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MODERN SOCIETY AND THE
ANCIENT GREEK IDEA
Most of the students of College Year in Athens' Spring 2003 philosophy class do not agree with the ancient Greek objectivist philosophy on the good virtuous life. As we saw in section B, according to their subjectivist philosophy: Finding … happiness is a matter of personal choice. That is, one must weigh his options and choose which one ultimately thinks will suit him best, while still operating within the context of our subjective society and its conventions. So while for one person having sex 27 times a day is a means to happiness, for another not having sex at all might be a means to happiness. But does it matter how such happiness is achieved, providing it is within the guidelines of society? Absolutely not. One can find his justice or happiness in different ways, and one need not balance his 'soul' the same as everyone else to find happiness, for if that were the case, everyone would achieve happiness in the same way.
Adam Fletcher, Miami University, Ancient Greek Modern societies have inherited no single ethical tradition from the past, but fragments of conflicting traditions: we are Platonic perfectionists in saluting gold medallists; utilitarians in applying the principle of triage to the wounded in war.; Lockeans in affirming rights over property; Christians in idealizing charity; Muslims in preferring polygamy; Kantians in affirming personal autonomy. No wonder that moral traditionss conflict and people are confused (Greg Pence, "Virue Theory", A Companion to Ethics, Blackwell, 2000, 21) Which moral tradition fosters subjectivism? How did it come that most of the students are subjectivists? What is the future of ancient Greek moral tradition in modern societies? Could we base our morality on virtues and habits?
Modern society lacks any coherent and workable idea of a virtuous good life: Alasdair MacIntyre on subjectivism, by Sam Sellers, University of Kansas, Philosophy The central hypothesis of Alasdair MacIntyre's book After Virtue (Duckworth, 1981, 114-238) is that modern society (including most of academia) lacks any coherent and workable system of virtues or morality. In our society today, "[t]here seems to be no rational way of securing moral agreement" (6). This is the case, argues MacIntyre, because differing and opposed moral arguments are grounded in irreconcilable premises. After detailing the history of Western systems of morality, MacIntyre discusses the Enlightenment's abandonment of Aristotelianism and the various attempts -- all failures, in his opinion -- to outline a feasible system of virtues. MacIntyre believes that what we are left with is a modern, liberal conception of morality, in which individual free agents possess the option of choosing their own set of virtues. In this system, termed emotivism, "moral judgments are nothing but expressions of preference, expressions of attitude or feeling, insofar as they are moral or evaluative in character" (11). Thus, morality has been reduced to little more than personal choice. MacIntyre opines that the abandonment of Aristotelianism was incorrect, and in providing his own conception of virtue, he uses Aristotle's ethics as his primary guide. The paragraphs below briefly outline MacIntyre's arguments against the rejection of Aristotelianism and describe his proposed system of virtues. The crux of MacIntyre's argument rests on the Enlightenment's wrongful rejection of Aristotelianism and the failure of later thinkers to provide a workable system of morality in its stead. We will deal with his argument against the abandonment of Aristotelianism later and with his arguments against Kant and the Existentialists first. Kant "reason out" morality in the form of the Categorical Imperative: "Always act so as to treat humanity, whether in your own person or in that of others, as an end, and not as a means". MacIntyre says that Kant's attempt to "reason out" morality failed. This is so because, though it attempts to be entirely rational, it allows for an individual to live by the maxim "Let everyone except me be treated as a means" (45). Such a position would be "immoral," but not logically "inconsistent," and Kant's attempt is aimed at providing a logic-based system of virtues. According to MacIntyre, Kant's failure led directly to Kierkegaard invoking "choice" as the means to morality. This marks the origin of "the moral debate in terms of a confrontation between incompatible and incommensurable moral premises and moral commitment as the expression of a criterionless choice between such premises, a type of choice for which no rational justification can be given" (38). According to MacIntyre, Nietzsche recognized the failure of the Enlightenment and later philosophers to pinpoint morality and responded as follows: "let will replace reason and let us make ourselves into autonomous moral subjects by some gigantic and heroic act of the will" (107). Ergo, the Ubermensch, guided be the maxim, "if there is nothing to morality but expressions of will, my morality can only be what my will creates" (107). Obviously, this outlook is a direct precursor of today's emotivism. However, as I've said