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Essays, Opinion, & Commentary |
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December 13, 2007
by Kile Jones [Accepted
for presentation at the University of York, British
Society for the History of Philosophy,
Abstract: Does Hume believe that there is no such thing as causality in the external world? Or does he just believe that causality cannot be known through experience? This debate, coined the 'New Hume Debate' has become a prominent issue in contemporary Hume studies and philosophy of science. This article covers Hume and his general position on causality, then explains the current debates over Hume, and ends with an argument, in the line of G.J. Warnock, that causality is non-falsifiable, and thus that Hume is consistent in his analysis on causation. There are current debates in philosophy, specifically the philosophy of science, over what exactly Hume says regarding causality. According to Hume are there actually causes and effects that occur or just various successions of events? Does Hume mean to show that causality is not actually there or merely that if it is there we could never know it? Better put, does Hume attempt to construct a metaphysic or simply promote a sceptical epistemology? This paper aims to clarify what Hume says in respect to causality while critically evaluating the opinions of Hume scholars on this topic. In it I will be arguing, along with G.J. Warnock, that causality is non-falsifiable [1], and thus that Hume, being consistent, does not (nor cannot) affirm or deny that causality actually occurs. In his Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding (which is a summary of the larger Treatise) Hume devotes much of his time on causality, and most of it, is spent arguing against those who say that causality is necessary, uniform, and demonstrative.[2] Hume argues thus:
Here Hume is arguing that their could be numerous, even unexpected, events which occur from a supposed 'cause.' This is meant to show that "every effect is a distinct event from its cause" and that any effect cannot be "discovered in the cause."[4] The Law of Causality assumes the Uniformity of Nature, which Hume shows is not necessary. It could be possible for nature to change her course and not stay on any fixed path [5], and if this is possible, than how do we say with any certainty that similar causes will produce similar effects? All that we can say is that, given multiple instances of uniform events, it is likely that such and such will take place.[6] On a similar vain, Hume uses the analogy of a person brought suddenly into the world:
It is true that this passage is specifically set in the context of Hume's empirical arguments against causality being known apriori, yet it yields interesting comments on his view of causality. In the second half of the above quote, the person brought suddenly into the world would not reach the idea of cause and effect at first. Hume is well aware that eventually the mind will form habits and customs by which it expects certain events to occur, yet, Hume wants to point out that strictly speaking causality is not observed. All that is observed is a succession of events, which may be arbitrary, occasional, or following some pre-established harmony.[8] What this teaches, in the least, is that Hume is sceptical of anyone who says that there is causality with absolute assurance. Hume is not, strictly speaking, affirming or denying that causality actually occurs; simply that causality cannot be empirically verified or thought to be a necessary apriori truth. Hume likewise denies that causality be known because it contains within it the ideas of necessity and infallibility:
Hume notes that when we think of events happening causally we assume that there is a necessary connexion between them, meaning, that they are infallibly tied to each other had one event not occurred, its effect would not have followed.[10] But how, Hume asks, do we discover this connexion? The fact is that we do not discover this connexion; we infer it from observing multiple instances of uniformity. The problem with assuming a necessary connexion between one event and another, according to Hume, is that we project our hypothesis into the future. We expect that events which are yet to occur will mimic the present, yet we cannot observe the future and cannot be entirely sure that nature will remain the same. Hume speaks of this when he says:
These two propositions are indeed different: the former Hume allows as sensible, but the latter goes beyond what can ever be observed or logically verified. To this Hume responds, saying that "the connexion between these propositions is not intuitive."