|
April
13, 2009
Panic:
First Wall Street, Then Main Street
by Gary North, Ph.D.
We
have not yet seen panic on Main Street. The malls'
parking lots are full. Most yuppie restaurant
chains are still in business. Their local
restaurants may not be as full as they were a year
ago, but they are open for business. There are
still shoppers at Wal-Mart.
Unemployment is now increasing by leaps and
bounds. It rose from 7.1% in December 2008 to 7.2%
in January -- not too bad. Then came February:
8.1%. Then March: 8.5%. In one year, according to
the April 3 press release of the Bureau of Labor
Statistics, 5.3 million people became unemployed.
This was an increase of 3.4 percentage points. Most
of this increase has been in the past four
months.
Americans are uneasy. Those with pensions have
seen significant declines in their holdings. The
net worth of the median household declined by 23%
in 2008 -- an unprecedented fall in the post-War
era.
We have not yet seen panic. I think we will
before the end of 2009. If not in 2009, then in
2010.
By panic, I mean a sharp shift in people's
spending habits. I mean half-empty parking lots at
the mall. I mean a decline of at least 50% from
today's income at yuppie restaurants. People will
finally start saving again, if they can. Credit
card defaults will double. Already, the figure is
over 4%.
On
April 1, Moody's downgraded U.S. corporate debt by
$1.76 trillion. Moody's said this was the
largest single downgrade ever. This signals the
worst level of defaults since World War II. Moody's
chief economist, John Lenski, put it this way:
"Business sales and profits fell off the table in
general in the final quarter of last year and have
continued to deteriorate in the first quarter in
2009."
There are those in the financial forecasting
industry who say that the recession will end late
this year. None of these people forecast the
recession that began in December 2007, nor did they
predict the collapse of stocks. They say there is
light at the end of the tunnel.
PANIC ON WALL STREET
On April 6, Federal
Reserve Board member Kevin Warsh gave one of the
most forthright speeches I have read from any
FED Board member, ever. He was almost breathtaking
in what he admitted in front of a group of
high-level international investors. He titled his
speech, "The Panic of 2008."
This panic arrived 101 years after the famous
Panic of 1907, also known as the bankers' panic. It
was in the aftermath of that panic that the
Rockefeller and Morgan banking interests decided to
call a truce in order to lobby for the creation of
a central bank.
He began with a litany of problems -- problems
of recession.
- Deterioration in employment conditions.
Pullback in consumer spending. Decline of
industrial production. Retreat in capacity
utilization. Falling capital expenditures. These
measures are objective, all-too-familiar
indicators of recessions.
His speech contrasted recessions with panics.
Recessions are common. Panics are not.
- Fear. Breakdown in confidence. Market
capitulation. Financial turmoil. These words are
different, not just in degree but also in kind.
They are more normative, but no less
consequential to the real economy. They are
indicative of panic conditions. In panics, once
firmly held truths are no longer relied upon.
Articles of faith are upended. And the very
foundations of economies and markets are called
into question.
He believes that the panic of 2008 called the
entire banking system into question, and perhaps
more important, called into question the
reliability of contracts. He has in mind contracts
between financial institutions and the U.S.
government. Above all, the near bankruptcy of
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac and the bailout of
October called the financial structure into
question.
He said that the beliefs of economists have been
challenged.
- Some economists, market participants, and
historians -- not so long ago -- were prepared
to relegate these highly charged descriptions of
despair to the dustbin of history. Government
policies improved, understanding of economics
deepened, and markets found a more sustainable
equilibrium, or so it was thought.
This optimism was premature, he thinks. We have
now seen events that have called this facile
optimism into question.
- The encouraging news, I should note, is that
panics end. And this panic is showing meaningful
signs of abating.
MAIN STREET
The problem with this optimism is that he
confines his discussion of panic to Wall Street. It
was panic among the financial insiders. He does not
even mention the panic of the common American. He
therefore ignores the next phase if the panic, when
it moves from Wall Street to Main Street.
The enormous losses sustained by the financial
markets have made their way into the budgets of
Americans, but not on the order of magnitude
experienced by Wall Street. The common American was
not leveraged 30 to 1 in 2007. He was not subject
to margin calls, just so long as he maintained his
monthly payments. This was not true of Bear Stearns
and its clones in the hedge fund world. The average
man has no pension. He has only his job, and he has
not lost it yet.
Warsh describes events of 1907. They parallel
events in 2008. There was one overwhelming
difference: bank runs. In 1907, bank depositors
withdrew currency and did not re-deposit it. That
reversed the fractional reserve process. Bank
capital imploded. This did not happen in 2008, nor
can it. Depositors transfer deposits to different
banks. The total deposit base does not decline for
the system.
