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September
19, 2007
Greenspan
Speaks
by Gary North, Ph.D.
Alan
Greenspan's autobiography was released on September
17. He was interviewed by Leslie Stahl on September
16 on CBS's "60 Minutes," for what has to be the
most successful book promotional appearance I can
remember.
The book's title is "The Age of Turbulence."
Yawn. The guys in the marketing division should
have insisted on "Straight Talk -- Finally."
Mr. Mumbles at long last has come clean about
what I had said for almost two decades: his
mumbling was deliberate.
- "I would engage in some form of syntax
destruction, which sounded as though I were
answering the question, but, in fact, had not,"
Greenspan admits, with a chuckle.
-
- At one hearing, Greenspan said, "Modest
pre-emptive actions can obviate the need of more
drastic actions at a later date, and that could
destabilize the economy."
-
- "Very profound," Greenspan says, after
listing to his testimony.
I like the phrase, "syntax destruction." The
master of this art -- the mixmaster -- was
President Eisenhower. He was equally deliberate. He
was perfectly content to be ridiculed by the press
as a verbal incompetent. He played the press like
the puppets they really are. Greenspan did the
same, with equal success.
In the interview, Stahl referred to his advance
on the book's royalties: $8 million. Even I was
stunned. If he was paid top royalty -- 15% -- then
at $35 per book, the publisher needs to sell over
1.5 million copies in hardback just to break even.
This advance was extraordinary for an
autobiography. It indicates just how influential he
was and remains.
She asked him which currency he would prefer to
be paid in. He said he plans to diversify. That was
a way of saying, "I will not stick with the dollar
100%." He has the picture.
I do not begrudge him his $8 million. It was
clearly worth that to get him out of the Federal
Reserve System. I do begrudge the way he got it: by
presiding over the FED and relying on monetary
inflation to bail out the stock market in 1987,
1990-91, and 2000--2004.
He said that he did not grasp what was happening
in the subprime mortgage market until late 2005.
Stahl did not know enough to ask him why he did not
recognize that a federal funds rate falling from
6.5% in mid-2000 to 1% in mid-2003 was inevitably
going to produce arbitrage opportunities between
the short-term rates and long-term, just at yen
carry trade did, beginning in the early 1990's. The
strategy of "borrow short, lend long" created the
savings & loan bust in the mid-1990's in the
United States. Why did he think it would be
different after 2000?
Both Stahl and Greenspan kept coming back to
Greenspan's love of economic statistics. The show's
Greenspan segment ended with this:
- When he's not working these days, he does
what he's always done to relax: he flips through
government reports with all those geeky
numbers.
-
- "He loves these data. I mean, I mean look at
this stuff here," his wife, Andrea Mitchell,
tells Stahl, looking at his morning reading,
including a report from the Bureau of Labor
Statistics.
-
- "I just love getting into the detail of what
the . . . say, protein content of hard red
winter wheat was because -- -- the differential
in price. The
- differential in price between . . . ,"
Greenspan says.
-
- "It's very romantic," Mitchell remarks.
-
- ". . . Kansas City and Chicago was. . . ,"
he says laughing. "No, it was romantic to me.
That's what the joke is. And I'm still that way.
I really just love that stuff."
This was Greenspan's problem for two decades: a
preference for data that were separated from a
coherent economic theory of the business cycle.
When he was a young economist in the 1960's, he
was a devoted advocate of the gold standard. He
understood cause and effect in economic theory. He
understood how monetary inflation distorts the
capital structure, leading to booms and busts. But,
at his accession to the Chairmanship of the Board
of Governors in 1987, his personal love for, and
deep faith in, economic statistics overcame his
mid-1960's faith in stable money as a matter of
economic principle. He adopted the print-and-spend
policies that have plagued every nation that has
adopted central banking, which is all of them
except Monaco and Andorra.
To begin with statistics is to begin with
built-in blinders to economic cause and effect.