[12] Thus causality, according to Hume, should not be taken for granted as some obviously accessible fact of the world, for it is only an inference which cannot be known. The question we must now ask ourselves is whether or not Hume denies causality in the metaphysical sense or in the epistemic sense. In recent years there has arisen a debate over what Hume thinks about causality; the Debate has been coined 'The New Hume Debate', originally due to Kenneth Winkler's article 'The New Hume' (1991) and subsequently in a compilation of articles which Rupert Read and Kenneth Richman organized titled 'The New Hume Debate' (2000). On one side of the debate are the so-called 'New-Humeans' (Strawson, Wright, and Craig, to name only a few) who feel that Hume was a causal realist who never denied that causality actually occurs in the external world; on the other side are the 'Old-Humeans' (Garrett, Winkler, and Popkin to name only a few) who hold that Hume most likely denied objective causation, or at least that we could never know that causation occurs even if it did. Both sides see themselves as accurately representing Hume's philosophical system and correctly interpreting his texts. Let's now go ahead and take a close look at what these scholars are debating over. Galen Strawson, one of the most prominent 'New-Humeans' feels that the old interpretation of Hume goes wrong in jumping from the epistemic claim "all we can ever know of causation is regular succession" to the positive ontological claim that "all that causation actually is, in the objects, is regular succession."[13] Strawson feels that this does injustice to Hume's overall skepticism, for
Yet, even though Hume cannot affirm or deny that causality definitely occurs in the objects, he, according to Strawson and other New-Humeans, holds to view of 'natural beliefs.' Natural beliefs are those everyday beliefs which we take for granted and assume to be true, like the existence of external objects and causality. These beliefs are 'natural' in that we assume them without initially challenging them, yet they, according to Hume, cannot provide adequate warrant for epistemic assent. Nonetheless, Strawson and others wish to point out that Hume assumes a sort of realism when speaking about external objects and causality, due, in part, by natural beliefs. John Wright, while speaking on Hume's scepticism, argues this point in a straightforward fashion:
Strawson, like Wright, quotes numerous texts where Hume seems to distinguish between 'sensible qualities' and 'secret connexions', noting that "when he does so, he is ipso facto thinking of objects in a realist fashion as something more than perceptions."[16] What this means is that Hume is a realist, but a sceptical one. He assumes natural beliefs (like everyone else) but then goes on to prove that we can never know that these beliefs are objectively valid. Thus within the sceptical realist interpretation of Hume there is a striking difference between belief and knowledge, one that attempts to balance natural beliefs with overall epistemic doubt. Kenneth Winkler, being one of the Old-Humeans, denies that Hume could have believed in causal realism. He clarifies what the debate is actually over:
What Winkler is proposing is that scholars like Strawson, who attack the standard interpretation of Hume because it makes 'positive ontological assertions' are in fact, attacking a straw man. According to Winkler the standard interpretation of Hume does not make such claims, it only promotes 'a refusal to affirm' attitude regarding causality in the external world. This may be true of Winkler and a few other 'Old-Humeans' but certainly not all of them. For instance, J.A. Robinson, John Mackie, and Alexander Rosenberg believed Hume to be a regularity theorist regarding causality, which is a positive ontological assertion (Robinson 1962, Mackie 1974, Rosenberg 1993).[18] Nonetheless, the so-called 'standard' view of Hume is that he was not a causal realist. Simon Blackburn notes a few texts which show Hume's difficulty with attributing anything to some external world:
After quoting these texts Blackburn says that "it requires some daring to take these passages as a model for sceptical realism. Hume is far- about as far as can be- from saying that we actually possess a going idea of the external world."[19] What Blackburn and other Old-Humeans realize is that the New-Humeans are dangerously close to their own positive ontological assertion, namely, that Hume believes that causality occurs in the external world. Of course here is where the New-Humeans would distinguish between natural belief and knowledge, yet this seems to be where the debate becomes fuzzy. The New-Humeans accuse the Old-Humeans of placing positive ontological assertions into Hume's mouth, and vice versa. Each side, given a few exceptions, seems to avoid placing positive ontological assertions into Hume's mouth while resting completely in his epistemic doubt. But is this all one big straw man argument? If all that the New-Humeans are proposing is that there are natural beliefs which we must suppose that are sometimes at odds with our philosophical discoveries, than so be it. I don't think that this a real issue anyone should object to. Yet if they are saying that Hume believed that causality occurs in the external world, this must be qualified. If by believe they are referring to some 'mitigated scepticism' where Hume knows not to place any real value on that belief than, once again, there should be no contention. The contention which the Old-Humeans have with this new interpretation is that they are saying that Hume actually believes with some sort of certainty that causality occurs in the external world (thus the causal realism), but if this is not what they are saying (which I believe is the case) than there is no problem. Likewise, if