The bank runs of 2008 were executed by banks.
They have stashed money -- excess reserves -- with
the FED. The bankers have pulled the plug on the
fractional reserve process. They have not lent out
all the money that the FED's increase in its
monetary base would allow. Warsh does not mention
the problem of excess reserves.
- The current financial and economic turmoil
is marked by indicia of both recession and panic
conditions.
I don't use words like "indicia." I prefer
"indicators." But however one denotes them, the
indicators are bad. He compared the recession with
the recession of 1981-82. This is common these
days. But it neglected two fundamental
differences:
- 1. Unemployment went above 11% in 1982.
-
- 2. The savings rate went to 10%.
Neither of these events has taken place so far.
So, the recession has a way to go before it reaches
the level of despair and panic that we had in 1982.
Be patient. It will get there.
- Economic output, as measured by gross
domestic product, contracted at a rate of about
6-1/4 percent in the fourth quarter of 2008 and
is on track to contract sharply again in the
first quarter, which would put the current
contraction among the most severe post-World War
II recessions.
He thinks this decline is abating. This assumes
that the panic we saw in 2008 on Wall Street does
not play itself out on Main Street to the same
degree. If it does, the economy will go off a
cliff.
What about economic recovery? Warsh is not
optimistic.
- The panic conditions that have marked this
period may also have long-run implications. I
suspect that the process of an efficient
reallocation of capital and labor will prove
slower and more difficult than is typical after
recessions. Policymakers should be wary of
policies that make the economy still less
capable of the growth, productivity, and
employment trends that have marked the postwar
period.
Yet this is exactly what policymakers have done
so far. They have lurched from one expensive
bailout to another. The public is beginning to
perceive that the bailouts are for the banks, not
the voters. This has been the case so far. Warsh
does not mention this, but his speech indicates
that he understands it.
- Greater clarity as to policymakers'
objectives for financial intermediation would
likely prove very constructive to financial
markets. More consequentially, in my view, it
would improve the prospects for economic
performance.
Clarity? How can they be clear? That would be
political suicide. Their policies have had a sole
objective: to preserve the largest banks and
financial institutions on Wall Street. So far,
their policies have just barely kept the doors
open.
Meanwhile, Main Street is suffering losses --
not so bad as Wall Street's losses, but bad.
- In the household sector, Federal Reserve
data indicate that household net worth fell $11
trillion in 2008, or about 18 percent, the
largest annual decline recorded. . . . For the
median household, net worth is estimated to have
decreased at a greater rate -- 23 percent in
2008. Household balance sheets may have
contracted about another 7 percent in the first
quarter, and I am watching keenly for that trend
to change in subsequent quarters as part of the
recovery.
LOST FAITH
He understands that the general public is losing
faith in the system. Those of us who are Austrian
School economists think there is far more faith
remaining than the system deserves. But Warsh
senses that the masses are getting restless.
- As a result, households are questioning the
route to financial security. Homeownership is no
longer perceived to ensure low-risk capital
appreciation. And assurances by investment
managers to invest in "stocks for the long haul"
are being subjected to intense scrutiny.
Investors of all stripes -- sovereign wealth
funds, large long-only institutional investors,
private equity sponsors, hedge funds, and retail
investors -- are searching for new rules of
asset allocation and appropriate risk premiums
in an uncertain and unusual economic
environment.
In short, investors' confidence in the system
and its present rules has suffered a major
setback.
- Previously,
I argued that we were witnessing a
fundamental reassessment of the value of every
asset everywhere in the world. This diagnosis
seems truer, and still more troubling,
today.
He thinks that participants at the highest
levels have lost confidence.
- Market participants wonder whether the forms
of financial intermediation and functions of
financial institutions -- long connecting savers
with investors -- will be implemented in a
manner that will enhance, or reduce, economic
well-being. Some are questioning the efficacy of
the remaining vestiges of the existing financial
architecture and remain uncertain of the timing,
efficacy, and policy preferences for the
financial architecture that will ultimately
emerge. Surely, they applaud the goal of
policymakers to reform the financial system to
make it more durable through the cycle and less
susceptible to shocks. But some query whether
policy actions are, on balance, lessening or
stoking panic conditions.
I
have already offered my assessment. Between
early September and late October, the United States
economy moved to fascism. The government-business
partnership ratcheted up so far that the older
Keynesian model was abandoned.
THE RULE OF LAW
At stake is the rule of law. He sees this.