Statistics are merely what government agencies have
sampled in the past. Following statistics rather
than a policy of stable money, he spent his career
at the FED looking into a government-built
rear-view mirror. He got out as Chairman just in
time for the day of reckoning to arrive. Bernanke
will get to ride the tiger that Greenspan left for
him, just as Paul Volcker left Greenspan the tiger
-- smaller and weaker -- in 1987.
MORE INFLATION
Greenspan argued that FED policy in his era did
not face the problem of price inflation that
Bernanke faces today.
- We were dealing in an environment back there
where inflation was easing. We could have acted
without the fear of stoking inflationary
pressures. You can't do that any more. And
therefore it's a different world.
If he were Pinocchio, his nose would have grown
six inches. Greenspan spent his entire career at
the FED warning against price inflation, which was
just around the corner. Only once do I recall that
he warned against deflation, and he refused even to
use the word. That was in his October, 1998
testimony after the New York FED had called
together New York banks that had lent billions to
Long Term Capital Management, Ltd., which was about
to go bankrupt. He warned against cascading cross
defaults. But he did not call this what it would
have been: mass deflation. Over and over in his
career, he warned that inflation was the economy's
main threat. Year after year, the FED inflated.
Inflation is always the problem because the Federal
Reserve System exists.
He thinks we are at long last entering the age
of inflation -- not the mamby-pamby inflation that
the FED has engineered ever since 1982, but the
real thing. The present credit crunch is not the
main problem.
- "We're going to get through this particular
credit crunch. We always do. This is a human
behavior phenomenon, and it will pass. The fever
will break and euphoria will start to come back
again," Greenspan says.
This is utter nonsense, and if he does not know
that it is nonsense, then he has become an amateur
psychologist rather than a professional economist.
Credit crunches are not human behavior problems.
They are fractional reserve banking problems. They
are the inevitable result of prior monetary
expansion.
In the very next paragraph, he admitted as much.
He predicted rising price inflation.
- But he does see clouds on the horizon. "Over
the long run, this is not going to be what our
problem is. Our problem over the long run is the
re-emergence of inflation," he says.
-
- "This is interesting because in your book,
your outlook on the broad future is pretty
gloomy. Interest rates going up, you say.
Inflation going up," Stahl says.
-
- "Yes. Indeed I have a line in the book, 'It
looks pretty gloomy,'" Greenspan agrees.
But why is price inflation inevitable? Stahl did
not pursue this on-screen. Inflation is inevitable
because the FED will create new fiat money in order
to overcome the existing credit crunch, as it
always does, and as it surely did under Greenspan
in 1987, 1990, and 2001.
The coming inflation is no more a problem of
human behavior than today's credit crunch is -- and
no less. Humans behave in terms of signals provided
by the external world, and the crucial signals
known as prices are deliberately, self-consciously
distorted by central bankers.
I am not arguing against Greenspan's prediction
of rising prices in general. I merely point out
that he refused to blame price inflation on its
source: the Federal Reserve System.
THE HOUSING BUBBLE
There is one exception to his prediction of
falling prices: real estate.
- Asked if he thinks this is going to have a
deep lasting effect throughout the economy, in
jobs, consumer and spending, Greenspan says,
"It's not clear yet. And it will not be clear
for quite a while. This is fundamentally,
originally caused by the flattening out of home
prices. And that is only now just
beginning."
- "Prices are going to fall further,"
Greenspan predicts.
-
- http://GaryNorth.com/snip/281.htm
-
- So, what are we to make of all this? He
says:
-
- 1. The FED did not cause a housing bubble.
The mortgage issuers did.
-
- 2. The present credit crunch is a human
behavior matter.
-
- 3. Home prices will fall further.
-
- 4. This, too, shall pass.
-
- 5. We are facing long-term inflation.
Here is my assessment:
- 1. The FED did cause a housing bubble. The
mortgage issuers acted the way they did because
the FED had lowered interest rates.
-
- 2. The present credit crunch is a human
behavior matter -- behavior in response to
monetary tightening by the FED, beginning the
month
- Greenspan departed: February, 2006.
-
- 3. Home prices will fall further.
-
- 4. This, too, shall pass.
