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A Guide
to Reading the American State Papers
The Declaration of
Independence,
The Constitution of the United States,
and The Federalist
I.
The Declaration
of Independence is largely the work of Thomas
Jefferson, while Alexander Hamilton is the chief
author of The Federalist, although some
papers were contributed by James Madison and some
by John Jay. In spite of the fact that the
contribution of the latter two is quantitatively
small, their co-authorship was important, since
Madison was one of the chief framers of the
Constitution, while John Jay's prestige, at the
time of writing was the greatest of the three men.
He was the oldest of the three authors (forty-two);
Hamilton was only thirty years old, and Madison,
thirty-six. No matter who the author of a
Federalist paper is, it is always signed
"Publius."
The Constitution
was, of course, the collaborative effort of the
Constitutional Convention, but Madison is often
called the "Father of the Constitution." The
Constitutional Convention completed its work in
September. 1787, and the Federalist papers
started to appear soon thereafter. They were
articles written for several New York newspapers,
in order to urge the people of the state of New
York to ratify the Constitution. The papers
appeared from October 1787 to April 1788. There was
considerable opposition to ratification in New
York, led by the very influential governor, George
Clinton.
The last article of the Constitution provides
that if nine of the thirteen states ratify it, it
shall then go into effect among those nine states.
In spite of the efforts of the Federalist
papers, New York was among the last states to
ratify the Constitution; and in fact it did not
ratify until after the ninth state (New Hampshire)
had done so. (With New Hampshire's ratification,
the Constitution went into effect for the ratifying
states.) Even when New York finally ratified in
July 1788, it did so only by a very slight margin
of votes in its convention thirty to
twenty-seven.
II.
Jefferson's views on representative government
were in many respects opposed to the views of the
Federalist writers. Jefferson favored placing power
and responsibility in the hands of the people as
far as possible; the Federalists wanted safeguards
against the uses to which the people might put such
power. Jefferson, for example, wrote as follows to
Pierre Du Pont de Nemours:
- We both consider the people as our children,
and love them with parental affection. But you
love them as infants whom you are afraid to
trust without nurses; and I as adults whom I
freely leave to self-government.
Madison, on the other hand, thinks that it is
beneficial to take the management of government out
of the direct hands of the people and to delegate
it to elected representatives, because this
will
- refine and enlarge the public views, by
passing them through the medium of a chosen body
of citizens, whose wisdom may best discern the
true interest of their country, and whose
patriotism and love of justice will be least
likely to sacrifice it to temporary or partial
considerations.
Thus, he prefers representative, republican
government to direct democracy, not only because
the size and population of the United States make
the latter impracticable, but because he (unlike
Jefferson) thinks that the people cannot always be
trusted to know what is for their own good. "Under
such [republican] regulation," he
continues,
- it may well happen that the public voice,
pronounced by the representatives of the people,
will be more consonant to the public good than
if pronounced by the people themselves...
The Constitution contains many evidences of
these two opposed tendencies, one of which would
give power and responsibility to the people, while
the other would guard against unlimited popular
government. The success of the Constitution may, at
least in part, be attributed to the fact that it
managed successful compromises between these two
tendencies.
Let us look at some of these compromises. They
can be found everywhere. Thus in Article 1, it is
noted that the Congress of the United States "shall
consist of a Senate and House of Representatives."
The bicameral arrangement of the legislature
constitutes a compromise between a Congress that is
very responsive to the will of the people, and a
Congress that acts in the light of its own best
opinion, without necessarily and automatically
succumbing to popular pressure.
One reason why the House of Representatives is
very responsive to the wishes of the electorate is
that each one of its seats is up for election every
two years. In the Senate, however, only a third of
the seats can change at each election; so that not
only does each senator serve for six years, but the
over-all complexion of the Senate tends to change
more slowly than that of the House. Furthermore, as
Section 3 of this article points out, the senators
were not to be elected by the people, but chosen by
the legislature of each state. This procedure was
not changed until the seventeenth amendment, which
provided that senators as well as representatives
were to be elected by the people of each state,
became effective in 1913.