the New-Humeans find trouble with the standard interpretation of Hume because it leaves no epistemic room for natural beliefs, than they should not be worried. There is obviously, in both camps, an agreement on natural beliefs, their place within human psychology, and their impossibility to prove. If the New-Humeans, like Strawson, take issue with the 'positive ontological assertions' of the standard view, than, as has been shown with men like Winkler, there is no need for dispute; all that we need to say is that Hume 'refuses to affirm' any position on the nature of external bodies and their connections. This may all seem a bit deflationary, and rightly so, but this does not mean that there are no minute and real disagreements between these camps. With this in mind, let me now turn to my argument for why Hume leaves debates over external causality unscathed. I am of the opinion that Hume is more focused on our ability to know causality than whether or not causality occurs in the external world. It is true that Hume cannot escape colloquial language when describing causality and thus takes for granted, along with everyone else, natural beliefs. The idea of causality, according to Hume, comes from, like every other idea, a prior impression. Where this impression comes from is hard to say, but Hume examines the possibility of it coming from the 'external world', and says,
Hume seems to be insisting that even if causality was occurring we could never discover it by its 'sensible qualities'; we wouldn't even have 'ground to imagine' anything like causality.[21] In other words, we are left without any epistemological ground when attempting to posit any theory on causality. Whether the world runs as a constant conjunction or as causally functional, or whether we project our ideas onto what we think is the external world, there can be no way to warrant one over the other for they are beyond our finding out. This gets back to my main argument that causality is non-falsifiable. G.J. Warnock spoke of this once when he describes the Law of Causality (referred to as S):
This seems to me to be why Hume never affirms anything about causality, or specifically the Law of Causality, in the external world. The Law, stating that Every Event has a Cause' cannot be proven wrong, for it requires you to produce either an uncaused event, which is impossible. It also asserts a proposition of complete knowledge, i.e. Every Event has a Cause, which cannot be known. We have not observed all events which have taken place in the world, throughout history, or those which will happen in the future. Moreover, there is a certain ambiguity in the term 'Event' or 'Effect', one which makes it hard to denote any one happening. It should also be noted that the Law attempts to find a single sufficient cause for every event, i.e. Every Event has a Cause. Clearly, even if we believe in causality, there are multiple causes for any event, even multiple sufficient causes for any event, which we now call overdetermination. Although the Law has its own philosophical difficulties it does not mean that we can prove or disprove its legitimacy. There are many of our natural beliefs which cannot be indubitably proven, i.e. our own objective and material existence, the existence of an objective external world, and 'Laws' or any sort, including causality. This does not mean that there is no epistemic warrant for thinking that these beliefs are true, it simply means that you cannot prove them to be true or false. There are, of course, many debates over this question, and this paper is not intended to cover them, needless to say it is productive to the discussion to note why it seems that Hume's strict empiricism leaves him from asserting, with any certainty, the truth of falsity of causality's objective existence. This is a similar interpretation of Hume to M.J. Costa's, when he says that "according to Hume reason cannot justify belief in the continued and independent existence of anything in the universe."[23] This does not mean that we do not believe in the existence of the objective world or causality, only that we cannot justify it adequately. I am not of the opinion that this interpretation places anyone within these two camps in the Hume Debate. I could easily say that Hume held to natural beliefs that causality occurs in the external world, or that he believed that there is only a constant conjunction of events. There are of course more reasonable opinions of Hume to hold to, yet, because of Hume's scepticism, there can be no opinion more reasonable than another when we posit that there are justifiable positive ontological assertions about the external world. Notes: 1. Warnock argues this specifically in his article 'Every Event has a Cause', published in Logic and Language, Anchor Books, 1965, pgs 312-330. 2. For instance Thomas Aquinas (1225-74), Rene Descartes (1596-1650), and Thomas Reid (1710-96). 3. Hume, David, An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, Hackett Publishing House, 1977, pg 18. 5. Hume was fond of arguing against the necessity of nature maintaining uniformity: "Let the course of things be allowed hitherto ever so regular; that alone, without some new argument or inference, proves not, that, for the future, it will continue so" (ECHU, pg 24). 