before, MacIntyre believes that the initial rejection of Aristotelianism was incorrect. And if he's right, Nietzsche was wrong in basing morality on the personal will. So, before getting to MacIntyre's system of virtue, I shall first describe MacIntyre's argument detailing why the Enlightenment thinkers should not have given up on Aristotle's system. MacIntyre says that the Enlightenment thinkers did not appreciate the Classical concept of the term "man." The Classical tradition equates "man" with "man-functioning-well-and-to-his-fullest" (57). This is an a prori assumption for Classical philosophers -- and is especially important to understanding the teleology of Aristotle. As such, MacIntyre says that, in their Classical context, morals and virtues "were at once hypothetical and categorical in form" (57). Hypothetical because an individual was expected to perform virtuous acts (and refrain from performing vices) in order to remain on the path to the telos; and categorical because Classical philosophers invoked the law of God or gods to justify their systems of virtue. However, the Eighteenth Century philosophers made the mistake of not interpreting "man" as an individual in pursuit of some good end. And "once the notion of essential human purposes or functions disappears from morality, it begins to appear implausible to treat moral judgments as factual statements" (57). Thus, MacIntyre judges this abandonment -- essentially the abandonment of the teleological conception of man -- with the beginning of 300 years of philosophers fishing empty waters. MacIntyre says Utilitarianism tried to provide a new telos and thus a new hypothetical form of morality (telos means whatever brings about the most good for the most people). However their attempt only yielded a vague or simply indiscernible notion of virtue (60, 62). The analytic philosophers, according to MacIntyre, tried, like Kant, to provide a new categorical necessity. But they failed because their proofs were forced to presuppose certain societal constructs (65). And therefore any particular morality they derived was the product of, logically speaking, arbitrary premises. Having explained the failures of other philosophical systems, MacIntyre presents his three-stage system of virtues. I shall deal with each stage in its order of appearance. MacIntyre believes that virtue can be found in a person that does an activity (a "practice") for no external benefit, but solely for the enjoyment of performing the activity. When someone plays chess for the pleasure of chess alone (and not external reward, e.g., money, fame, honor, etc.), then in that person we can identify virtuous traits, such as patience (in learning the skill necessary to improve) and fairness (in playing within the game's rules). A virtue is an acquired human quality the possession and exercise of which tends to enable us to achieve those goods which are internal to practices and the lack of which effectively prevents us from achieving any such goods. (178) This stage brings to mind the football coach that explains to his team that they are not just learning skills necessary to play good football, but also the skills necessary to live a good life (MacIntyre assumes that an individual can learn a virtue through an activity and then apply that virtue in the greater activity of life.). This initial stage only yields a few virtues, may also yield vices, and will likely yield virtues in conflict with one another. Which means we must look for more virtues and a system for prioritizing the virtues in the next stage. The second stage is that of a unified life guided by some sort of desire for a good end, a telos. In order to understand MacIntyre's conception of the telos, we must understand his notion of the unity of life. It is because we all live out narratives in our own lives and because we understand our own lives in terms of the narratives that we live out that the form of the narrative is appropriate for understanding the actions of others. (197) If we understand one's life as a narrative, then we can conceptualize it as a unified mission, not just the performance of a variety of heterogeneous actions. And a unified life, MacIntyre argues, can indeed have a telos as its goal. To ask 'What is the good for me?' is to ask how best I might live out that unity [of life] and bring it to completion. To ask 'What is the good for man?' is to ask what all answers to the former question must have in common. (203) Thus a teleological view yields the following definition of virtues and morality:[T]he good life for man is the life spent in seeking for the good life for man, and the virtues necessary for the seeking are those which will enable us to understand what more and what else the good life for man is. (204) Imagine a man begins life physically blind (without any virtue). This man desires to see (i.e., possess virtue) and thus his life is guided by the desire for sight (virtue). The third stage will show that the man has been born into a culture that provides him with a desire for virtue and some skills to guide him on his journey. Slowly, as the narrative of his life proceeds he gains more sight (virtue), but to gain more sight (virtue) he