The manner of electing the president also
reveals the opposing tendencies in the
Constitution. On the one hand, the president is
elected by the people, rather than by the state
legislatures or governors. This places great power
in the hands of the people. On the other hand, the
election of the president is not direct; the people
of each state elect electors, who in turn elect the
president. This interposition of the electoral
college which, in theory, is free to name as
president whomever it likes, was intended to limit
the power of the people; the college has, as we
know, become a mere formality.
Yet another instance of this conflict can be
seen in the duties of each branch of the
legislature. Only the popular house can initiate
bills having to do with money matters (presumably
because taxation is to go along with
representation), but only the upper house is
consulted in matters of foreign policy (presumably
because it is not subject to sudden and disastrous
whims). Or, again, only the House of
Representatives has the power to initiate
impeachment; but the Senate tries all cases of
impeachment.
III.
In The Federalist, No. 10, Madison faces
one of the perennial problems that beset any
popular government -- the problem of internal
instability, strife, and faction. It is a problem
well known to modern democracies. An extreme
contemporary instance is the rapid succession of
governments in France. Examples such as this always
raise a doubt as to whether the people are really
fit to govern themselves. But let us hear Madison's
description of the problem:
- Complaints are everywhere beard from our
most considerate and virtuous citizens, equally
the friends of public and private faith, and of
public and personal liberty, that our
governments are too unstable, that the public
good is disregarded in the conflicts of rival
parties, and that measures are too often
decided, not according to the rules of justice
and the rights of the minor party, but by the
superior force of an interested and overbearing
majority.
Such malfunctioning of government, Madison says,
is largely due to factions, i.e., groups of
citizens which manage to control the government not
for the common good, but for their own special
interests. To prevent this development, be says, we
can either (1) eliminate the causes of factions, or
(2) control their effects.
Factions can be eliminated if it is possible to
give to every citizen "the same opinions, the same
passions, and the same interests." But this clearly
is impossible. The other method of eliminating a
faction is that of "destroying the liberty which is
essential to its existence." But, Madison adds,
- It could never be more truly said than of
[this] remedy, that it was worse than
the disease. Liberty is to faction what air is
to fire, an aliment without which it instantly
expires. But it could not be less folly to
abolish liberty, which is essential to political
life, because it nourishes faction, than it
would be to wish the annihilation of air, which
is essential to animal life, because it imparts
to fire its destructive agency.
Hence Madison concludes that the way to deal
with factions is to realize that they will always
be with us and to concentrate on controlling their
effects. Now a factious group, i.e., a group aiming
at its own rather than the com-mon good, becomes
dangerous when it becomes the majority in a popular
government. Only then can it pursue its selfish
ends without effective opposition. Therefore, the
remedy which Madison proposes is something which
will prevent a faction from becoming the ruling
power in a government.
- It may be concluded that a pure democracy,
by which I mean a society consisting of a small
number of citizens, who assemble and administer
the government in person, can admit of no cure
for the mischiefs of faction. A common passion
or interest will, in almost every case, be felt
by a majority of the whole; a communication and
concert result from the form of government
itself; and there is nothing to check the
inducements to sacrifice the weaker party or an
obnoxious individual. Hence it is that such
democracies have ever been spectacles of
turbulence and contention....
The solution which Madison advocates is
republican rather than democratic government. "The
two great points of difference between a democracy
and a republic are," he points out,
- first, the delegation of the government, in
the latter, to a small number of citizens
elected by the rest; secondly, the greater
number of citizens, and greater sphere of
country, over which the latter may be
extended.
We have already quoted Madison's opinion that
such delegates will often recognize the true
interest of the country (as distinguished from the
selfish interest of a faction) better than the
people themselves could. Furthermore, a larger
country suffers less from the evils of factions
than a small one, for the following reasons:
- Extend the sphere, and you take in a greater
variety of parties and interests; you make it
less probable that a majority of the whole will
have a common motive to invade the rights of
other citizens; or if such a common motive
exists, it will be more difficult for all who
feel it to discover their own strength, and to
act in unison with each other.