6. Here is an instance of Probability Theory which many modern philosophers now promote. Barry Gower sheds some light on Hume's usage of probability: "Hume was trained, and occasionally practised, as a lawyer. Moreover, as a historian he would quite naturally have thought in legalistic terms when determining the reliability of witnesses and documents. He would, therefore, have been accustomed to think of a measure of probability as expressing a degree of provability" ("Hume on Probability," British Journal of the Philosophy of Science, 42, 1991, pg 1-19). Hume was cognizant that probability is the only ways in which we should make statements about the future, he notes that "though we give preference to that which has been found most usual, and believe that this effect will exist, we must not overlook the other effects, but must assign to each of them a particular weight and authority in proportion as we have found it to be more or less frequent" (ECHU, pg 39). 8. Hume even refers to a pre-established harmony when he says that "here, then, is a kind of pre-established harmony between the course of nature and the succession of our ideas" (ECHU, pg 36). Here Hume obviously has in mind the metaphysics of Leibniz. Though in this quote Hume seems to be in agreement with Leibniz, it is quite obvious that Hume rejects Leibniz's metaphysical system. Regarding occasionalism, Hume emphatically critiques Malebranche who propounded its doctrines. He says that "these philosophers, last-mentioned [Descartes and Malebranche] substituted the Notion of occasional Causes, by which it was asserted that a Billiard Ball did not move another by its Impulse, but was only the Occasion why the Deity, in pursuance of general Laws, bestowed motion on the second ball…it was considered too little supported by Philosophical Arguments, ever to admitted as any Thing but a mere hypothesis." (Hume, David, Letter from a Gentleman to His Friend in Edinburgh, Hackett Publishing House, 1977, pg 121. 9. Hume, David, An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, Hackett Publishing House, 1977, pg 41. 10. According to causality the opposite is true as well: had one event occurred its effect would have occurred as well (see Lewis, Counterfactuals, Oxford University Press, 1973). 13. Strawson, Galen, "David Hume: Objects and Power," published in The New Hume Debate, Routledge, 2000, pgs 31-51, pg 33. 14. Ibid, pg 34. This is eventually going to be my argument that causality is non-falsifiable. 15. Wright, John, "Hume's causal realism," published in The New Hume Debate, Routledge, 2000, pgs 88-99, pg 95. 16. Strawson, Galen, "David Hume: Objects and Power," published in The New Hume Debate, Routledge, 2000, pg 41. 17. Winkler, Kenneth, "The New Hume," published in The New Hume Debate, Routledge, 200, pgs 52-87, pg 53. 18. Similar but not identical positions were held by Knight (1886), Aikins (1893), and Elkin (1904), all of which leaned more to thinking of Hume as an idealist regarding causality. Rosenberg gives a typical and traditional definition of Hume's view of causality: "Most crucially for Hume, the difference between causal sequences and merely accidental ones does not consist in some real metaphysical connection between individual events present in particular causal sequences and absent in particular accidental sequences. Rather, causation in one sequence of events requires constant conjunction of other events of the same types." (Rosenberg, Alexander, "Hume and the philosophy of science," published in The Cambridge Companion to Hume, Cambridge University Press, 1993, pg 71). 19. Blackburn, Simon, "Hume and thick connexions," published in The New Hume Debate, Routledge, 2000, pgs 100-112, pg 102. 20. Hume, David, An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, Hackett Publishing House, 1977, pg 63. 21. I want to emphasize that this is an epistemological statement not an ontological one. You could still believe in causal realism and affirm Hume's scepticism. Here there could start debates over the whether there is or is not an 'external world' which impresses itself upon us and causes our ideas to form. Hausman speaks of this when he says that "unlike Locke, who misleadingly states that relations arise from a comparison, Hume claims that we gain ideas of relation by discovering them among objects. One cannot discover what is not there to be discovered. At best, however, Hume's statement is a mere affirmation of common sense, refreshing though it may be." (Hausman, A., "Hume's Theory of Relations," published in David Hume: Critical Assessments, Routledge, 1995, pg 395). 22. Warnock, G.J., "Every Event has a Cause," published in Logic and Language, Anchor Books, 1965, pg 325. 23. Costa, M.J., "Hume and the Existence of an External World," published in David Hume: Critical Assessments, Routledge, 1995, pg 564. © 2007 by Kile Jones. Published with permission of the author. Kile Jones lives in Glasgow and studies epistemology, analytic philosophy, and religious epistemology. He holds a B.A. in theology, a Masters of Theological Studies from Boston University, and is a Ph.D. in philosophy candidate at the University of Glasgow. Visit his website at www.kilejones.com.
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