-
- 5. We are facing long-term inflation.
On "60 Minutes," he said housing prices will
fall further. He was more specific in his interview
in the London "Financial Times."
- Mr. Greenspan said he would expect "as a
minimum, large single-digit" percentage declines
in US house prices from peak to trough and added
that he would not be surprised if the fall was
"in double digits".
The author of the article reminded readers that
Greenspan had refused as Chairman to call this
market a bubble.
- As Fed chairman, Mr. Greenspan had talked
about "froth" in the housing sector, but never
said there was a bubble in the market as a
whole. His successor Ben Bernanke has also
avoided the word "bubble".
-
- But Mr. Greenspan told the FT that froth
"was a euphemism for a bubble".
-
- He said he still thought froth -- a
collection of bubbles -- was a better
description, because of the variation in house
price appreciation in different
- local housing markets. But he said "all the
froth bubbles add up to an aggregate
bubble".
THE CREDIT CRUNCH
His description of the credit crunch in the
"Financial Times" was far less rosy than on "60
Minutes."
- The former Fed chairman said the current
turmoil in financial markets was "an accident
waiting to happen.
-
- He said the price of risk had fallen to
unsustainably low levels beforehand, with
investors addicted to asset-backed securities
that offered some additional yield over Treasury
bonds as if they were "cocaine". Mr. Greenspan
said this demand induced the big increase in the
origination of subprime mortgages by mortgage
brokers.
His audience on "60 Minutes," as well as the
interviewer, was not ready for a discussion of
asset-backed securities. The issue is risk. The
market had failed to assess the level of risk.
Yes, it had. But why? Why should entrepreneurs
make such a mistake? The business cycle theory
offered by Ludwig von Mises in 1912 gave the
answer: the central bank's inflation sent out false
signals to entrepreneurs. Low short-term interest
rates persuaded them that there was more capital
available than there really was. When entrepreneurs
at last discover this, there is a credit crunch.
This is now happening.
- The rise in defaults on subprime mortgages
was only the trigger that set off a broad
re-evaluation of risk, he argued.
-
- Mr. Greenspan said the off-balance sheet
investment vehicles that issued much of the
asset-backed commercial paper represented a
"savings and loans disaster waiting to happen"
because of the mismatch between their assets and
liabilities. Mr. Greenspan thought the issuance
of asset-backed commercial paper "is probably
not going to get back to where it was."
-
- They had "five-year maturity assets financed
with 30-day commercial paper", he said.
There it is, in plain English: the capital
markets have borrowed short and lent long.
Greenspan's comparison was correct. This practice
was also the cause of the S&L crisis of the
1980's.
- The former Fed chairman said collateralized
debt obligations - securities that slice up and
repackage loans to meet the risk-appetite of
different investors -- "will never get back to
the levels and structures that they were,
because now everybody knows you cannot price
them".
http://GaryNorth.com/snip/283.htm
CONCLUSION
Alan Greenspan has not come clean. He has not
come close to admitting that he presided over the
FED as a joint agent of the commercial banking
system, Wall Street, and the Federal government. He
does not admit that the FED has not attempted to
deliver stable money since about 1933. He has never
admitted that the FED under his administration
constantly returned to monetary inflation as a way
to forestall recession. He did not mention that
prices doubled under his era as Chairman, and
nobody asked him.
He gets softball interviews which help sell his
book. He has dropped FedSpeak, but he has not
abandoned convenient memory loss. The Establishment
media, which are also dependent on commercial
banking, the stock market, and the Federal
government, plays ball with him.
His general assessment is accurate, however.
Housing prices will continue to fall, probably in
the double digits. The credit crunch will subside,
due to FED intervention. Finally, the economy's
long-term threat is more inflation, just as it has
been since 1914.
Gary
North Archive
Dr.
Gary North earned a Ph.D. in history and is one of
America's keenest economic analysts and
commentators. He supports the Austrian school of
economics and is a previous assistant to
libertarian congressman Dr. Ron Paul. Visit his
website at http://garynorth.com.
To
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