So convinced is Madison that the Constitution
will prevent the evils of factions that he
concludes the tenth paper thus:
- In the extent and proper structure of the
Union, therefore, we behold a republican remedy
for the diseases most incident to republican
government.
IV.
The separation of the powers of government is a
basic provision of the Constitution of the United
States. It is a device that prevents any part of
the government from becoming too powerful.
Locke mentions the separation of powers; but the
doctrine that it is all-important for free
government stems from Montesquieu, as Madison
acknowledges in The Federalist, No. 47.
After first distinguishing the three powers,
Montesquieu says:
- When the legislative and executive powers
are united in the same person, or in the same
body of magistrates, there can be no liberty;
because apprehensions may arise, lest the same
monarch or senate should enact tyrannical laws,
to execute them in a tyrannical manner.
-
- Again, there is no liberty, if the judiciary
power be not separated from the legislative and
executive. Were it joined with the legislative,
the life and liberty of the subject would be
exposed to arbitrary control; for the judge
would be then the legislator. Were it joined to
the executive power, the judge might behave with
violence and oppression.
-
- There would be an end of everything, were
the same man or the same body, whether of the
nobles or of the people, to exercise those three
powers, that of enacting laws, that of executing
the public resolutions, and of trying the causes
of individuals. (The Spirit of Laws, Book
XI, Chap. 6).
In The Federalist, No. 47, Madison notes
the importance of the separation of powers:
- One of the principal objections inculcated
by the more respectable adversaries to the
Constitution is its supposed violation of the
political maxim, that the legislative,
executive, and judiciary departments ought to be
separate and distinct. In the structure of the
federal government, no regard, it is said, seems
to have been paid to this essential precaution
in favour of liberty. The several departments of
power are distributed and blended in such a
manner as at once to destroy all symmetry and
beauty of form, and to expose some of the
essential parts of the edifice to the danger of
being crushed by the disproportionate weight of
other parts.
Madison acknowledges that there is considerable
mixing of governmental powers (the so-called system
of checks and balances) in the proposed
Constitution. But, referring to Montesquieu's words
and to his primary example (the British
Constitution), Madison argues that Montesquieu
- did not mean that these departments ought to
have no partial agency in, or no control over,
the acts of each other. His meaning, as his own
words import, and still more conclusively as
illustrated by the example in his eye, can
amount to no more than this, that where the
whole power of one department is exercised by
the same hands which possess the whole power of
another department, the fundamental principles
of a free constitution are subverted.
Still, even if we grant that some mixture of
powers is defensible, they are for the most part to
be kept separate. And so the author of The
Federalist, No. 51, continues as follows:
- To what expedient, then, shall we finally
resort, for maintaining in practice the
necessary partition of power among the several
departments, as laid down in the Constitution?
The only answer that can be given is, that as
all these exterior provisions are found to be
inadequate, the defect must be supplied, by so
contriving the interior structure of the
government as that its several constituent parts
may, by their mutual relations, be the means of
keeping each other in their proper places.
"Publius" then lists the principal means for
achieving this end:
- In order to lay a due foundation for that
separate and distinct exercise of the different
powers of government, which to a certain extent
is admitted on all hands to be essential to the
preservation of liberty, it is evident that each
department should have a will of its own; and
consequently should be so constituted that the
members of each should have as little agency as
possible in the appointment of the members of
the others...
- It is equally evident, that the members of
each department should be as little dependent as
possible on those of the others, for the
emoluments annexed to their offices...
- But the great security against a gradual
concentration of the several powers in the same
department, consists in giving to those who
administer each department the necessary
constitutional means and personal motives to
resist encroachments of the others. The
provision for defence must in this, as in all
other cases, be made commensurate to the danger
of attack. Ambition must be made to counteract
ambition. The interest of the man must be
connected with the constitutional rights of the
place.
