings, I believe,
agree with most of what I will present in my next
essay. Among the most prominent are Tibor R.
Machan, Douglas B. Rasmussen, and Douglas J. Den
Uyl.
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