must use the sight (virtue) he has already obtained. In this way the blind man (without virtue) can come to see perfectly (complete virtue) only through the use of the sight (virtue) that he gains along the way. In the third stage, MacIntyre attempts to connect the virtues of the individual with the community that the individual is apart of. For the story of my life is always imbedded in the stories of those communities from which I derive my identity. I am born with a past; and to try and cut myself off from the past, in the individualist mode, is to deform my present relationships. (205) Hence individuals are born as a part of a moral tradition and will come to pass at least some of that tradition on to later generations. The morals that are handed down help individuals to find their telos and then overcome obstacles on the way to achieving it. In this way, each individual's system of virtue is inextricably linked to the virtue of the community as a whole. When this third stage is linked to the first two, MacIntyre says the following:
Thus MacIntyre believes he has outlined a system of virtues for individuals and for communities; both systems dependent on that old Aristotelian notion of the telos -- for the individual: the ultimate good of his or her individual life, and for the community: solidarity produced by the collective "vision of and understanding of" the panoply of individual goods.
The future of the ancient Greek moral tradition in modern societies - An Adlerian perspective: Mortimer Adler on "How do I go about living a good life?", by Spiros Kulubis, University of Pennsylvania, Classical Studies/Philosophy During the 7th and 6th centuries before Christ, a fantastic transformation of the human condition came to pass in the lands of Asia Minor. For the first time in the history of man, reason and not dogmatic beliefs were used to try and answer many of the questions that had baffled man since the birth of language. This shift away from dogma and towards reasoned thinking took the form of the first kind of Greek philosophy, or what we now call Pre-socratic philosophy. As important as this transformation was historically, it can be argued that an even more significant advancement in Greek Philosophy developed later in the 5th century B.c., with the first pursuits into human moral philosophy. This new focus on the humanistic element of mankind rather than on the materialistic components of the universe was first advocated by Socrates of Athens, who stated that we as men should, "Know thyself" and that "the unexamined life is not worth living." The book Time of Our Lifes. The Ethics of Common Sense (Fordham Univ. Press, 1996) by Mortimer Adler, especially ch, 2 How Can I Make A Good Life For Myself, examines some of the views of the first moral thinkers and attempts to make its own argument for how to attain what the ancient Greeks called "the good life." Adler begins his book by stating that the question of "How can I make a good life for myself" is one that can be examined only by those who have not already succeeded in attaining the good life. Confident that this is the case for most of humanity, or at least his reading audience, he more clearly defines that the examination of what constitutes a good life is something that can be contemplated by all those who have reached the age of reason and consent and onwards. For Adler, maturity is the main criteria for any individual to reflect on how to attain a good life. Furthermore, he states that the examination of how to attain the good life is only worthwhile to those who have the time, and more importantly, the desire to change their character and apply what they learn to their own lives. Adler proposes 12 considerations that should be contemplated by anyone who seriously confronts and tries to solve the problem of how one should go about living a good life. The overall conclusions of these 12 considerations is that in order to have a good life, one must formulate some kind of life plan from when they are young and at the beginning stages of their life. Adler makes the age-old connection that the decisions of the present, especially during the early stages of life, directly impact the freedoms and limitations that one experiences during their later years in life. As it is, Adler dissects life into specific stages that are dependent on choices made by an individual during what Adler calls the youth stage, or the time when decisions matter and ultimately influence the future the most. As far as Adler is concerned, making a good life for oneself, involves making choices that should involve a way of the immediate consequences versus the remote effects. The greatest human tragedy as Adler sees it is, That 'in the early years of our lives that we are disinclined to make choices that favor the long as against the short run, probably becasue the eventualities of the long run then seem so remote. This lies at the root of the generation gap. On one side are those who find the long run unreal or too remote to think about; on the other are those for whom it has become a reality and a dominant consideration. The great misfortune of the human race, in every generation, is that its younger members- at