In a word, the Federalists propose to rely on
the self-interest of men. If the self-interest of
men can be made to coincide with the separation of
governmental powers, then these powers will be kept
separate far more surely than by any artificial or
external devices. "Publius" dwells for a moment on
the melancholy truth that public interest is safest
when it coincides with private ambition:
- It may be a reflection on human nature that
such devices should be necessary to control the
abuses of government. But what is government
itself but the greatest of all reflections on
human nature? If men were angels, no government
would be necessary. If angels were to govern
men, neither external nor internal controls on
government would be necessary. In framing a
government which is to be administered by men
over men, the great difficulty lies in this: you
must first enable the government to control the
governed; and in the next place oblige it to
control itself.
V.
What, according to the Federalists, is the
indispensable condition of civil peace?
Papers 2 through 9 are devoted to the discussion
of war and peace. The first four of these deal with
the "dangers from foreign force and influence"
while the last four are concerned with "dangers
from war between the states."
In The Federalist, No. 6, Hamilton makes
it clear that if the states were to become
independent, sovereign nations, they would soon
become embroiled in war.
- A man must be far gone in Utopian
speculations who can seriously doubt that, if
these States should either be wholly disunited,
or only united in partial confederacies, the
subdivisions into which they might be thrown
would have frequent and violent contests with
each other. To presume a want of motives for
such contests as an argument against their
existence, would be to forget that men are
ambitious, vindictive, and rapacious.
He takes up this topic again a little later:
- There are still to be found visionary or
designing men, who stand ready to advocate the
paradox of perpetual peace between the States,
though dismembered and alienated from each
other. The genius of republics (say they) is
pacific; the spirit of commerce has a tendency
to soften the manners of men, and to extinguish
those inflammable humours which have so often
kindled into wars.
Hamilton shows by many examples that this is a
delusion. "There have been," he concludes, "almost
as many popular as royal wars." The only effective
means of maintaining peace among the several States
is by uniting them under a common government.
Hamilton quotes the Abbe de Mably in support of his
contention: "Neighbouring nations are naturally
enemies of each other, unless their common weakness
forces them to league in a confederate republic,
and their constitution prevents the differences
that neighbourhood occasions, extinguishing that
secret jealousy which disposes all states to
aggrandise themselves at the expense of their
neighbours."
Are there any first principles or axioms
in politics?
In The Federalist, No. 31, Hamilton
writes as follows:
- In disquisitions of every kind, there are
certain primary truths, or first principles,
upon which all subsequent reasonings must
depend. These contain an internal evidence
which, antecedent to all reflection or
combination, commands the assent of the mind. .
. . Of this nature are the maxims in geometry,
that "the whole is greater than its part; things
equal to the same are equal to one another; two
straight lines cannot enclose a space; and all
right angles are equal to each other." Of the
same nature are these other maxims in ethics and
politics, that there cannot be an effect without
a cause; that the means ought to be proportioned
to the end; that every power ought to be
commensurate with its object; that there ought
to be no limitation of a power destined to
effect a purpose which is itself incapable of
limitation.
Obviously, therefore, Hamilton answers our
question affirmatively. But we can still ask
whether he is correct, and even if he is, whether
he has correctly identified the first principles of
politics.
Taking the first question first, we may point
out that some of the axioms to which Hamilton
refers are not restricted to geometry. Indeed, such
axioms, being "common notions," apply equally to
geometry, arithmetic, ethics, or any other
discipline. In other words, that the whole is
greater than any of its parts is not a truth
applicable only to geometry.
Hence, strictly speaking, there are no "axioms
of geometry" or "axioms of politics," but simply
"axioms." On the other hand, there are first or
basic principles of geometry; and there may also be
first or basic principles of politics.
That a straight line cannot enclose a space
seems to be such a first principle of geometry.
This principle is definitely geometrical in nature.
Most of the statements concerning power that
Hamilton offers appear to be first principles of
politics, rather than axioms.