- Headlines have been dominated in recent
weeks by the legal rules that govern contracts.
To be sure, markets function best when economic
actors comport themselves in a manner consistent
with the rule of law. Fidelity to the rule of
law is not just some aphorism for a judicial
system to protect property right disputes among
private parties. Nor should it be just some
preachy truism of economic development for
emerging economies. Rather, it is the linchpin
of modern market economies like ours. And it
suffers its greatest blow when the governing
authorities are unwilling to uphold their end of
the bargain.
As a good bureaucrat on the Federal government's
payroll -- a FED Board member -- he affirms his
confidence:
- Nonetheless, despite some highly publicized
suggestions to the contrary, I remain highly
confident that the government will work
tirelessly to uphold its obligations.
Then he added: "Hewing to the rule of law,
however, may be the easier part." Why? Because more
is involved here than government rules. The fabric
of trust has been shred. What is this fabric? He
called them articles of faith.
- The panic bred by the loss of confidence in
the underlying financial architecture is
difficult to remedy beyond the purview of
statutes and regulations. A weighty accumulation
of unwritten, but no less critical, practices
and understandings governs behavior and
establishes expectations in market economies.
Over time, these informal understandings attract
deep and loyal followings by economic actors.
They become articles of faith.
I could not have put it any better. He went to
the heart of the matter in the change that took
place between September and October of 2008. The
old faith has been undermined at the highest
levels.
- Panics can thus be understood as periods in
which key articles of faith are cast in doubt.
How does this happen? After long periods of
economic prosperity -- in the most recent case,
the so-called Great Moderation -- articles of
faith accumulate.
The boom fosters faith in the system. He
recognizes that what took place in 2008 was not
some typical recession. Something far more
fundamental has changed.
- Some of these articles of faith are rooted
in government policies; others develop as a
matter of private practice. Regardless of their
cause and contour, when faith is undermined, the
resulting fear and ambiguity can accelerate the
deterioration in economic performance.
What happened last year? The senior financial
institutions performed so poorly that faith has
been undermined.
- Some key articles of faith have been
undermined with respect to some financial
institutions. And that is as it should be.
Risk-management failures at some large,
systemically significant financial institutions
are now legendary. In some cases, investors and
counterparties came to rely to their detriment
on these entities and their financial
wherewithal.
All true. The question is this: "How do these
institutions get back what they squandered?" Here,
he gets vague.
- Market participants appear equally uncertain
about the nature, objective, and duration of the
relationship between the government and
financial institutions.
He sees the bailout of Fannie and Freddie as the
archetypes of confusion.
- These efforts, while necessary and well
intended, have not completely resolved the
uncertainty around the GSEs to market
participants. Indeed, even after extraordinary
actions most recently by the Federal Reserve to
improve liquidity and market functioning in the
agency debt markets, confidence in the GSEs is
less than markets were long accustomed to before
this period began.
CONCLUSION
His conclusion points to a restructuring of the
present financial system.
- To accelerate the formation of a new
financial architecture, the official sector
should outline and defend a positive vision for
financial firms and welcome private capital's
return. The nature and terms of the relationship
between financial firms and the official sector
should not be left in limbo.
- He has sounded a warning: the
decision-makers at the top are preparing to
re-structure the financial system. I have said
that the deal was done last fall. What is not
yet clear to anyone, at any level, is how this
re-structuring will work. We are in uncharted
waters.
- Financial stability demands policy
stability. The official sector's policy
preferences must be communicated clearly,
credibly, and consistently and backed by
concrete action.
The Federal Reserve was a deliberate mystery
from 1913 until today. The heart of the monetary
system is concealment.
- Finally, and perhaps most important,
policymakers across the government must be ever
mindful of the long-term consequences of their
actions.
Here is my conclusion, as John Wayne said in
The
Searchers: "That'll be the day."
Gary
North Archive
Dr.
Gary North earned a Ph.D. in history and is one of
America's keenest economic analysts and
commentators. He supports the Austrian school of
economics and is a previous assistant to
libertarian congressman Dr. Ron Paul. Visit his
website at http://garynorth.com.
To
subscribe to Gary North's Reality Check go to
http://www.dailyreckoning.com/sub/GetReality.cfm
If
you enjoyed this essay and would like to read more
of Gary's writing please visit his website at
http://www.garynorth.com
or http://www.freebooks.com
Articles
& Essays Index
Because
The Radical Academy publishes essays and articles
on its website does not imply acceptance or
approval of the comments or opinions expressed by
the author of the material. Nor is the Academy
responsible for any misrepresentation of the facts
included. It is your job to be a critical
reader.
|