the time of their lives when it is most important to understand this point- find it extermely difficult to understand and often fail to understand it. But if the point is only difficult, no impossible, for the young to understand, then it is the greatest importance that sound moral instruction and training help them to understand it at the earliest possible moment in their lives. Their elders may finally have come to understand it only too well, and with some measure of remorse, that their understanding has too late for them to make the best use of their wisdom'. This quote by Alder serves to sum up the sentiments of his book, namely the making of a good life as a whole entails long-term considerations and specific and careful planning. It further touches on the incapability of most youths to take advantage of their freedoms by taking their lives into their own hands, and in doing so, provide for a greater sense of stablility in the future of their lives. This stability and freedom that is present throughout the whole of a person's life is what Adler would call "making a good life for one's self." Adler focuses on the actual construction of a life plan for all men, regardless of the special circumstances of their individual lives. He is able to universally apply the prescriptions for 'making a good life for one's self' by appealing to the wisdom acquired by common sense. However, Adler repeatedly stresses both the inadequacy and indispensibility of appealing to common sense for a solution to the problem. He believes it is of the utmost importance to understand that common sense cannot be overlooked in the process of making one's life decisions, but that also it cannot serve as a meticulous guide to all the problems encountered by day-to-day living. He stresses that common sense is a small core of widsom and that goes to the heart of all our practical problems, and as such needs to be incorporated into our personal moral philosophy, but at the same time cannot be expected to solve every problem with the utmost specificity. What Adler wants to avoid the most is giving his reader the impression that he is offering a how-to book on making a good life. He stresses that the art of living cannot be perfected with a book of highly specific rules that can, through practice, be applied in order to attain some sort of mastery over the problem of making a good life. That a man can never be expected to attain the same level of planning mastery that an engineer, musician or artist can through the proper practice at their particular craft. This is why he specifically stresses that the principles of moral philosophy only acquire a certain kind of universality when applied as a general guide to one's own life and not as a specific set of rules that hope to "get you on the right path quickly" as would be expected from a how-to book. Adler makes no promise for a 'navigation chart' through the hardships of life, because he wisely recognizes that even the best human life, precisely because it is the life a man and not of a god, may not escape the taint of tragedy. Every human life, even under the most fortunate circumstances, has its share of frustration and discontent, its burden of remorse for avoidable mistakes committed, its insoluble dilemmas. He advocates that the dismissal of the basic truths of moral philosophy from one's decision-making process, only due to the fact that it offers no concrete solutions to any of life's specific problems, would be completely foolish. He makes the parallel with basic justice in this matter, stating that men also dismiss a clear definition of justice as of no practical utility because it does not automatically enable them to decide, in a particularly difficult case, whether a certain act or policy is just or unjust, forgetting that they would not and could not even be troubled about justice in that particular case if they did not have some definite standard of justice to apply it. This is a fine example he uses as to why the same principles of moral philosophy apply to the formulation of 'making a good life', and that to dismiss them because of their lack of specificity on how to deal with a particular problem would be lacking any sort of common sense. The underlying principle evoked by moral philosophy is that is does not automatically tell us what to do in specific dark moments of our lives, but that without its wisdom we could not even hope to navigate through those trying dark moments. This is precisely the kind of understanding of moral philosophy that Adler is advocating in his book. Specifically, that in order to make a good life for one's self, a person must have some kind of plan that incorporates common sense. Furthermore, this common sense that is inherent in understanding moral philosophy will not serve as a specific guide through the dark periods of one's life, but will consequently serve as some kind of moral reference point in order to even begin to have a chance at making it through those dark points of life. Only be incorporating this kind of moral philosophy, one that is based upon common sense, does Adler believe that mankind can hope to answer the question of "How Can I Make a Good Life for Myself?"