This brings us to a second question: Are the
first principles of politics only those that
Hamilton mentions? Or, for instance, is the
observation that the public interest is most
effectively safeguarded when it coincides with
private interest also a first principle?
Are the self-evident truths of the
Declaration of Independence first principles of
politics?
In the second paragraph Of the Declaration, we
read:
- We hold these truths to be self-evident,
that all men are created equal; that they are
endowed by their Creator with certain
unalienable rights; that among these are life,
liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. That, to
secure these rights, governments are instituted
among men, deriving their just powers from the
consent of the governed; that, whenever any form
of government becomes destructive of these ends,
it is the right of the people to alter or to
abolish it, and to institute a new government,
laying its foundation on such principles, and
organizing its powers in such form, as to them
shall seem most likely to effect their safety
and happiness.
It is interesting to observe that, although the
Declaration of Independence preceded The
Federalist by eleven years, Hamilton does not
refer to the truths that Jefferson had called
self-evident in order to exemplify the first
principles of politics. The reason may be that
Hamilton did not think these statements true, much
less self-evident.
The twenty-second amendment to the
Constitution limits the president to two terms.
What are the consequences of this
limitation?
Here is the precise text of the twenty-second
amendment, which became effective on February 26,
1951:
- 1. No person shall be elected to the office
of the President more than twice, and no person
who has held the office of President, or acted
as President, for more than two years of a term
to which some other person was elected President
shall be elected to the office of the President
more than once. But this Article shall not apply
to any person holding the office of President
when this Article was proposed by the Congress,
and shall not prevent any person who may be
holding the office of President, or acting as
President, during the term within which this
Article becomes operative from holding the
office of President or acting as President
during the remainder of such term.
- 2. This article shall be inoperative unless
it shall have been ratified as an amendment to
the Constitution by the legislatures of
three-fourths of the several States within seven
years from the date of its submission to the
States by the Congress.
We may, first of all, wonder whether this
amendment is an expression of one of the two
tendencies in the Constitution that we mentioned
earlier. Does this limitation of the president's
tenure put greater or less power into the hands of
the people? It probably does both. On the one hand,
it prevents a president from becoming too powerful,
because he continues in office too long. This,
therefore, seems to safeguard the people against an
ambitious president. On the other hand, the
amendment also limits the power of the people,
since it forbids them to elect anyone president for
a third time, even if they should desire to do so
because of his special qualifications or because of
special circumstances.
Hamilton devotes all of paper No. 72 to exactly
this question. He concludes that
- Nothing appears more plausible at first
sight, nor more ill-founded upon close
inspection, than a scheme which in relation to
the present point has had some respectable
advocates, -- I mean that of continuing the
chief magistrate in office for a certain time,
and then excluding him from it, either for a
limited period or for ever after.
He lists the various undesirable effects that he
thinks would follow upon such a constitutional
exclusion.
- "One ill effect of the exclusion would be a
diminution of the inducements to good
behaviour."
- "Another ill effect of the exclusion would
be the temptation to sordid views, to
peculation, and, in some instances, to
usurpation."
- "A third ill effect of the exclusion would
be the depriving the community of the advantage
of the experience gained by the chief magistrate
in the exercise of his office."
- "A fourth ill effect of the exclusion would
be the banishing men from stations in which, in
certain emergencies of the state, their presence
might be of the greatest moment to the public
interest or safety."
- "A fifth ill effect of the exclusion would
be, that it would operate as a constitutional
interdiction of stability in the
administration."
Hamilton concludes his discussion with the
following paragraph:
- There is an excess of refinement in the idea
of disabling the people to continue in office
men who had entitled themselves, in their
opinion, to approbation and confidence; the
advantages of which are at best speculative and
equivocal, and are overbalanced by disadvantages
far more certain and decisive.
From The Great Ideas Program: An Introduction to
The Great Books and to a Liberal Education, by
Mortimer J. Adler and and Peter Wolff
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