Could we base our morality on virtues and habits?, by Deborah Ashley Frison, University of Notre Dame, Psychology/Art History William James' chapter on habit found in Principles in Psychology, is guided by Dr. Carpenter's phrase, "our nervous system grows to the modes in which it has been exercised" (112) (Mental Physiology, 1874, Archives de Biologie, vol. I, Liege, 1880). Carpenter calls the reader's attention to the fact that "every kind of training for special aptitudes" is more effective and longer lasting in the growing brain over the adult (110). Organs are molded by what is habitually rehearsed. The increased size, power, and flexibility of specific muscles and joints of gymnasts, are used as an example. As humans, we have developed habits common to the race in general (e.g. walking) and others unique to the individual (e.g. process in which one brushes their teeth). Carpenter says it is an admitted fact that "any sequence of mental action which has been frequently repeated tends to perpetuate itself' so that we find ourselves automatically prompted to think, feel, or do, under like circumstances, with out any consciously formed purpose or anticipation of the results" (112). In accordance, very strong and/ or habitually repeated actions leave an impression on the cerebrum that under similar circumstances are often recalled. "It is in this way that what is early 'learned by heart' becomes branded in (as it were) upon the cerebrum; so that its 'traces' are never lost, even though the conscious memory of it may have completely faded out" (112). The first of James' practical application of this philosophy of habit to human life is: Habit simplifies the movements required to achieve a given result, makes them more accurate, and diminishes fatigue (112). When a piano player first learns, he may move his hand, elbows, torso, and entire body in search of the keys. As he becomes more skilled and familiar with the art of the trade, his movement will become confined to his fingers. The simplifying of tasks through habit and repetition is a basic function of man. In explaining why practice should make perfect in man, James quotes Dr. Mauldsley. "If act did not become easier after being done several times, if…consciousness were necessary for its accomplishment on each occasion, it is evident that the whole activity of a lifetime might be confined to one or more deeds, that no progress could take place in development" (113) (The Physiology of Mind, London, 1876, 155). If basic acts, such as the of washing ones hands, were as difficult to achieve every time as a child's first, all the time and energy of the day would be lost to simple activities. Considering this, the second application is: Habit diminishes the conscious attention with which our acts are performed (115). The chain of events that complete an act can be represented by A B C D E F G. When A is triggered, it leads to natural progression of B, which leads to C, etc. Such a routine is created so that "our lower centers know the order of these movements…but our higher thought-centers know hardly anything about the matter" (115). It is difficult for one to verbally recall many daily routines such as the order in which one brushes his/her hair, teeth, or ties his/her shoes with out at least mentally rehearsing the act. Often times one has to actually perform the ritual to remember, in spite of the fact that it may be a common sequence of events performed often and usually in the same order. This habitual chain of events maintained by the lower centers, frees the attention of the higher thought-centers. It is therefore possible for a pianist to carry on a conversation while playing and for one to say or recite the alphabet with his or her attention far away. Finally, James applies the: Ethical implication of the law of habit (122). Habits are conservative agents that shape our society. James sites rider-less cavalry horses that continue to respond to the bugle call, an escaped tiger that willfully returns to its cage, and prisoners to be readmitted. By age 20, many personal habits are formed. After this, habits of gesture, pronunciation, and dress seem to be embedded in a person and hold them to their particular place in society. It is therefore possible for a pianist to carry on a conversation while playing and for one to say or recite the alphabet with his or her attention far away'
BIBLIOGRAPHY [page references in parenthesis from "Habit" by William James, Principles of Psychology, VOL. 1] W. James, Pragmatism, Dover, 1995 W. James, The Principles of Psychology, 2 Vols, Dover, 1918 W. James, Essays in Pragmatism, "The Moral Philosophers and the Moral Life", 65-88, Hafner, 1948 |
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